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Abstract
Plaintext awareness is a property of a public-key encryption scheme intended
to capture the idea that the only way to produce a valid ciphertext is to take a
message and encrypt it. The idea is compelling, but the devil, as always, is in
the details. The established definition of plaintext awareness in the standard
model is known as PA2 plaintext awareness and was introduced by Bellare
and Palacio. We propose a modified definition of plaintext awareness, which
we call 2PA2, in which the arbitrary stateful plaintext creators of the PA2
definition are replaced with a choice of two fixed stateless plaintext creators.
We show that under reasonable conditions our new definition is equivalent to
the standard one. We also adapt techniques used by Teranishi and Ogata to
show that no encryption scheme which allows arbitrarily long messages can be
PA2 plaintext aware, a disadvantage which our new definition does not appear
to share.
Dent has shown that a variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme
based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is PA2 plaintext aware under the Diffie-
Hellman Knowledge (DHK) assumption. We present a generalisation of this
assumption to arbitrary subset membership problems, which we call the Sub-
set Witness Knowledge (SWK) assumption, and use it to show that the generic
Cramer-Shoup and Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption schemes based on hash
proof systems are plaintext aware. In the case of the Diffie-Hellman problem,
the SWK assumption is exactly the Diffie-Hellman Knowledge assumption,
but we also discuss several other possible instantiations of this assumption.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Definitions
Plaintext awareness was first defined by Bellare and Rogaway [4] as a device to
prove the OAEP scheme was IND-CCA2 secure. The idea is that an encryption
scheme is plaintext aware if the only way to generate a valid ciphertext is to
take a message and encrypt it.
The original form of the definition relied heavily on the random oracle
model and could not easily be generalised to the standard model. The first
definition of plaintext awareness in the standard model was proposed by Bel-
lare and Palacio [3]. In this formulation, the plaintext extractor is given the
random tape used by the plaintext creator instead of the oracle queries. We
will only consider this and related standard-model definitions in this work.
In either the random oracle or standard model, the plaintext extractor is
given enough information to “follow” the execution of the ciphertext creator.
One may think of the ciphertext creator as trying to construct a ciphertext
with the extractor watching over its shoulder: if the ciphertext creator takes
a message and encrypts it, the extractor sees this and can simply output this
message. On the other hand, plaintext awareness means that there is no way
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to produce a valid ciphertext without “knowing” the underlying plaintext,
so if the ciphertext creator does not encrypt some known message, then the
plaintext extractor may confidently assert that the ciphertext is invalid.
Bellare et al. [2] later studied plaintext awareness in as a property in its
own right, but in order to prove that an encryption scheme which is IND-
CPA secure and plaintext aware is IND-CCA2 secure, they had to capture
the adversary’s ability to obtain ciphertexts that were produced by a third
party. To this end, they augmented the model with a “plaintext creator”
which creates messages which the adversary does not know, but may have
some influence over. These messages are then encrypted before being returned
to the adversary. This stronger definition is called PA2 plaintext awareness.
Despite this, the original proof of security for OAEP went unchallenged in the
published literature until four papers relating to OAEP appeared in CRYPTO
2001. Manger demonstrated a chosen ciphertext attack against the PKCS
standard version of RSA OAEP [23]. This attack relied on a side-channel,
specifically the ability to distinguish two different types of decryption error.
Shoup demonstrated that the there is no black box proof that an encryption
scheme which is both IND-CPA secure and PA1 plaintext aware is IND-CCA2
secure. He also presented a modified version of OAEP, called OAEP+ which
is IND-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model. Fujisaki et al. [16] used
algebraic properties of the RSA function to give a proof of security for RSA-
OAEP, despite the weaknesses in the generic OAEP construction. Boneh [6]
used algebraic properties of both the RSA and Rabin trapdoor functions to
show that a construction much simpler than the full version of OAEP achieves
IND-CCA2 security when instantiated with either of those trapdoor functions.
When Bellare and Palacio introduced the standard model definitions of
9
plaintext awareness [3], they showed that a simplified form of the Cramer-
Shoup encryption scheme is PA1 plaintext aware under a non-standard as-
sumption called the Diffie-Hellman knowledge (DHK) assumption, also known
as the knowledge of exponent assumption, which was first introduced by
Damg˚ard [13]. Dent later showed that the full Cramer-Shoup scheme is PA2
plaintext aware under the same assumption. Since these schemes were already
known to be IND-CCA2 secure, plaintext awareness does not serve its original
function as a method to prove that an encryption scheme is IND-CCA2 secure
in these cases, but it has been studied as a property of independent interest.
Raimondo et al. gave a construction of an authentication and key exchange
protocol which relies on the plaintext awareness of an underlying encryption
scheme [30]. Apart from this and the original OAEP papers, plaintext aware-
ness has remained mostly of theoretical interest. Of the theoretical literature,
one of the more interesting results is by Teranishi and Ogata [34], who proved
that any encryption scheme which is one way and PA2 plaintext aware must
be IND-CPA (and hence IND-CCA2) secure. We will return to and extend
this result in Chapter2.
1.1 Probability and Statistics
1.1.1 Statistical Distance
Statistical distance is a metric for comparing two probability distributions.
It is sometimes useful in provable security because substituting one random
variable with another in any experiment will change the success probability
by at most the statistical distance between the two variables, a property we
prove as Lemma 1.2.1.
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Definition 1.1.1 (Statistical Distance). Let x and y be random variables
taking values on a finite set S. We define the statistical distance between x
and y as
∆[x, y] =
1
2
∑
s∈S
|Pr[x = s]− Pr[y = s]| .
Lemma 1.1.2. Let x and y be random variables taking values on a finite set
S, and let T ⊆ S. Then
∆[x, y] ≥ |Pr[x ∈ T ]− Pr[y ∈ T ]| .
Additionally, there exists a set T ′ such that
∆[x, y] = |Pr[x ∈ T ′]− Pr[y ∈ T ′]| .
The proof of this is straight-forward and is given as Theorem 6.15 of [33].
Lemma 1.1.3. If f is a function on the set S, then the following inequality
holds:
∆[Pr[f(x)],Pr[f(y)]] ≤ ∆[x, y] .
The proof of this is straight-forward and is given as Theorem 6.16 of [33].
Lemma 1.1.4. Let x1, . . . , x`, y1, . . . , y` be mutually independent random vari-
ables. Then
∆[(x1, . . . , x`), (y1, . . . , y`)] ≤
∑`
i=1
∆[xi, yi] .
The proof of this theorem is given as Theorem 6.18 of [33].
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1.1.2 Conditional Probability and Experiments
We will use the following notation for experiments. For an event A and a
sequence of statements s, Pr[A : s] denotes the probability that event A occurs
after running s. For example, P = Pr[x = 0 : y
R← {0, 1}n;x← M(y)] means:
let y
R← {0, 1}n, let x ← M(y), and let P = Pr[x = 0]. This notation
should not be confused with the conditional probability Pr[A|B] which is the
probability that event A occurs given that event B occurs.
1.2 Algorithms and Complexity
Formally, we define an algorithm as a Turing machine which halts on all input.
However, for practical reasons we note that any reasonable modern program-
ming language is Turing complete, so we will specify algorithms in pseudo-code
that resembles high-level compiled or interpreted languages. For simplicity, we
will assume that all computations are done in binary, and all inputs and out-
puts of algorithms are represented as binary strings. We will also assume that
tuples of binary strings can be encoded in an unambiguous way, so that, for
example, (001, 00) is distinct from (00, 100).
An algorithm may be deterministic or probabilistic. A deterministic al-
gorithm uses no randomness, while a probabilistic algorithm requires access
to a source of randomness. We will model this as a Turing machine with,
in addition to its working tape(s), a read-only tape which is initialised with
an infinite sequence of bits chosen uniformly and independently at random,
which we will call a random tape. We present notation used for algorithms in
Table 1.2.
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Notation Meaning
x← value Variable x is assigned the value value.
x
R← S Variable x is assigned a value chosen uniformly at random
from the finite set S.
y ← A(x) Variable y is assigned the output of probabilistic algorithm
A when run on input x with a random tape R[A], an infinite
string of bits chosen independently at random from {0, 1}.
We may consider deterministic algorithms to be probabilis-
tic algorithms which simply do not use their random tape.
y ← AO(x) Variable y is assigned the output of algorithm A when run
on input x and with access to the oracle O.
y ← A(x;R) Variable y is assigned the output of probabilistic algorithm
A when run on input x with the specific random tape R.
When using this notation we must ensure that R is suffi-
ciently long.
y ← AO(x;R) Variable y is assigned the output of probabilistic algorithm
A when run on input x with the specific random tape R
and with access to the oracle O. When using this notation
we must ensure that R is sufficiently long.
Table 1.1: Notation for Algorithms
Algorithms may run other algorithms as subroutines. The controlling algo-
rithm may “suspend” an algorithm that is running as a subroutine, by saving
the subroutine’s working tapes and head state into a variable. In principle
the controlling algorithm could do this in response to any event, such as after
a fixed number of operations, but typically the event in question will be a
particular oracle query. We write this as follows:
function B(x)
Run x← A(y)
if Trigger Event Occurs then
state← Suspend(A)
x← Resume(A, state)
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This ability may be used to “rewind” an algorithm but in this work it will be
mainly useful to pass the working state of a subroutine between algorithms.
For ease of notation, we will sometimes set a state variable, for example state←
(x, y, z;R), and call Resume(A, state). When we do this, we mean the same
as running A on inputs (x, y, z) with random tape R.
Sometimes we will consider oracle-algorithms, i.e. algorithms which have
access to one or more oracles. The algorithm may “query” an oracle, by
writing an input to a dedicated “oracle tape”, then changing to a particular
head state. In a single step, the oracle will then compute its output value
and write that to the oracle tape. Sometimes the value returned by the oracle
could be computed from the inputs given to the algorithm itself, but there
may be no known way for the algorithm to do so in polynomial-time. On
the other hand, we will sometimes consider oracles that return values that are
independent of all other inputs to the algorithm. When writing an algorithm
that has access to an oracle O, we will write “y ← Query O(x)” to denote
the action of calling the oracle on input x and storing the result in variable y.
We use this notation to distinguish an oracle call from running an algorithm
as a subroutine. Algorithms which run oracle-algorithms as subroutines must
respond to all oracle queries. We write this as follows:
Run x← AO(y)
if A queries O(z) then
Do Something
return w
We will sometimes consider stateful algorithms. This means that the algo-
rithm takes a value state as one of its inputs, and returns an updated value of
state as part of its output. This should not be confused with suspending and
resuming an algorithm that is being run as a subroutine.
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Lemma 1.2.1. Let A be an algorithm which takes inputs (x, y1, . . . , yn), and
random tape R where x is independent of (y1, . . . , yn, R). Then for any random
variables x, x′, y1, . . . , yn, ∆[A(x, y1, . . . , yn;R),A(x′, y1, . . . , yn;R)] ≤ ∆[x, x′].
Proof. Since R is fixed, A(·;R) defines a function. By Lemma 1.1.3,
∆[A(x, y1, . . . ,yn;R),A(x′, y1, . . . , yn;R)] ≤
∆[(x, y1, . . . , yn, R), (x
′, y1, . . . , yn, R)] .
By Lemma 1.1.4,
∆[(x, y1, . . . , yn, R), (x
′, y1, . . . , yn, R)] ≤ ∆[x, x′] ,
since
∆[(y1, . . . , yn, R), (y1, . . . , yn, R)] = 0 .
Putting it together we see that:
∆[A(x, y1, . . . , yn;R),A(x′, y1, . . . , yn;R)] ≤ ∆[x, x′] .
Variable Types
All variables are either integers, strings or lists. We do not explicitly specify
variable types, but employ common sense to determine what type a variable
is1. Unless otherwise specified, integers are all initialised to 0, strings initialised
to the empty string ε, and lists initialised to the empty list ().
1Computer scientists sometimes call this “duck typing”, presumably on the basis that if
it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s safe to cast it to an integer.
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Lists
We write List = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) to specify a list consisting of the values
x1, . . . , xn. We write “Append x to List” to append the value x to the end of
the list List. List[k] denotes the kth entry of the list. The first element of the
list is List[1] – there is no List[0] – and |List| to denotes the number of entries
of the list or, equivalently, the index of the final entry.
1.2.1 Notation for computational complexity
Given functions f, g : S → R, where S is either R or Z, and g(x) is non-
negative for all x ∈ S we define the following:
Definition 1.2.2 (Big and Little O-notation). f = O(g) if there exists c, d ∈
R such that |f(x)| ≤ cg(x) for all x ≥ d. f = o(g) if f(x)/g(x)→ 0 as x→∞
Definition 1.2.3 (Negligible). A function f is negligible if for all n ∈ N,
f = O
(
1
xn
)
. We say that a function f(x, y) is negligible in x if the function
gy(x) = f(x, y) is negligible. Note that f may be negligible in x for some values
of y but not others.
Definition 1.2.4 (Running Time). We say that an algorithm A has running
time TA(λ) if for all x ∈ {0, 1}λ and for all random tapes R ∈ {0, 1}∞, A(x;R)
terminates within TA(λ) steps, and there exists x ∈ {0, 1}λ and R ∈ {0, 1}∞
such that A(x;R) takes TA(λ) steps to complete. This latter condition is to
ensure that the running time is uniquely defined.
The number of random bits used by a probabilistic algorithm is bounded
by its running time, since reading each random bit uses one operation. This
means that if we run a probabilistic algorithm A on input x, we may use a
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finite random string R ∈ {0, 1}m as the random tape, as long as we ensure
that it is sufficiently long; typically we will chose m to be the running time
TA(|x|).
Definition 1.2.5 (Polynomial-Time). An algorithm A is polynomial-time if
TA(λ) = O(λn) for some n ∈ N.
Throughout this work, we will describe the running time of algorithms in
terms of the security parameter, λ, rather than the length of the input to the
algorithms. In practise, this does not make any difference, since in all our
experiments at least one of the algorithms takes as input a string of length
λ, and all subsequent algorithms take outputs from previous algorithms as
their inputs. Since we only distinguish between polynomial-time and super
polynomial-time algorithms, and the set of polynomials is closed under com-
position, each algorithm is polynomial-time in the input length if and only if
it is polynomial-time in the security parameter.
1.3 Public-Key Encryption Schemes
1.3.1 Definitions and Notation
A public-key encryption scheme, originally defined by Diffie and Hellman [15],
consists of three algorithms:
• KeyGen: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which takes a se-
curity parameter 1λ as input and returns a pair of keys (pk, sk). The
public key pk is used by the sender to encrypt, and the private key sk
is used by the recipient to decrypt. Each public key is associated with a
message space MsgSp(pk) and a ciphertext space CiphSp(pk).
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• Encrypt: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which takes a pair
(pk,m) as input, where pk is a public key and m ∈ MsgSp(pk) is a
message, and returns a ciphertext C ∈ CiphSp(pk).
• Decrypt: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which takes a pair
(sk, C) as input, where sk is a private key and C ∈ CiphSp(pk) is a
ciphertext, and returns a message m ∈MsgSp(pk) or the distinguished
“reject” symbol ⊥, indicating the ciphertext is invalid.
Since |pk| and |sk| are both polynomially bounded in λ, and the set of
polynomials is closed under composition, it follows that the running time of
Encrypt and Decrypt is bounded by a polynomial in λ. Of course, there is no
lower bound on |pk|, but for any algorithm KeyGen, we may trivially modify
it to pad pk and sk with the value 1λ. In some sense, this means it does not
matter whether we consider Encrypt to be polynomially bounded in |pk| or λ.
We also note that while the running time of Encrypt may be polynomial in
|m|, for any practical encryption scheme the running time of Encrypt will be
at most linear in λ.
MsgSp(pk) and CiphSp(pk) should be polynomial-time decidable, i.e.
there is a polynomial-time algorithm which takes a public key pk and bitstring
m as input, and returns 1 if m ∈MsgSp(pk) and 0 otherwise, and similarly
for CiphSp(pk). Note that we did not require that for all C ∈ CiphSp(pk),
there exists m ∈ MsgSp(pk) and r ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that Encrypt(pk,m;R) =
C. In other words, we think of CiphSp(pk) more like the co-domain of the
encryption algorithm than the range.
A public-key encryption scheme must satisfy the following soundness prop-
erty: For all λ ∈ N, for all (pk, sk) ∈ ({0, 1}∗)2 such that Pr[KeyGen(1λ) =
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(pk, sk)] > 0 and for all m ∈MsgSp(pk):
Pr[Decrypt(sk,Encrypt(pk,m)) = m] = 1 .
1.3.2 Security of Public-Key Encryption Schemes
We will define notions of security in terms of experiments performed on adver-
saries. An adversary is modelled as a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm,
or in some cases a tuple of such algorithms. We say that A = (A1, . . . ,An) is
polynomial-time if A1, . . . ,An are all polynomial-time.
Indistinguishability of Ciphertexts
The IND-CPA definition was proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [18], who
called it polynomial security. Naor and Yung [25] proposed the IND-CCA1
model, and the IND-CCA2 model was proposed by Rackoff and Simon [29].
An adversary against the IND security of a public-key encryption scheme
Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time al-
gorithms A = (A1,A2), where A1 takes a public key pk as input, and returns
two messages m0,m1 ∈ MsgSp(pk) such that |m0| = |m1|, and some state
information state and A2 takes a ciphertext C∗ ∈ CiphSp(pk) and the value
state that was returned by A1 as input and returns a single bit b′. We now
describe the IND experiment:
ExptIND−ATK−bΠ,A (λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
(m0,m1, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,mb)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
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A1 and A2 have access to an oracle Decrypt, which takes a ciphertext C ∈
CiphSp(pk) and returns Decrypt(sk, C). We consider three attack models.
In the chosen plaintext attack (CPA) model, neither A1 nor A2 may make
any decryption oracle queries. In the (non-adaptive) chosen ciphertext at-
tack model (CCA1 or lunch-time attack), A1 may query the decryption oracle
Decrypt but A2 may not query the decryption oracle. In the adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack (CCA2) model, A1 and A2 may both query the decryption
oracle, but A2 may not query the decryption oracle on C∗.
We define the IND-ATK advantage of A as
AdvIND−ATKA (λ) = |Pr[ExptIND−ATK−1Π,A (λ) = 1]− Pr[ExptIND−ATK−0Π,A (λ) = 1]|
where ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA1,CCA2}.
Definition 1.3.1 (IND-ATK). A public key encryption scheme Π = (KeyGen,
Encrypt,Decrypt) is IND-ATK secure if for any polynomial-time IND-ATK
adversary A, the advantage AdvIND−ATKA (λ) is negligible in λ.
One-Wayness
This definition of a one-way encryption scheme was originally proposed by
Rabin [28]. An adversary against the one-wayness of an encryption scheme
Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) with a finite message space is a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A which takes a public key pk and ciphertext C ∈
CiphSp(pk) as input, and returns a message m′ ∈ MsgSp(pk). We now
describe the OW experiment for an adversary A:
ExptOW−CPAΠ,A (λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
m
R←MsgSp(pk)
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C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,m)
m′ ← A(pk, C∗)
if m′ = m then
return 1
else
return 0
We define the advantage of A as:
AdvOW−CPAA (λ) = Pr[Expt
OW−CPA
Π,A (λ) = 1] .
Definition 1.3.2 (OW-CPA). A public key encryption scheme Π = (KeyGen,
Encrypt,Decrypt) is OW-CPA secure if for any polynomial-time OW-CPA ad-
versary A, the advantage AdvOW−CPAA (λ) is negligible in λ.
One could give corresponding definitions for OW-CCA1 and OW-CCA2
but we will not need them in this work.
1.3.3 Plaintext Awareness
Loosely speaking, Bellare and Rogaway defined an encryption scheme to be
plaintext aware in the random oracle model if for any algorithm A (known as
a ciphertext creator) that outputs a ciphertext C, there is another algorithm
A∗ (known as a plaintext extractor) that takes C and the list of random
oracle queries made by A as input and returns the underlying message, if
there is one. This definition could be adapted to the standard model, since
the plaintext extractor relies on the random oracle queries, so in Bellare and
Palacio’s standard model definition [3], they supply the random tape of A to
the ciphertext creator. Their definitions are as follows:
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PA1 Plaintext Awareness
Formally, we consider two experiments. In both cases, the ciphertext creatorA
is given a public key pk and outputs a bitstring x. The games are distinguished
by the “decryption oracle” to which A has access. A may query the decryption
oracle on any ciphertext C ∈ MsgSp(pk). In the PA1-Real experiment, the
oracle will return Decrypt(sk, C). In the PA1-Fake experiment, the oracle will
compute (m, stateA∗) ← A∗(pk, C,R[A], stateA∗), where stateA∗ is A∗’s state
variable and R[A] is the random tape of A.2 The oracle then returns m to A.
The encryption scheme is plaintext aware if the string xreal returned by A
in the real experiment is computationally indistinguishable from the output
xfake of A in the fake experiment, or in other words, no polynomial time
distinguishing algorithm D can distinguish xreal from xfake. We present these
two experiments below:
ExptPA1−RealΠ,A,P,D (λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run xreal ← ADecrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
b← D(xreal)
return b
ExptPA1−FakeΠ,A,A∗,P,D(λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run xfake ← ADecrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateA∗)← A∗(pk, C,R[A], stateA∗)
return m
b← D(xfake)
return b
2Strictly speaking, we define R[A] as the first TA(λ) bits of the random tape, where TA
is the running time of A. However, we will refer to this as simply the random tape of A for
clarity.
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Definition 1.3.3 (PA1 Plaintext Awareness). A public-key encryption scheme
Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is PA1 plaintext aware if for all PA1 ciphertext
creators A there exists a polynomial-time plaintext extractor A∗ such that for
all polynomial-time distinguishing algorithms D, the advantage
AdvPA1A,A∗,D(λ) = |Pr[ExptPA1−RealΠ,A,P,D (λ) = 1]− Pr[ExptPA1−FakeΠ,A,A∗,P,D(λ) = 1]|
is negligible in λ.
PA2 Plaintext Awareness
Bellare and Palacio [3] addressed the need to consider ciphertexts obtained
from third parties in their standard model formulation of plaintext awareness
by defining a a standard model version of PA2 plaintext awareness. Like
the random oracle model definition, the model is augmented with an Encrypt
oracle and an algorithm P called a plaintext creator. P takes a public key
pk, a bitstring s and a state variable stateP as input, and returns a message
m ∈ MsgSp(pk) and a new state stateP . The Encrypt oracle takes a string
s as input, and computes (m, stateP) ← P(pk, s, stateP). It then computes
C ← Encrypt(pk,m), appends C to a list Clist and returns C. This ensures
that A may influence the distribution of messages (by choosing inputs for P)
without necessarily knowing the exact message that was encrypted. A may
also make Decrypt queries as in the PA1 definition, but it may not query
Decrypt(C) for any C ∈ Clist. In the PA2-Fake experiment, the plaintext
extractor A∗ is also given the list Clist to enable it to follow the execution of
A as before.
We present the PA2 experiments below:
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ExptPA2−RealΠ,A,P,D (λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
(m, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
b← D(x)
return b
ExptPA2−FakeΠ,A,A∗,P,D(λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateA∗)← A∗(pk, C,R[A],Clist, stateA∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
(m, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
b← D(x)
return b
Definition 1.3.4 (PA2 Plaintext Awareness). A public key encryption scheme
Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is PA2 plaintext aware if for all polynomial-
time ciphertext creators A, there exists a polynomial-time plaintext extractor
A∗ such that for all polynomial-time plaintext creators P and polynomial-time
distinguishing algorithms D, the advantage
AdvPA2Π,A,A∗,P,D(λ) = |Pr[ExptPA2−RealΠ,A,P,D (λ) = 1]− Pr[ExptPA2−FakeΠ,A,A∗,P,D(λ) = 1]|
is negligible in λ.
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The following theorem was proved by Bellare and Palacio [3]. We call this
theorem the fundamental theorem of plaintext awareness, because it provided
the original motivation for the study of plaintext awareness3.
Theorem 1.3.5 (Fundamental Theorem of Plaintext Awareness). Let Π =
(KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a public-key encryption scheme. If Π is IND-
CPA secure and PA2 plaintext aware then it is IND-CCA2 secure.
Remark 1.3.6. The definitions above are sometimes collectively known as com-
putational plaintext awareness, in contrast with stronger notions where the
output of the ciphertext creator must be statistically or perfectly indistin-
guishable in the real and fake experiments. In this work, we focus only on
computational notions of plaintext awareness, as this is the weakest (and thus
easiest to achieve) of these three definitions, but it is sufficient for the funda-
mental theorem to hold.
Dent [14] introduced the following modified definition which he used to
prove the PA2 plaintext awareness of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme.
Definition 1.3.7 (PA+). For any plaintext awareness definition PA (PA1,
PA2), we define a new definition PA+ (PA1+, PA2+) by adding a random-
ness oracle Randomness, which takes no input and returns a random bit. The
plaintext extractor is altered so that it takes a list Rlist of all bits returned by the
randomness oracle as one of its inputs, i.e. A∗(pk, C,R[A],Rlist,Clist, stateA∗).
Note that any PA+ definition is at least as strong as the corresponding PA
definition, since a PA plaintext creator may be regarded as a PA+ plaintext
creator which does not use the randomness oracle.
3More accurately, the corresponding “fundamental theorem of random oracle model
plaintext awareness” motivated the study of plaintext awareness, but we do not study the
random oracle model plaintext awareness here.
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The idea behind this definition is that in the standard PA2 definition the
plaintext extractor, which knows the code of the adversary and its random-
ness, can determine the past and present states of the adversary. Interestingly,
because it knows the entire random tape of the adversary it can predict what
the adversary would do after being given a particular message by the plaintext
creator. In principle, this allows the plaintext creator to chose its responses
based on what the adversary will do with them. The randomness oracle pre-
vents the plaintext extractor from using this sort of strategy, because the
adversary can get new randomness that the plaintext extractor has not yet
seen.
These definitions parallel two possible interpretations of probabilistic al-
gorithms. We defined probabilistic algorithms as Turing machines that have
access to a tape containing randomly selected bits, but alternatively, we could
have defined them as Turing machines with a randomness oracle, or an opera-
tion that writes a random bit into the current tape square. For the purposes of
algorithms operating in isolation, it makes no difference which interpretation
we choose; in the setting of plaintext awareness where the plaintext extractor
gets access to the randomness used by the ciphertext creator, the difference
emerges. We will relate PA2 with PA2+ in Chapter 2.
1.3.4 Special-Form: Notational Convenience for Plain-
text Awareness
When constructing a plaintext extractor A∗ for a plaintext creator A, it will
occasionally be useful to give standard names to the following variables:
• Elist is the list of encryption queries A makes.
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• Clist is the corresponding list of ciphertexts returned by the encryption
oracle.
• Dlist is the list of decryption queries A makes.
• Mlist is the corresponding list of messages returned by the decryption
oracle.
Of these, only Clist is given as an input to the plaintext extractor in the
PA2 experiment. However, all of these values can be computed from the
information available to the plaintext extractor in a standard way. In or-
der to show that an encryption scheme is PA2 plaintext aware, it suffices
to construct a plaintext extractor Aˆ∗ of a special-form4 which takes as in-
put pk, C,R[A],Rlist,Clist,Elist,Dlist,Mlist and a state variable stateAˆ∗ , and
returns a message m ∈ MsgSp(pk) and a new state stateAˆ∗ . In some cases,
passing these values as input can make describing the plaintext extractor sub-
stantially clearer, so although we only use this technique once, we believe it is
potentially useful for other plaintext awareness proofs so we have included it
on its own merit.
Given a special-form plaintext extractor Aˆ∗, we construct a normal-form
plaintext extractor A∗ as follows:
function A∗(pk, C,R[A],Rlist,Clist, state∗A)
if stateA∗ = ε then
stateA ← (pk;R)
else
Parse stateA∗ as (nr, ne, nd,Elist,Dlist,Mlist, stateA, stateAˆ∗)
Resume AEncrypt,Decrypt,Randomness(stateA)
if |Mlist| > 0 then
Return Mlist[|Mlist|] to A’s previous query.
4We distinguish special-form plaintext extractors by making them wear dunce hats, be-
cause they are too lazy to compute these values for themselves.
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if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
ne ← ne + 1
Append s to Elist
return Clist[ne]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Append C to Dlist
(m, stateA∗)← Aˆ∗(pk, C,R[A],Rlist,Clist,Elist,Dlist,Mlist, stateAˆ∗)
Append m to Mlist
stateA ← Suspend(A)
stateA∗ ← (nr, ne, nd,Elist,Dlist,Mlist, stateA, stateAˆ∗)
return (m, stateA∗)
We will now show by induction that the values of Elist, Dlist, and Mlist
computed above are correct: i.e, they are the same as the encryption queries,
decryption queries, and the corresponding responses to the decryption queries
that were made by A in the ExptPA2+Fake
Π,A,Aˆ∗,P,D.
Suppose that the values computed by A∗ prior to the the ith decryption
query are correct. A∗ simulates a run of A using the same inputs and the same
randomness, so it behaves the same as the instance of A ran by the challenger.
In particular, the values of Elist and Dlist collected by A∗ are identical to their
real values in ExptPA2+FakeΠ,A,A∗,P,D. This means that the inputs to Aˆ∗ are correct.
Mlist is correct by definition, since it consists of the messages returned to A
by the plaintext extractor.
We emphasise that a special-form plaintext extractor receives R[A] as
usual, so it could in principle compute Elist,Dlist and Mlist for itself. In par-
ticular, when using a special-form extractor in a proof, one may not substitute
these values for computationally indistinguishable values, since Aˆ∗ may always
verify their correctness using R[A].
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1.4 Symmetric Encryption Schemes
We will need to consider symmetric encryption schemes when we study the
plaintext-awareness properties of the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme in Chapter 5.
The definitions we use are based on those of Cramer and Shoup [12]. Cramer
and Shoup called the primitive we describe one-time symmetric-key encryp-
tion, though it is now more commonly known as a Data Encapsulation Mech-
anism or DEM.
1.4.1 Definitions and Notation
A DEM Σ parametrised by a security parameter λ consists of two algorithms:
• A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm enc which takes a key κ ∈
{0, 1}`(λ) and a message m ∈MsgSp(λ) as input, and returns a cipher-
text χ ∈ CiphSp(λ).
• A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm dec which takes a key κ ∈
{0, 1}`(λ) and a ciphertext χ ∈ CiphSp(λ) as input, and returns a mes-
sage m ∈ CiphSp(λ) or the distinguished reject symbol ⊥, which indi-
cates that the ciphertext is invalid.
where ` : N → N is called a key-length function, MsgSp(λ) is the message
space and CiphSp(λ) is the ciphertext space. Note that the message and
ciphertext spaces depend only on the security parameter λ, unlike the case of
public-key encryption where the message and ciphertext spaces may depend
on the public key pk. As in the public-key case, MsgSp(λ) and CiphSp(λ)
should be polynomial-time decidable.
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We require that for all λ ∈ N, for all κ ∈ {0, 1}`(λ) and m ∈MsgSp(λ),
dec(κ, enc(κ,m)) = m.
1.4.2 Security of DEMs
We will use two security properties of DEMs:
One-time IND-CCA2 Security of DEMs
An adversary A = (A1,A2) against the one-time IND security of a DEM
Σ = (enc, dec) is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms where A1
takes a security parameter 1λ as input and returns two messages (m0,m1) ∈
MsgSp(λ) such that |m0| = |m1| and some state information state, and A2
takes input a ciphertext χ∗ ∈ CiphSp(λ) and the value state that was returned
by A1 as input and returns a single bit b′. We now describe the OT-IND
experiment:
ExptOT−IND−CCA2−bΣ,A (λ)
κ
R← {0, 1}`(λ)
(m0,m1, state)← A1()
χ∗ ← enc(κ,mb)
b′ ← Adec(κ, · )2 (χ∗, state)
return b′
A2 has access to an oracle dec, which takes a ciphertext χ ∈ CiphSp(λ) as
input and returns dec(κ, χ). A2 may not query the decryption oracle on χ∗.
Note that A1 does not have access to any oracles.
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We define the one-time IND-CCA2 advantage of A as
AdvOT−IND−CCA2Σ,A (λ) = |Pr[ExptOT−IND−CCA2−1Σ,A (λ) = 1]−
Pr[ExptOT−IND−CCA2−0Σ,A (λ) = 1]| .
Definition 1.4.1 (IND-CCA2). A DEM Σ = (enc, dec) is one-time IND-
CCA2 secure if for any polynomial-time IND-CCA2 adversary A, the advan-
tage AdvOT−IND−CCA2Σ,A (λ) is negligible in λ.
Rejection Security
The Kurosawa-Desmedt [22] scheme also requires that the DEM satisfies the
following condition:
Definition 1.4.2 (Rejection Security). A DEM Σ = (enc, dec) is ²-rejection
secure if for all λ ∈ N, and for all χ ∈ CiphSp(λ),
Pr[dec(κ, χ) 6= ⊥ : κ R← {0, 1}`(λ)] ≤ ²(λ) .
This definition models the idea that if you take a ciphertext and attempt
to decrypt it with a randomly-chosen key, you will obtain the output ⊥ with
overwhelming probability. This should not be confused with an integrity check;
it may be possible for an adversary to take a ciphertext C = enc(κ,m) and
compute a modified ciphertext C ′ which decrypts to some message m′ 6= ⊥
under the key κ.
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1.5 Smooth Hash Functions
A hash function is a polynomial-time algorithm Hash which takes as input a
security parameter λ and an element x ∈ Xλ (which may depend on λ) and
returns a bitstring h ∈ {0, 1}`(λ) for some polynomial ` known as the output-
length function. There are many properties that are expected of hash func-
tions, including preimage-resistance, collision resistance and second preimage-
resistance, but here we are only concerned with smooth hash functions.
Intuitively, a hash function is smooth if, when given a random input, the
hash value is distributed uniformly at random on {0, 1}`(λ).
Definition 1.5.1 (Smooth Hash Function). Let Hash be a hash function, and
fix a security parameter λ. Let x
R← Xλ and s R← {0, 1}`(λ). Then Hash is
δ-smooth if ∆(Hash(λ, x), s) ≤ δ(λ).
Lemma 1.5.2. Let Σ = (enc, dec) be an ²-rejection secure DEM and Hash
be a δ-smooth hash function such that the key-length function of Σ equals the
output-length function of Hash. Then for all χ ∈ CiphSp(λ),
Pr[dec(κ, χ) 6= ⊥ : a R← Xλ;κ← Hash(a)] ≤ ²(λ) + δ(λ) .
Proof. Fix a security parameter λ and a ciphertext χ ∈ CiphSp(λ) and let
S = {s ∈ {0, 1}`(λ) | dec(s, χ) 6= ⊥}. Let a R← Xλ, κ ← Hash(a) and κ′ R←
{0, 1}`(λ). Then by the smoothness of Hash and Lemma 1.1.2
Pr[dec(κ, χ) 6= ⊥] = Pr[κ ∈ S]
≤ Pr[κ′ ∈ S] + ∆(κ′, κ)
≤ ²(λ) + δ(λ) .
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Chapter 2
Relations Among Notions of
Plaintext Awareness
In this chapter we will propose several new definitions of PA2 plaintext aware-
ness and will relate these new definitions to the existing ones.
2.1 Outline
Our aim for this chapter is to investigate the definition of PA2 plaintext aware-
ness in the standard model. We will present a naive approach to achieving
PA2 plaintext awareness without the full power of a plaintext creator, which we
call PA2E, motivated by the belief that the arbitrary stateful plaintext creator
makes full PA2 definition more complicated than it needs to be. This naive
approach is inadequate, as Lemma 2.2.2 shows, because the combination of
PA2E plaintext awareness and IND-CPA security does not imply IND-CCA2
security.
We will then introduce a new definition called 2PA2 plaintext awareness,
which restricts the PA2 definition to the two plaintext creators used in Bellare
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and Palacio’s proof of the fundamental theorem of standard model plaintext
awareness. Since this theorem motivates the study of plaintext awareness, it
was crucial that our new definition is sufficient to give the same result.
Together, these sections show that our definition 2PA2 is in some sense
close to minimal; it is adequate to prove the fundamental theorem of plaintext
awareness, but Theorem 2.2.2 shows that if we remove the plaintext creator
entirely, it no longer fulfils this requirement.
We would have liked to show that 2PA2 is in fact equivalent to PA2 plain-
text awareness, at least for schemes which are IND-CPA secure. This idea
seems reasonable, since if the encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure, then it
shouldn’t matter what message is encrypted. In Section 2.4, we will give this
idea formal treatment, but are not able to prove this. Instead, we introduced
the idea of length hiding; informally this captures the idea that an encryption
scheme hides the length of a message as well as its contents. We will show
that any scheme which is both length-hiding IND-CPA secure and 2PA2 is in
fact PA2 plaintext aware.
We will investigate the idea of length-hiding and how it relates to plaintext
awareness further in Section 2.6. Specifically we use the ideas of Teranishi
and Ogata to show that any scheme which is IND-CPA, has a suitably large
message space, and is PA2 plaintext aware is also length-hiding. This shows
why we need length-hiding to prove our result in Section 2.4: any encryption
scheme which is IND-CPA secure and PA2 plaintext awareness but not length-
hiding is not PA2 plaintext aware by Theorem 2.6.2! 2PA2 does not appear
to share this characteristic, since the stateful nature of the plaintext creator
is key to proving Theorem 2.6.2.
Finally, we will use our definition of 2PA2 plaintext awareness to give a
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rigorous proof of Dent’s conjecture that PA2 plaintext awareness is stronger
than PA1+ plaintext awareness. This works by showing that any scheme
which is 2PA2 plaintext aware and IND-CPA secure is 2PA2+ plaintext aware,
and we may use our previous theorems to complete the proof. Using 2PA2+
plaintext awareness simplified this proof, because we were able to construct
an extractor A∗ which relies on the particular behaviour of P0 and P1. In
contrast, an extractor for PA2 plaintext awareness must work for all stateful
plaintext creators P .
2.2 Introducing PA2E
One of the more complex aspects of PA2 plaintext awareness is the fact that
the encryption oracle returns an encryption of a message that has been chosen
from some arbitrary distribution defined by P . The order of the quantifiers in
the definition of PA2 plaintext awareness means that neither the ciphertext
creator A, nor the plaintext extractor A∗, know the distribution from which
messages are chosen, although the ciphertext creator does have the ability to
affect this distribution via its input s to the encryption oracle.
One approach to simplifying PA2 plaintext awareness might be to remove
the plaintext creator from the definition entirely, and instead give the cipher-
text creator access to a straightforward encryption oracle which computes
Encrypt(pk, · ). Equivalently, we could consider the fixed plaintext creator PE
defined as follows:
function PE(s)
return s
Definition 2.2.1 (PA2E). A public key encryption scheme Π = (KeyGen,
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Encrypt,Decrypt) is PA2E plaintext aware if for all polynomial-time ciphertext
creators A, there exists a polynomial-time plaintext extractor A∗ such that for
all polynomial-time distinguishing algorithms D, the advantage
AdvPA2EΠ,A,A∗,D(λ) = Adv
PA2
Π,A,A∗,PE ,D(λ)
is negligible in λ. ExptPA2E−RealΠ,A,D (λ) and Expt
PA2E−Fake
Π,A,A∗,D (λ) are defined in the
natural way.
Unfortunately, this definition is not strong enough. The minimum we re-
quire from any definition of plaintext awareness is for it to satisfy the funda-
mental theorem of plaintext awareness, Theorem 1.3.5. In other words any
encryption scheme which is IND-CPA secure and plaintext aware should be
IND-CCA2 secure. We will now show that PA2E does not meet this require-
ment.
Theorem 2.2.2. Suppose that Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is an encryp-
tion scheme which is IND-CPA secure and PA2E plaintext aware. Then there
exists an encryption scheme Π′ which is IND-CPA secure and PA2E plaintext
aware, but not IND-CCA2 secure.
Proof. Let Π′ = (KeyGen,Encrypt′,Decrypt′), where Encrypt′ and Decrypt′ are
defined as follows:
function Encrypt′(pk,m)
C ′ ← Encrypt(pk,m)
C ← C ′||0
return C
function Decrypt′(sk, C)
Parse C as C ′||a where a ∈ {0, 1}
m← Decrypt(sk, C ′)
return m
Π′ is not IND-CCA2, as an adversary may change the final bit of the
challenge ciphertext C∗ to a 1 and call the decryption oracle on the resulting
ciphertext to obtain the underlying message, and recover b.
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On the other hand, if A is an adversary against the IND-CPA security of
Π′ then there is an adversary B against the IND-CPA security of Π, which
simply runs A and appends a 0 bit to the challenge ciphertext. B wins if and
only if A does, so AdvIND−CPAΠ,B (λ) = AdvIND−CPAΠ′,A (λ), which is negligible in λ
since Π was assumed to be IND-CPA secure.
We must now show that Π′ is PA2E plaintext aware. Let A be an arbitrary
PA2E ciphertext creator for Π′. We construct a PA2E ciphertext creator B
for Π as follows.
function B(pk)
Run x← AEncrypt′,Decrypt′(pk)
if A queries Encrypt′(m) then
Query C ← Encrypt(m)
C ′ ← C||0
Append m to Mlist
Append C ′ to Clist
return C ′
if A queries Decrypt′(C ′) then
Parse C ′ as C||a for some bit a
if a = 1 and C||0 = Clist[i] for some i then
return Mlist[i]
else
Query m← Decrypt(C)
return m
return x
By the PA2E property of Π, there exists a plaintext extractor B∗ for B
such that AdvPA2EΠ,B,B∗,D(λ) is negligible in λ for all distinguishing algorithms D.
We use B∗ to construct a special-form PA2E plaintext extractor Aˆ∗ for A as
follows:
function Aˆ∗(pk, C,R[A],Clist,Elist,Mlist,Dlist, state)
Parse C ′ as C||a for some bit a
for i← 1 to |Clist| do
Parse Clist[i] as Ci||0
Append Ci to ClistB
37
if a = 1 and C||0 = Clist[i] for some i then
m← Mlist[i]
else
(m, state)← B∗(pk, C,R[A],ClistB, stateB∗)
return (m, state)
Let A∗ be the corresponding normal-form plaintext creator as described in
Section 1.3.4.
If A makes a decryption query C ′||1, B avoids calling the Decrypt oracle
on ciphertexts that been returned by the Encrypt oracle by checking Clist for
the ciphertext C ′||0. Since Decrypt′ ignores the final bit, the corresponding
plaintext must be the correct decryption for both C ′||0 and C ′||1. Note that
all ciphertexts in Clist must end in 0 so we do not need to check the case
C ′||0 since A may not make such queries anyway. The plaintext extractor A∗
mimics this behaviour to ensure the queries to B∗ remain the same.
We must now show thatAdvPA2EΠ,A,A∗,D(λ) is negligible in λ for all distinguish-
ing algorithms D, where A∗ is the normal-form plaintext extractor constructed
from Aˆ∗. The proof is structured as a sequence of four games, in the style of
Shoup [32]. Throughout the proof, we use the symbol C to represent cipher-
texts of the basic scheme Π and C ′ to represent the augmented ciphertexts
belonging to the scheme Π′. We also name the oracles Encrypt′ and Decrypt′
to emphasise that they implement the encryption and decryption algorithms
of the modified scheme Π′ rather than the original. We fix a distinguishing
algorithm D and let Si be the event that D outputs 1 in Game i.
Game 0: Let Game 0 be ExptPA2−FakeΠ′,A,A∗,PE ,D(λ). Written out in full, it is as
follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x0 ← ADecrypt′,Encrypt′(pk)
if A queries Encrypt′(m) then
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C ← Encrypt(pk,m)
C ′ ← C||0
return C ′
if A queries Decrypt′(C ′) then
Parse C ′ as C||a for some bit a
if a = 1 and C||0 = Clist[i] for some i then
return Mlist[i]
else
m← B∗(pk, C,R[B],Clist)
return m
b′0 ← D(x0)
return b′0
Game 1: Let Game 1 be ExptPA2−FakeΠ,B,B∗,PE ,D(λ). Written out in full, it is as
follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x1 ← ADecrypt′,Encrypt′(pk)
if A queries Encrypt′(m) then
C ← Encrypt(pk,m)
C ′ ← C||0
Append m to Mlist
Append C ′ to Clist
return C ′
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C ′ as C||a for some bit a
if a = 1 and C||0 = Clist[i] for some i then
return Mlist[i]
else
m← B∗(pk, C,R[B],Clist)
return m
b′1 ← D(x1)
return b′1
This is a bridging step; instead of Mlist and Clist being recorded by A∗, it
is recorded by B, but otherwise there is no change, so
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] .
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Game 2: Let Game 2 be ExptPA2−RealΠ,B,PE ,D(λ). Written out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x2 ← ADecrypt′,Encrypt′(pk)
if A queries Encrypt′(m) then
C ← Encrypt(pk,m)
C ′ ← C||0
Append m to Mlist
Append C ′ to Clist
return C ′
if A queries Decrypt′(C) then
Parse C ′ as C||a for some bit a
if a = 1 and C||0 = Clist[i] for some i then
return Mlist[i]
else
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
b′2 ← D(x2)
return b′2
Pr[S2]− Pr[S1] ≤ AdvPA2Π,B,B∗,PE ,D(λ)
which is negligible in λ by the PA2E property of Π.
Game 3: Let Game 3 be ExptPA2−RealΠ′,A,PE ,D(λ). Written out in full, it is as
follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x3 ← ADecrypt′,Encrypt′(pk)
if A queries Encrypt′(m) then
C ← Encrypt(pk,m)
C ′ ← C||0
return C ′
if A queries Decrypt′(C ′) then
Parse C ′ as C||a where a is a single bit.
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
b′3 ← D(x3)
return b′3
This is a bridging step; if the condition a = 1 and C||0 = Clist[i] ever
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occurs, then C||0 = Encrypt′(pk,Mlist[i]) by definition. By the soundness
property of Π, this implies that Decrypt(sk, C) = Mlist[i] with probability 1.
Thus the responses to A’s queries are unchanged and so
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2] .
Putting it all together, we see thatAdvPA2Π′,A,A∗,PE ,D(λ) = Adv
PA2
Π,B,B∗,PE ,D(λ),
which is negligible in λ by assumption, hence we see that Π′ is PA2E plaintext
aware.
This proof works precisely because in PA2E, the plaintext creator A simply
submits a message to the encryption oracle for decryption. This allows A∗ to
determine the message underlying the returned ciphertext by looking at the
queries A makes. In contrast, in the full PA2 model, A∗ cannot determine
the message based on the inputs to the encryption oracle because the same
plaintext extractor must work for all plaintext creators P .
Canetti et al. gave a modified IND-CCA2 definition [9], which they call
relaxed chosen ciphertext security (IND-RCCA2), which improves upon earlier
definitions by Shoup [31], Krawczyk et al. [21] and An et al. [1]. The goal of
all of these models is to include a variety of schemes where the adversary
can modify a ciphertext to produce another valid ciphertext which decrypts
to the same value, such as the scheme Π′ which we defined above. Shoup
calls these schemes “benignly malleable”, because they seem to be secure for
most practical purposes, but would nevertheless be ruled out by the stricter
IND-CCA2 definition.
We suspect that it is possible to adapt the results of Section 2.3 to the
PA2E notion of plaintext awareness by using the IND-RCCA2 definition of
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security, but we will focus on IND-CCA2 security in this work.
2.3 Introducing 2PA2
Let us now consider a slightly stronger definition of plaintext awareness, in-
spired by Bellare and Palacio’s proof [3] that a scheme which is PA2 and
IND-CPA secure must be IND-CCA2 secure. They make use of two plaintext
creators, P0 and P1, as defined below:
function Pi(pk, s)
Parse s as (m0,m1)
if parsing fails then
return 0
else
return mi
We have modified their definition slightly, so that behaviour on input s which
is not of the form (m0,m1) is defined. Notice that Pi does not check whether
|m0| = |m1|.
Definition 2.3.1 (2PA2). A public key encryption scheme Π = (KeyGen,
Encrypt,Decrypt) is 2PA2 plaintext aware if for all polynomial-time ciphertext
creators A, there exists a polynomial-time plaintext extractor A∗ such that for
all polynomial-time distinguishing algorithms D, the advantage
Adv2PA2Π,A,A∗,D(λ) = max{AdvPA2Π,A,A∗,P0,D(λ),AdvPA2Π,A,A∗,P1,D(λ)}
is negligible in λ.
Since the proof [3] of the fundamental theorem of plaintext awareness (The-
orem 1.3.5) only makes use of the plaintext creators P0 and P1, the following
modification to the fundamental theorem holds:
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Theorem 2.3.2 (Bellare-Palacio). Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a
public-key encryption scheme. If Π is IND-CPA secure and 2PA2 plaintext
aware then it is IND-CCA2 secure.
Definition 2.3.3 (2PA2+). We define 2PA2+ in the same way as we did
for PA1+ and PA2+, by adding a randomness oracle, which takes no in-
put and returns a random bit. The plaintext extractor is altered so that it
takes a list Rlist of all such bits queried so far as one of its inputs, i.e.
A∗(pk, C,R[A],Rlist,Clist).
2.4 Length Hiding
We now introduce a generalisation of IND security, which we call Length
Hiding, or LH-IND. This will be used when we come to relate 2PA2 with PA2
plaintext awareness.
An adversary A = (A1,A2) against the LH-IND security of an encryption
scheme Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms such that A1 takes a public key pk as input and returns two
messages m0,m1 ∈ MsgSp(pk) and some state information state, and A2
takes a ciphertext C∗ ∈ CiphSp(pk) and the value state that was output
by A1 as input, and returns a single bit b′. This differs from the definition
of an IND adversary only in that m0 and m1 may have different lengths.
We define ExptLH−IND−ATK−bΠ,A (λ) and Adv
LH−IND−ATK
Π,A (λ) for b ∈ {0, 1} and
ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA2} exactly as we did for their IND counterparts, except
without the restriction that |m0| = |m1|.
Definition 2.4.1 (Length-Hiding IND-CPA security). An encryption scheme
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Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is LH-IND-CPA secure if for any polynomial-
time adversary LH-IND-CPA A, the advantage AdvLH−IND−CPAΠ,A (λ) is negligi-
ble in λ.
Definition 2.4.2 (Length-Hiding IND-CCA2 security). An encryption scheme
Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is LH-IND-CCA2 secure if for any polynomial-
time adversary LH-IND-CCA2 A, the advantage AdvLH−IND−CCA2Π,A (λ) is neg-
ligible in λ.
This is a natural extension of the IND definition, because it captures the
idea that it should be impossible to distinguish between encryptions of any
two messages, not just those of equal length.
Remark 2.4.3. If an encryption scheme has the property that for all public
keys pk, MsgSp(pk) = {0, 1}` for some ` = `(pk), then LH-IND-ATK (for
ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA2})is trivially equivalent to IND-ATK because the fact
that m0,m1 ∈MsgSp(pk) implies that |m0| = `(pk) = |m1|.
Remark 2.4.4. If an encryption scheme is LH-IND-ATK (for ATK ∈ {CPA,
CCA2}) secure then it is IND-ATK secure, because IND-ATK adversaries are
a special case of LH-IND-ATK adversaries.
Lemma 2.4.5. Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a public-key encryption
scheme with the infinite message space {0, 1}∗. Then Π is not LH-IND-CPA
secure.
Proof. Let PKλ be the set of public keys, i.e PKλ = {pk ∈ {0, 1}∗|Pr[KeyGen(1λ) =
(pk, sk) for some sk] > 0}, let t(λ) be an upper bound on the running time of
Encrypt(pk, 0) for all pk ∈ PKλ, and let (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ). We construct
an LH-IND-CPA adversary as follows:
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function A1(pk)
m0 ← 0
m1
R← {0, 1}t(λ)+λ+1
return (m0,m1, ε)
function A2(C∗, state)
if |C∗ > t(λ)| then
return 1
else
return 0
Pr[ExptLH−IND−CPA−0Π,A (λ) = 0] = 1, because |C∗| is bounded by the run-
ning time t(λ). On the other hand, there are at most 2t(λ)+1− 1 ciphertexts of
length less than or equal to t(λ), so if m1
R← {0, 1}t(λ)+λ+1 then by the pigeon-
hole principle we see that |Pr[Encrypt(pk,m1) ≤ t]| ≤ 2t(λ)+1/2t(λ)+λ+1 = 2−λ.
So Pr[ExptLH−IND−CPA−1Π,A (λ) = 0] ≤ 2−λ. Thus
AdvLH−IND−CPAΠ,A (λ) = |Pr[ExptLH−IND−CPA−0Π,A (λ) = 0]
−Pr[ExptLH−IND−CPA−1Π,A (λ) = 0]|
≥ 1− 2λ
which is non-negligible in λ, so Π is not LH-IND-CPA secure.
This fairly obvious result shows that any encryption scheme which allows
arbitrarily long plaintexts cannot be LH-IND-CPA secure. It is of course not
the goal of such systems to hide the message length, but we include this re-
sult to show that LH-IND security excludes an important class of encryption
schemes, notably including any hybrid scheme which uses symmetric encryp-
tion to encrypt arbitrarily long messages.
Using the methodology of Bellare and Palacio [3], we now prove the ana-
logue of Theorem 2.3.2 for LH-IND security. In Theorem 2.5.2 below we will
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show that any encryption scheme which is 2PA2+ plaintext aware and LH-
IND-CCA2 secure must be PA2+ plaintext aware; by combining these results
we see that any encryption scheme which is 2PA2+ plaintext aware and LH-
IND-CPA secure is PA2+ plaintext aware.
Theorem 2.4.6. Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a public-key encryp-
tion scheme. If Π is LH-IND-CPA secure and 2PA2 plaintext aware then it is
LH-IND-CCA2 secure.
Proof. LetA be an LH-IND-CCA2 adversary. We construct a 2PA2 ciphertext
creator B and use B to construct an LH-IND-CPA adversary C:
function B(pk)
R1
R← {0, 1}TA1 (λ)
R2
R← {0, 1}TA2 (λ)
Run (m0,m1, stateA)← A1(pk;R1)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Query m← Decrypt(C)
return m
Query C∗ ← Encrypt(m0,m1)
Run b′ ← A2(C∗, stateA;R2)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Query m← Decrypt(C)
return m
return b′
By the 2PA2 property of Π there exists a plaintext extractors B∗ such that
for all distinguishing algorithms D, and for i ∈ {0, 1}, AdvPA2Π,B,B∗,PiD(λ) is
negligible in λ.
We use B and B∗ to construct an LH-IND-CPA adversary C:
function C1(pk)
R1
R← {0, 1}TA1 (λ)
R2
R← {0, 1}TA2 (λ)
Run (m0,m1, stateA)← A1(pk;R1)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
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(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R1||R2,CliststateB∗)
return m
stateC ← (stateA, stateB∗ , R1, R2)
return (m0,m1, stateC)
function C2(C∗, stateC)
Parse stateC as (stateA, stateB∗ , R1, R2)
Clist← (C∗)
Run b′ ← A2(C∗, stateA;R2)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R1||R2,Clist, stateB∗)
return m
return b′
Note that C2 does use a random tape of its own, the randomness for A2 is
supplied as part of stateC. This is because B∗ takes the random tape of B as
one of its inputs, which consists of R1||R2, so we must generate these values in
advance. We define D to be the distinguishing algorithm which takes a single
bit b as input and returns b.
We now use B, B∗ and C to prove that AdvLH−IND−CCA2Π,A (λ) is negligible
in λ. The proof is structured as a sequence of games. We let Si be the event
that A outputs 1 in Game i.
Game 0: Let Game 0 be ExptLH−IND−CCA2−0Π,A (λ). Written out in full, it is
as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
(m0,m1, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,m0)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
Game 1: Let Game 1 be Expt2PA2−RealΠ,B,P0,D (λ). By writing B out in full, and
recalling that D simply returns the bit it is given as input, we see that it is as
follows:
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(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
R1
R← {0, 1}TA1 (λ)
R2
R← {0, 1}TA2 (λ)
Run (m0,m1, stateA)← A1(pk;R1)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,P0(pk,m0,m1))
Append C∗ to Clist
Run b′ ← A2(C∗, stateA;R2)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
return b′
Since the operations performed are essentially unchanged, this is a bridging
step, and we see that
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] .
Game 2: Let Game 2 be Expt2PA2−FakeΠ,B,B∗,P0,D(λ). Written out in full, it is as
follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
R1
R← {0, 1}TA1 (λ)
R2
R← {0, 1}TA2 (λ)
Run (m0,m1, stateA)← A1(pk;R1)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R1||R2,Clist, stateB∗)
return m
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,P0(pk,m0,m1))
Append C∗ to Clist
Run b′ ← A2(C∗, stateA;R2)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R1||R2,Clist, stateB∗)
return m
return b′
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By the 2PA2 property of Π,
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ Adv2PA2Π,B,B∗,D(λ) .
Game 3: Let Game 3 be ExptLH−IND−CPA−0Π,C (λ). By writing C out in full,
we see that it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
R1
R← {0, 1}TA1 (λ)
R2
R← {0, 1}TA2 (λ)
Run (m0,m1, stateA)← A1(pk;R1)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R1||R2,Clist, stateB∗)
return m
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,m0)
Append C∗ to Clist
Run b′ ← A2(C∗, stateA;R2)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R1||R2,Clist, stateB∗)
return m
return b′
Since P0(pk,m0,m1) = m0the operations performed are essentially un-
changed, this is a bridging step, and we see that
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2] .
Game 4: Let Game 4 be ExptLH−IND−CPA−1Π,C (λ). By writing C out in full,
we see that it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
R1
R← {0, 1}TA1 (λ)
R2
R← {0, 1}TA2 (λ)
Run (m0,m1, stateA)← A1(pk;R1)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R1||R2,Clist, stateB∗)
49
return m
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,m1)
Append C∗ to Clist
Run b′ ← A2(C∗, stateA;R2)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R1||R2,Clist, stateB∗)
return m
return b′
|Pr[S4]− Pr[S3]| ≤ AdvLH−IND−CPAΠ,C (λ) .
Game 5: Let Game 5 be Expt2PA2−FakeΠ,B,B∗,P1,D(λ). Written out in full, it is as
follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
R1
R← {0, 1}TA1 (λ)
R2
R← {0, 1}TA2 (λ)
Run (m0,m1, stateA)← A1(pk;R1)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R1||R2,Clist, stateB∗)
return m
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,P1(pk,m0,m1))
Append C∗ to Clist
Run b′ ← A2(C∗, stateA;R2)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R1||R2,Clist, stateB∗)
return m
return b′
Since P1(pk,m0,m1) = m1, the operations performed are essentially un-
changed, this is a bridging step, and we see that
Pr[S5] = Pr[S4] .
Game 6: Let Game 6 be Expt2PA2−RealΠ,B,P1,D (λ). Written out in full, it is as
follows:
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(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
R1
R← {0, 1}TA1 (λ)
R2
R← {0, 1}TA2 (λ)
Run (m0,m1, stateA)← A1(pk;R1)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,P1(pk,m0,m1))
Append C∗ to Clist
Run b′ ← A2(C∗, stateA;R2)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
return b′
By the 2PA2 property of Π,
|Pr[S6]− Pr[S5]| ≤ Adv2PA2Π,B,B∗,D(λ) .
Game 7: Let Game 7 be ExptLH−IND−CCA2−1Π,A (λ). Written out in full, it is
as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
(m0,m1, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,m1)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
Since the operations performed are essentially unchanged, this is a bridging
step, and we see that
Pr[S7] = Pr[S6] .
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Putting it all together, we see
AdvLH−IND−CCA2Π,A (λ) = |Pr[ExptLH−IND−CCA2−1Π,A (λ)]−
Pr[ExptLH−IND−CCA2−0Π,A (λ)]|
= |Pr[S7]− Pr[S0]|
≤ |Pr[S7]− Pr[S6]|+ . . .+ |Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]|
≤ 2Adv2PA2Π,B,B∗,D(λ) +AdvLH−IND−CPAΠ,C (λ)
which is negligible in λ by the LH-IND-CPA and 2PA2 properties of Π.
2.5 Relation between 2PA2 and PA2
Firstly, we note that 2PA2 is a special case of PA2.
Theorem 2.5.1. If an encryption scheme Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is
PA2 plaintext aware then it is 2PA2 plaintext aware.
Proof. Let A be a polynomial-time ciphertext creator and let Pi (where i ∈
{0, 1}) be as in the definition of 2PA2. Then by the PA2 property of Π there
exists a polynomial-time plaintext extractor A∗ such that for all polynomial-
time distinguishing algorithms D, the advantage
Adv2PA2Π,A,A∗,D(λ) = max{AdvPA2Π,A,A∗,P0,D(λ),AdvPA2Π,A,A∗,P1,D(λ)}
is negligible in λ as required.
It is more interesting to consider the question of whether 2PA2 plaintext
awareness implies PA2 plaintext awareness. We will soon show that with cer-
tain extra conditions, this is the case. First we show that if an LH-IND-CCA2
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encryption scheme is plaintext aware with respect to some fixed, stateless
plaintext creator, then it is plaintext aware with respect to all plaintext cre-
ators.
Theorem 2.5.2. Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be an encryption scheme
which is LH-IND-CCA2 secure and suppose that there is some polynomial-
time stateless plaintext creator Pˆ such that for all polynomial-time ciphertext
creators A there exists a ciphertext extractor A∗ such that for all distinguishing
algorithms D, AdvPA2+
Π,A,A∗,Pˆ,D(λ) negligible in λ. Then Π is PA2+ plaintext
aware.
Remark 2.5.3. The conditions of this theorem are similar to the definition of
PA2+ plaintext awareness but with two important relaxations. Firstly, Pˆ is
required to be stateless, and more importantly, the order of the quantifiers
is reversed: A∗ is only assumed to be a valid plaintext extractor for A with
respect to some fixed plaintext creator Pˆ , instead of requiring that A∗ works
for all plaintext creators.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary PA2+ ciphertext creator A. Let A∗ be the plain-
text extractor for A with respect to Pˆ , which exists by the assumption above.
Let qe be an upper bound for the number of encryption queries made by A
and let qd be an upper bound for the number of decryption queries made by
A. We will show that for any plaintext creator P , and for any distinguishing
algorithm D:
AdvPA2+Π,A,A∗,P,D(λ)
is negligible in λ.
We structure the proof as a sequence of games.
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Let xi be the output of A in Game i. Fix a distinguishing algorithm D
and let Si be the event that D(xi) = 1.
Game 0: Let Game 0 be ExptPA2+FakeΠ,A,A∗,P,D(λ), and let A∗ be the plaintext
extractor for A with respect to Pˆ , which exists by the assumption above.
Written out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x0 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateA∗)← A∗(pk, C,R[A],Clist, stateA∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
(m, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
Append ρ to Rlist
return ρ
b′0 ← D(x0)
return b′0
Game 1: Let Game 1 be ExptPA2+Fake
Π,A,A∗,Pˆ,D(λ), i.e. we change the plaintext
creator to Pˆ . Written out in full it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x1 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateA∗)← A∗(pk, C,R[A],Clist, stateA∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
m← Pˆ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
Append ρ to Rlist
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return ρ
b′1 ← D(x1)
return b′1
To prove that |Pr[S1]−Pr[S0]| is negligible, we will consider a sequence of
games, Game (0, 0), . . . , Game (0, qe), where Game (0, 0) equals Game 0, Game
(0, qe) equals Game 1, and |Pr[S0,i]− Pr[S0,i−1]| is negligible for i = 1, . . . , qe.
Game (0, i): Let Game (0, i) be the same as ExptPA2+Fake
Π,A,A∗,Pˆ,D(λ) except that
the first qe − i queries to the encryption oracle are answered using P , and all
encryption queries after the (qe− i)th are handled using Pˆ . Written out in full,
it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x0,i ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateA∗)← A∗(pk, C,R[A],Clist, stateA∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
ne ← ne + 1
if ne > qe − i then
m← Pˆ(pk, s)
else
(m, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
Append ρ to Rlist
return ρ
b′0,i ← D(x0,i)
return b′0,i
We construct a sequence of adversaries B1,B2, . . . against the LH-IND-CPA
security of the scheme as follows, where Bi = (Bi,1,Bi,2) for all i ∈ N:
function Bi,1(pk)
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RA
R← {0, 1}TA(λ)
RA∗
R← {0, 1}TA∗ (λ)
Run x0,i ← A(pk;RA)
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
Append ρ to Rlist
Return ρ
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateA∗)← A∗(pk, C,RA,Rlist,Clist, stateA∗ ;RA∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
ne ← ne + 1
if ne ≤ qe − i then
(m, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
C ← Encrypt(pk,m)
Append C to Clist
return Cne
else if ne = qe − i+ 1 then
(m′0, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
m′1 ← Pˆ(pk, s)
stateA ← Suspend(A)
stateB ← (pk,Clist,Rlist, RA∗ , stateA, ne, stateA∗)
Terminate and output (m′0,m
′
1, stateB)
function Bi,2(C∗, stateB)
Parse stateB as (pk,Clist,Rlist, RA∗ , , stateA, ne, stateA∗)
Run x← Resume(A, stateA)
Return C∗ in response to A’s previous encryption query
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
Append ρ to Rlist
Return ρ
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateA∗)← A∗(pk, C,RA,Rlist,Clist, stateA∗ ;RA∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
ne ← ne + 1
m← Pˆ(pk, s)
Cne ← Encrypt(pk,m)
Append C to Clist
return Cne
return D(x)
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Bi,1 takes as input the public key pk and runsA with oracle access toA∗ ex-
actly as described in the Game 0. Bi,1 responds to the first qe−i−1 encryption
oracle queries as in Game 0 (i.e. by computing (m, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
and returning C ← Encrypt(pk,m)). For the (qe− i)th query to the encryption
oracle, Bi,1 suspends A, generates both (m0, stateP) ← P(pk, s, stateP) and
m1 ← Pˆ(pk, s) and returns (m0,m1, state) to the challenger.
The challenger chooses b
R← {0, 1}, computes C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,mb) and
runs Bi,2(C∗, state). Bi,2 resumes A from where it left off when Bi,1 terminated,
i.e, by responding to A’s encryption query using C∗. It then responds to all
subsequent encryption queries using Pˆ . Eventually A terminates and outputs
a bitstring x. Bi,2 terminates by outputting the bit D(x).
Since Π is LH-IND-CPA, AdvLH−IND−CPAΠ,Bi (λ) is negligible in λ for all
1 ≤ i ≤ qe. Since Game (0, i) = ExptIND−CPA−0Π,Bi (λ), and Game (0, i + 1) =
ExptIND−CPA−1Π,Bi (λ), this implies that
Pr[S0,i+1]− Pr[S0,i]| ≤ AdvLH−IND−CPAΠ,Bi .
Therefore:
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| = |Pr[S0,0]− Pr[S0,qe ]|
≤ |Pr[S0,0]− Pr[S0,1]|+ . . .+ |Pr[S0,qe−1]− Pr[S0,qe ]|
≤
qe∑
i=1
AdvLH−IND−CPAΠ,Bi (λ) .
Game 2: Let Game 2 be ExptPA2+Real
Π,A,Pˆ,D (λ). Written out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x2 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
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m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
m← Pˆ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
return C
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
return ρ
b′2 ← D(x2)
return b′2
By the assumption that Π is 2PA2+ plaintext aware, we have that:
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ Adv2PA2+Π,A,A∗,D(λ) .
Game 3: Let Game 3 be ExptPA2+RealΠ,A,P,D (λ). In other words, we modify the
encryption oracle to use P instead of Pˆ . Written out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x3 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
(m, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
C ← Encrypt(m)
return C
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
return ρ
b′3 ← D(x3)
return b′3
To prove that |Pr[S3]−Pr[S2]| is negligible, we will consider a sequence of
games, Game (2, 0), . . . , Game (2, qe), where Game (2, 0) equals Game 2, Game
(2, qe) equals Game 3, and |Pr[S2,i]− Pr[S2,i−1] is negligible for i = 1, . . . , qe.
Game (2, i): Let Game (2, i) be the same as ExptPA2+RealΠ,A,P,D (λ) except that
58
all encryption queries after the ith are handled as in ExptPA2+Real
Π,A,Pˆ,D (λ), i.e. the
encryption oracle computes m ← Pˆ(pk, s) and returns C ← Encrypt(pk,m).
Only the first i queries to the encryption oracle are answered using P . Written
out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run x2,i ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
ne ← ne + 1
if ne ≤ i then
(m, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
else
m← Pˆ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
return C
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
return ρ
b′2,i ← D(x2,i)
return b′2,i
We construct a sequence of adversaries C1, C2, . . . against the LH-IND-
CCA2 security of the scheme as follows, where Ci = (Ci,1, Ci,2) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ qe:
function Ci,1(pk)
RA
R← {0, 1}TA(λ)
Run A(pk;RA)
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
return ρ
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
Query m← Decrypt(C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
ne ← ne + 1
if ne < i then
(m, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
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C ← Encrypt(pk,m)
return C
else if ne = i then
(m0, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
m1 ← Pˆ(pk, s)
stateA ← Suspend(A)
stateC ← (stateA, ne)
Terminate and output (m0,m1, stateC)
function Ci,2(C∗, stateC)
Parse stateC as (stateA, ne)
Run x← Resume(A, stateA)
Return C∗ in response to A’s previous encryption query
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
return ρ
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
Query m← Decrypt(C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
ne ← ne + 1
m← Pˆ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(pk,m) return C
return D(x)
Ci,1 takes as input the public key pk and runs A with oracle access to A∗
exactly as described in the Game 2. Ci responds to the first i − 1 encryption
oracle queries as in Game 2 (i.e. by computing (m, stateP)← P(pk, s, stateP)
and returning C ← Encrypt(pk,m) to A). For the ith query to the encryption
oracle, Ci,1 generates both (m0, stateP)← P(pk, s) andm1 ← Pˆ(s) and returns
(m0,m1, state) to the challenger.
The challenger chooses b
R← {0, 1}, computes C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,mb) and
runs Ci2(C∗, state). Ci,2 resumes A so that it is in the same state as when Ci,1
terminated. It responds to the ith encryption query using C∗. It then responds
to all subsequent encryption queries using Pˆ . Eventually A terminates and
outputs a bitstring x. Ci,2 terminates by outputting the bit D(x).
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Since Π is LH-IND-CCA2, AdvLH−IND−CCA2Π,Ci (λ) is negligible in λ. Since
Game (2, i−1) = ExptIND−CCA2−0Π,C (λ), and Game (2, i) = ExptIND−CCA2−1Π,Ci (λ),
this implies that |Pr[S2,i] − Pr[S2,i−1]| ≤ AdvLH−IND−CCA2Π,Ci (λ), for all i ∈
{1, . . . , qe}. Therefore
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| = |Pr[S2,0]− Pr[S2,qe ]|
≤ |Pr[S2,0]− Pr[S2,1]|+ . . .+ |Pr[S2,qe−1]− Pr[S2,qe ]|
≤
qe∑
i=1
AdvLH−IND−CCA2Π,Ci (λ) .
Putting it all together, we see that:
AdvPA2+Π,A,A∗,P,D(λ) = |Pr[S0]− Pr[S3]|
≤ |Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]|+ |Pr[S2]− Pr[S2]|+ |Pr[S2]− Pr[S3]
=
qe∑
i=1
AdvLH−IND−CPAΠ,Bi (λ) +Adv
PA2+
Π,A,A∗,Pˆ,D(λ) +
qe∑
i=1
AdvLH−IND−CCA2Π,Ci (λ) .
which is negligible in λ as required.
Theorem 2.5.4. Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be an encryption scheme
which is LH-IND-CCA2 secure and suppose that there is some polynomial-
time stateless plaintext creator Pˆ such that for all polynomial-time ciphertext
creators A there exists a ciphertext extractor A∗ such that for all distinguishing
algorithms D, AdvPA2
Π,A,A∗,Pˆ,D(λ) negligible in λ. Then Π is PA2 plaintext
aware.
The proof of this theorem is nearly identical, but without the need to
consider the randomness oracle.
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Corollary 2.5.5. Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a public-key encryp-
tion scheme which is LH-IND-CPA secure and 2PA2+ plaintext aware. Then
Π is PA2+ plaintext aware.
Proof. By Theorem 2.4.6, Π is LH-IND-CCA2 secure. Since P0 is a stateless
plaintext creator, Theorem 2.5.2 shows that Π is PA2+ secure.
The fact that we may be substitute an arbitrary plaintext creator P with
the specific plaintext creator Pˆ will be crucial in proving the relationship
between PA2 and PA2+ in Section 2.7.
2.6 PA2, One-Wayness and Length Hiding
In the previous section, our theorem required the encryption scheme to be
length hiding, rather than just IND-CPA. This may seem like an unreasonable
restriction. Far from being unreasonable, we will show in this section that
length hiding is necessary in order for an IND-CPA scheme to achieve PA2
plaintext awareness. Our proof will not preclude the possibility that a scheme
is 2PA2 plaintext aware, IND-CPA secure, but not length hiding.
In particular, the combination of Theorem 2.6.2 and Lemma 2.4.5 shows
that there are no schemes with infinite message spaces which are IND-CPA
and PA2 plaintext aware.
We base our proof on the following result, proved by Teranishi and Ogata [34].
Theorem 2.6.1 (Teranishi and Ogata). Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt)
be a public-key encryption scheme and suppose that Π is OW-CPA secure
and PA2 plaintext aware. Then Π is IND-CPA secure, and hence IND-CCA2
secure.
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Teranishi and Ogata assume that Π is a public-key encryption scheme
which is not IND-CPA secure, so there is an IND-CPA adversary A such that
AdvIND−CPAΠ,A (λ) is non-negligible in λ. They construct a ciphertext creator B
and a plaintext creator P which collude to “smuggle” a ciphertext generated
by P back to B in a bit by bit fashion, by using A to exploit the insecurity of
Π. Since it was not returned by the encryption oracle, C does not appear in
Clist, and A may legally decrypt it using the decryption oracle.
The observation underlying this entire section is simply that this technique
works identically if A is an LH-IND-CPA adversary instead of an IND-CPA
adversary, as the restriction to equal length messages is unused in the proof.
We would like to include the case where MsgSp(pk) is infinite, for example
{0, 1}∗, but OW-CPA security is not defined for infinite message spaces. To
account for this, we will adapt their proof to show that a scheme which is IND-
CPA and PA2 plaintext aware is LH-IND-CPA. In the case whereMsgSp(pk)
is finite, we may combine this with Teranishi and Ogata’s original result to
see that if Π is OW-CPA then it is LH-IND-CPA. The precise details of this
construction are presented in Theorem 2.6.2.
Theorem 2.6.2. Suppose that Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is an encryp-
tion scheme which is PA2 plaintext aware and IND-CPA secure, and suppose
that |MsgSp(pk)| is super-polynomial in λ. Then Π is LH-IND-CPA secure.
Proof. Suppose that Π is PA2 plaintext aware, but not LH-IND-CPA se-
cure. Then there exists an LH-IND-CPA adversary A = (A1,A2) such that
AdvLH−IND−CPAΠ,A (λ) is non-negligible in λ. Teranishi and Ogata construct a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm GuessNu which takes a public key pk,
a bit b and an integer N as input. GuessNu runs ExptIND−CPA−bΠ,A N times
and returns an estimate for Pr[ExptIND−CPA−bΠ,A (λ) = 1] by simply computing
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the fraction `/N where ` is the number of times A correctly guessed b1. The
following algorithms make use of GuessNu to transmit a single bit:
function Setup(pk,N)
v0 ← GuessNu(pk, 0, N)
v1 ← GuessNu(pk, 1, N)
for i = 1 to N do
(m0,m1, stateA)← A1(pk)
Append (m0,m1, stateA) to FindList
Param← (v0, v1,FindList)
return Param
function Send(pk,Param, b, j)
Parse Param as (v0, v1,FindList)
(m0,m1, stateA)← FindList[j]
return mb
function Receive(pk,Param, N, C1, . . . , CN)
Parse Param as (v0, v1,FindList)
for j = 1 to N do
(m0,m1, stateA)← FindList[j]
bj ← A2(Cj, stateA)
`← `+ bj
if `/N ≥ (v0 + v1)/2 then
return 1
else
return 0
The algorithms (Setup, Send,Receive) may be used to send a single bit b as
follows:
function Channel(b)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
N ← d32nλα/p(λ)2e
Param← Setup(pk,N)
for i = 1 to N do
m← Send(pk,Param, b, i)
Ci ← Encrypt(pk,m)
1By extension, for LH-IND-CPA adversaries GuessNu estimates
Pr[ExptLH−IND−CPA−bΠ,A (λ) = 1].
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b′ ← Receive(pk,Param, C1, . . . , CN)
return b′
In the above, α is an arbitrary constant which represents a trade-off be-
tween running time and success probability. For our purposes any value α > 0
suffices.
Lemma 2.6.3. There is an infinite set Λ ⊂ N of security parameters, a family
of sets {Ωλ}λ∈Λ and a polynomial p such that for all λ ∈ Λ, the following two
properties hold:
Pr[pk ∈ Ωλ : (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)] ≥ 1
p(λ)
and for all λ > 0, for all n > 0, for all α > 0, for all pk ∈ Ωλ and for
b ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[Channel(b) = b] ≥ 1− 1
nλα
The proof of this is given in Appendix B.1 of Teranishi and Ogata’s pa-
per [34]. Since neither GuessNu, Setup, Send nor Receive ever make use of
the fact that |m0| = |m1| in ExptIND−CPAΠ,A , the proof also covers the case of
LH-IND-CPA adversaries with no alteration.
We present a ciphertext creator and a plaintext creator which exploit this
channel to break the IND-CPA security of Π. The interaction between this
ciphertext creator and plaintext creator is quite complex, so we will first de-
scribe it in general terms, then present the algorithms below. Recall that when
B makes an encryption query the challenger runs P on this input, P returns
a message, which the challenger encrypts and returns to B. The objective
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here is for P to produce a ciphertext C to which B does not “know” the un-
derlying message, and return it to B. B may then use its decryption oracle
to recover the message, since it was not one of the ciphertexts created by the
challenger. The complication arises because while B may pass any information
it likes to P , P ’s responses will all be encrypted by the challenger. Instead,
B runs Setup to generate a set of parameters for each bit of the ciphertext to
be transmitted, which it passes to P via an Encrypt query. P uses these along
along with the Send algorithm to send the bits of C∗ to B, which may recover
the bits of the ciphertext individually using Receive. B may then decrypt the
ciphertext C∗ using its decrypt oracle (since C∗ was not returned by the en-
cryption oracle and therefore does not appear in Clist). Finally, B checks that
the message returned by the decrypt oracle is correct by sending it back to the
plaintext creator in another encrypt query, which uses Send to tell B whether
the message is correct.
Let M be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which takes a pub-
lic key pk as input and returns an arbitrary pair of messages (m0,m1) ∈
MsgSp(pk)2 such that |m0| = |m1| but m0 6= m1. If C is any IND-CPA ad-
versary, then C1 satisfies these requirements, so the assumption that M exists
is not unusual. Let `(pk) be an upper bound on the length of a ciphertext pro-
duced by encrypting a message of length |m0| under the key pk, let α > 0, and
let p be the polynomial as in Lemma 2.6.3. We present a ciphertext creator
B and plaintext creator P below. The symbols SendParams, AskBit, SendM
and AskT represent arbitrary constants: all that we require is that they are
distinct.
function B(pk)
n← `(pk)
N ← d32(n+ 1)λα/p(λ)2e
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for i = 1 to n do
Parami ← Setup(pk,N)
Query Encrypt(SendParams, (pk,N,Param1, . . . ,Paramn))
for i = 1 to n do
for j = 1 to N do
Query Cj ← Encrypt(AskBit, (i, j))
b′i ← Receive(pk,Parami, N, C1, . . . , CN)
C ′ ← b′1|| . . . ||b′n
Query m′ ← Decrypt(C ′)
Param′ ← Setup(pk,N)
Query Encrypt(SendM, (C ′,m′,Param′))
for j = 1 to N do
Query Cj ← Encrypt(AskT, j)
T ′ ← Receive(pk,Param′, N, C1, . . . , CN)
if T ′ = 0 then
m′ ← ⊥
return (pk, C ′,m′)
function P((Q1, Q2), stateP)
if Q1 = SendParams then
Parse Q2 as (pk,N,Param1, . . . ,Paramn)
(m0,m1)←M(pk)
b
R← {0, 1}
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,mb)
stateP ← (pk,mb, C∗, N,Param1, . . . ,Paramn)
return (0, stateP)
else if Q1 = AskBit then
Parse Q2 as (i, j)
Parse stateP as (pk,mb, C∗, N,Param1, . . . ,Paramn)
bi ← ith bit of C∗
m← Send(pk,Parami, bi, j)
return (m, stateP)
else if Q1 = SendM then
Parse Q2 as (C
′,m′,Param′))
Parse stateP as (pk,mb, C∗, N,Param1, . . . ,Paramn)
if mb = m
′ then
T ← 1
else
T ← 0
stateP ← (pk,Param′, N, T )
return (0, stateP)
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else if Q1 = AskT then
j ← Q2
Parse stateP ← (pk,Param′, N, T )
m← Send(pk,Param′, T, j)
return (m, stateP)
By the PA2 property of Π, there is an extractor B∗ such that for all dis-
tinguishing algorithms D,
AdvPA2Π,B,B∗,P,D(λ) = |Pr[ExptPA2−RealΠ,B,P,D (λ)− Pr[ExptPA2−FakeΠ,B,B∗,P,D(λ)]| ,
is negligible in λ. Let us now analyse the behaviour of B in the ExptPA2−RealΠ,B,P,D (λ)
experiment. Lemma 2.6.3 shows that for all λ ∈ Λ,
Pr[pk ∈ Ωλ] ≥ 1
p(λ)
,
which is non-negligible since p is a polynomial. Suppose that pk ∈ Ωλ. Then
Lemma 2.6.3 also shows that each bit of C ′ is received correctly by B with
probability at least 1 − 1
(n+1)λα
. Since each bit is recovered independently, it
follows that C ′ = C with probability at least
(
1− 1
(n+ 1)λα
)n
> 1− n
(n+ 1)λα
.
Thus
Pr[C ′ = C] ≥ Pr[C ′ = C|pk ∈ Ωλ] Pr[pk ∈ Ωλ]
≥ 1
p(λ)
(
1− n
(n+ 1)λα
)
.
which is non-negligible. Since decryption queries are answered using the real
decryption algorithm, this implies that the event m′ = mb occurs with the
68
same probability. If m′ = mb then T = 1, and T ′ = 1 with probability at least
1− 1
(n+1)λα
.
Putting it all together we see that
Pr[B outputs m] ≥ 1
p(λ)
(
1− n
(n+ 1)λα
)(
1− 1
(n+ 1)λα
)
>
1
p(λ)
(
1− n
(n+ 1)λα
− 1
(n+ 1)λα
)
=
1
p(λ)
(
1− 1
λα
)
On the other hand, if T ′ = 0, B returns ⊥ by definition. Now consider
the ExptPA2−FakeΠ,B,B∗,P,D(λ) experiment with the distinguishing algorithm D which
simply returns 1 if B outputs ⊥ and 0 otherwise. This shows that that in
the ExptPA2−FakeΠ,B,B∗,P,D(λ) experiment, the probability that B returns m′ 6= ⊥, or
equivalently,
Pr[m′ = mb] ≥ 1
p(λ)
(
1− 1
λα
)
−AdvPA2Π,B,B∗,P,D(λ) .
We construct an IND-CPA adversary C based on B, B∗ and P as follows:
function C1(pk)
R[B] R← {0, 1}TB(λ)
Run (pk, C ′,m′)← B(pk;R[B])
if B queries Encrypt(Q1, Q2) then
if Q1 = SendParams then
stateB ← Suspend(B)
(m0,m1)←M(pk)
Parse Q2 as (pk,N,Param1, . . . ,Paramn)
else
return ⊥ . This will never occur, since the first query
. made by B is always SendParams.
stateC ← (stateB, R[B], pk,m0,m1, N,Param1, . . . ,Paramn)
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return (m0,m1, stateC)
function C2(C∗, stateC)
Parse stateC as (stateB, R[B], pk,m0,m1, N,Param1, . . . ,Paramn)
C ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
Append C to Clist
Run (pk, C ′,m′)← Resume(B, stateB)
return C to B’s previous query.
if B queries Encrypt(Q1, Q2) then
if Q1 = AskBit then
Parse Q2 as (i, j)
bi ← ith bit of C∗
m← Send(pk,Parami, bi, j)
else
Terminate B
C ← Encrypt(pk,m)
Append C to Clist
return C
if B queries Decrypt(C ′) then
m′ ← B∗(pk, C ′, R[B],Clist, ε)
Terminate B
if m′ = m1 then
return 1
else
return 0
By definition of C, ExptIND−CPA−bΠ,C (λ) is identical to ExptPA2−FakeΠ,B,B∗,P ′,D(λ)
until the point where B makes the Decrypt query. The queries that occur after
this point in the PA2-Fake experiment were needed to show that B∗ returns
the correct message, but once we have obtained the valuem′ it is not necessary
for the adversary to continue the simulation. In particular, it follows that:
Pr[m′ = mb] ≥ 1
p(λ)
(
1− 1
λα
)
−AdvPA2Π,B,B∗,P,D(λ) .
We must now bound Pr[ExptIND−CPA−0Π,C (λ) = 1]. By definition of PA2
plaintext awareness, B∗ is independent of the choice of P and does not receive
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the random coins of P . Since the challenger does not ever use the value m1 in
ExptIND−CPA−0Π,C (λ), it follows that m1 is independent of the inputs to B∗, and
thus
Pr[ExptIND−CPA−0Π,C (λ) = 1] ≤
1
|MsgSp(pk)| .
Putting it all together we see that:
AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ) = |Pr[ExptIND−CPA−1Π,C (λ) = 1]− Pr[ExptIND−CPA−0Π,C (λ) = 1]|
≥ 1
p(λ)
(
1− 1
λα
)
−AdvPA2Π,B,B∗,P,D(λ)−
1
|MsgSp(pk)|
which is negligible as required, since |MsgSp(pk)| is super-polynomial.
2.7 Connection Between PA2 And PA2+
Clearly, a scheme which is PA2+ must necessarily be PA2, since an adversary
may simply not use its randomness oracle, but the converse is not obviously
true. We now show that it is true for any IND-CPA secure encryption scheme,
since an adversary may use randomness inherent in a ciphertext generated by
the encryption oracle to simulate a randomness oracle. This in turn implies
that a suitably random PA2 encryption scheme is PA1+, thus giving a formal
proof to the conjecture of Dent [14].
The proof essentially involves constructing a randomness oracle by taking
ciphertexts created by the encryption algorithm and hashing them onto a
single bit using a randomly-chosen universal hash function. The resulting
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distribution on {0, 1} is only a small statistical distance from the uniform
distribution on {0, 1} and the result follows from the Leftover Hash Lemma
[20]. One subtlety of the proof is that we will require the ciphertext creator A∗
that we construct to know the functionality of the plaintext creator P . Hence,
we actually prove that an IND-CPA and 2PA2 plaintext aware encryption
scheme is 2PA2+, and appeal to Theorem 2.5.2 and Theorem 2.6.2 to finish
the proof.
Definition 2.7.1 (Universal Hash Family). A family H = (H,K,A,B) of
functions (Hk)k∈K where each Hk maps A to B is universal if for all x 6= y in
A, Pr[Hk(x) = Hk(y) : k
R← K] ≤ 1/|B|.
This definition was originally given by Carter and Wegman [35]. We will
use a universal function family H = (Hk)k∈K where Hk is a function from
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} for all k ∈ K. For simplicity, we will assume K = {0, 1}n.
Such families are known to exist without any computational assumptions [35].
Definition 2.7.2 (Collision Probability). For any random variable x which
takes values on a set X, we define the collision probability
κ(x) :=
∑
y∈X
Pr[x = y]2 .
Remark 2.7.3. κ(x) is called the collision probability because if x and x′ are
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random variables independent and identically distributed on X,
Pr[x = x′] =
∑
y∈X
Pr[x = x′ = y]
=
∑
y∈X
Pr[x = y ∧ x′ = y]
=
∑
y∈X
Pr[x = y] Pr[x′ = y]
=
∑
y∈X
Pr[x = y]2
= κ(x)
Lemma 2.7.4. Let x be a random variable on a set X. Then
max
z∈X
Pr[x = z] ≤
√
κ(x) .
Proof. Let z ∈ X be an arbitrary element of X. Then
Pr[x = z]2 ≤
∑
y∈X
Pr[x = y]2 = κ(x)
So Pr[x = z] ≤√κ(x).
The Leftover Hash Lemma was originally proved by H˚astard et al. [19]. We
present the version of Leftover Hash Lemma given in Theorem 6.21 of [33].
Theorem 2.7.5 (Leftover Hash Lemma). Let H = (H,K,A,B) be a family of
universal hash functions where |B| = β. Let k R← K, let x1 . . . xn denote any
mutually independent random variables on the set A which are independent of
the choice of k, let (y1, . . . , yn)
R← Bn, and let
κ =
`
max
i=1
{κ(xi)} .
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Then ∆[(k,Hk(x1), . . . , Hk(x`)), (k, y1, . . . , y`)] ≤ `
√
βκ/2.
Lemma 2.7.6. Let Π be an IND-CPA encryption scheme, let M be a deter-
ministic polynomial-time algorithm which takes a public key pk as input and
returns a messagem ∈MsgSp(pk), and let X be a random variable distributed
according to Encrypt(pk,M(pk)). Then there is an IND-CPA adversary C such
that the collision probability
κ(X) = AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ) .
Proof. Let C = (C1, C2) be the following polynomial-time IND-CPA adversary:
function C1(pk)
m0 ←M(pk)
Let m1 be an arbitrary element of MsgSp(pk) \ {m0}.
state← pk
return (m0,m1, state)
function C2(C∗, state)
pk ← state
C ← Encrypt(pk,M(pk))
if C = C∗ then
return 0
else
return 1
Then
AdvIND−CPAΠ,A (λ) = |Pr[ExptIND−CPA−0Π,A (λ) = 0]
−Pr[ExptIND−CPA−1Π,A (λ) = 0]|
= |Pr[C = C∗]− 0|
= Pr[C = C∗]
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because in ExptIND−CPA−1Π,A (λ), Decrypt(sk, C
∗) = m1 6= m0 = Decrypt(sk, C),
so C∗ 6= C. In ExptIND−CPA−0Π,A (λ), C∗ and C are independent and identi-
cally distributed, as they are both generated by Encrypt(pk,M(pk)). Thus
AdvIND−CPAΠ,A (λ) = Pr[C = C
∗] = κ(C) by Remark 2.7.3.
Theorem 2.7.7. Suppose a public key encryption scheme Π = (KeyGen,
Encrypt,Decrypt) is IND-CPA secure and 2PA2 plaintext aware. Then it is
2PA2+ plaintext aware.
Proof. Fix a security parameter λ, and a key pair (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ). Let
`(λ) be an upper bound on |Encrypt(pk, 0)|. Carter and Wegman give con-
structions of universal hash functions mapping {0, 1, . . . , α − 1}n → {0, 1}m
using keys in the set {0, 1}αnm [35] without computational assumptions. How-
ever this only works for fixed length strings. In this case, we would like to
map an element x ∈ {0, 1}≤`(λ) onto {0, 1}. To achieve this, we may first
encode x as a bitstring of length `(λ) by encoding x as the `(λ) + 1 bit string
0`(λ)−|x|||1||x, and then hashing using the construction described above, using
keys of length 2`(λ) + 2 bits.
Let H = (H, {0, 1}2`(λ)+2, {0, 1}≤`(λ), {0, 1}) be a family of universal hash
functions mapping {0, 1}≤`(λ) onto {0, 1}.
Let A be a 2PA2+ ciphertext creator for Π. We construct a 2PA2 cipher-
text creator B as follows:
function B(pk)
k
R← {0, 1}2`(λ)+2
R[A] R← {0, 1}TA(λ)
x← A(pk;R[A])
if A Queries Encrypt(m0,m1) then
C ← Query Encrypt(m0,m1)
return C
75
if A Queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Query Decrypt(C)
return m
if A Queries Randomness then
C ← Query Encrypt(0, 0)
ρ← Hk(C)
return ρ
return x
Since B is a valid 2PA2 ciphertext creator, there exists a plaintext extractor
B∗. We use B∗ to construct a plaintext extractor A∗ for A.
Recall that A∗ takes input (pk, C,R[A],Rlist,Clist, stateA∗). A∗ works by
choosing a hash key k then using the random coins R[A] to simulate the ex-
ecution of A. This allows it to construct a fake ciphertext list ClistB for B∗
which interleaves ciphertexts that come from encryption queries, and cipher-
texts that B would use to obtain random bits. Specifically it works as follows:
function A∗(pk, C,R[A],Rlist,Clist, stateA∗)
if stateA∗ = ε then
k
R← {0, 1}2`(λ)+2
stateB∗ ← ε
stateA ← (pk;R[A])
else
Parse stateA∗ as (k,ClistB,Mlist, stateA, stateB∗ , nc, nr)
Run Resume(A, stateA)
if |Mlist| > 0 then
Return Mlist[|Mlist|] to A’s previous query.
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1 . Randomness query counter
j ← 0
repeat
j ← j + 1
C ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
if j = λ then
Abort . A∗ Fails
until Hk(C) = Rlist[nr]
Append C to ClistB
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
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nc ← nc + 1 . Encryption query counter
Append Clist[nc] to ClistB
return Clist[nc]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C, k||R[A],ClistB, stateB∗)
Append m to Mlist
stateA ← Suspend(A)
stateA∗ ← (k,ClistB,Mlist, stateA, stateB∗ , nc, nr)
return (m, stateA∗)
We now show that AdvPA2+Π,A,A∗,Pβ ,D(λ) is negligible in λ for any distinguish-
ing algorithm D and all β ∈ {0, 1}. Choose β ∈ {0, 1}, fix a distinguishing
algorithm D, let xi be the output of A in Game i and let Si be the event that
D(xi) = 1.
Game 0: Let Game 0 be ExptPA2+FakeΠ,A,A∗,Pβ ,D(λ).
Game 1: We modify the game so that the lists Clist and Rlist that were
computed by A∗ in Game 0 are instead computed by the challenger. Written
out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
k
R← {0, 1}2`(λ)+2
R[A] R← {0, 1}TA(λ)
R[B]← k||R[A]
Run x1 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R[B],ClistB, stateB∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
m← Pβ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
Append C to ClistB
return C
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
repeat
j ← j + 1
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if j = λ then
Abort
C ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
until Hk(C) = ρ
Append C to ClistB
return ρ
b′1 ← D(x1)
return b′1
Since the challenger computes Clist and Rlist using the same inputs and
randomness that A∗ did in game 0, their values in game 1 are unchanged, i.e.
this is a bridging step. So Pr[S1] = Pr[S0].
Game 2: We modify the Randomness oracle so that it puts the ciphertexts it
generates onto Clist. Since this makes Clist and ClistB identical, we also remove
ClistB and just use Clist instead. Written out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
k
R← {0, 1}2`(λ)+2
R[A] R← {0, 1}TA(λ)
R[B]← k||R[B]
Run x2 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R[B],Clist, stateB∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
m← Pβ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
repeat
j ← j + 1
if j = λ then
Abort
C ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
until Hk(C) = ρ
Append C to Clist
return ρ
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b′2 ← D(x2)
return b′2
In Game 2, the ciphertexts that were generated by the randomness oracle
are added to Clist, and A may not query Decrypt(C) for any ciphertext C ∈
Clist. These ciphertexts are not given to A, but A could by chance generate
such a ciphertext independently. Let F be the event that A queries Decrypt(C)
for some ciphertext C which was added to Clist in response to a randomness
query.
For a given element C ∈ Clist which was computed as part of a randomness
query, and for a given Decrypt query C ′,
Pr[C = C ′] ≤ max
y∈CiphSp(pk)
Pr[C = y]
≤
√
κ(C)
by Lemma 2.7.4. But κ(C) ≤ AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ) by Lemma 2.7.6, so
Pr[C = C ′] ≤
√
AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ) .
Since A makes at most qd decryption queries and at most qr randomness
queries, we see that
Pr[F ] ≤ qdqr
√
AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ) ,
So
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ qdqr
√
AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ) .
Game 3: We modify the randomness oracle so that it does not limit the
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number of attempts to find C such that Hk(C) = ρ.
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
k
R← {0, 1}2`(λ)+2
R[A] R← {0, 1}TA(λ)
R[B]← k||R[B]
Run x3 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R[B],Clist, stateB∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
m← Pβ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
repeat
C ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
until Hk(C) = ρ
Append C to Clist
return ρ
b′3 ← D(x3)
return b′3
Note that this game no longer runs in polynomial time (although the ex-
pected running time is still polynomial). This is not a problem, as there is no
need for the challenger to be efficient. We will restore the polynomial running
time in the next game hop.
Let Fi be the event that Game 3 aborts because j = λ during the i
th ran-
domness query, and let F =
⋃qr
i=1 Fi. We now compute an upper bound on
Pr[F ]. As noted earlier, κ(C) ≤ AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ), where C is as in Lemma 2.7.6.
By Lemma 2.7.5, it follows that the statistical distance ∆((k,Hk(C)), (k, ρ))
where ρ
R← {0, 1} is negligible as a function of λ. Thus for sufficiently large
values of λ, ∆((k,Hk(C)), (k, b)) ≤ 1/6. This implies that 13 ≤ Pr[Hk(C) =
0] = (1−Pr[Hk(C) = 1]) ≤ 23 , where the probability statements are taken over
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the random choice of k and the coins used to compute C ← Encrypt(pk, 0).
Thus Pr[Fi] ≤ (23)λ for all i and so Pr[F ] ≤ qr(23)λ which is negligible. If the
event F does not occur then the two games proceed identically, so
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ qr
(
2
3
)λ
.
Game 4: We modify the randomness oracle so that instead of choosing ρ at
random, it computes a ciphertext C ′ ← Encrypt(pk, 0) and sets ρ← Hk(C).
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
k
R← {0, 1}2`(λ)+2
R[A] R← {0, 1}TA(λ)
R[B]← k||R[B]
Run x4 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R[B],Clist, stateB∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
m← Pβ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
if A queries Randomness then
C ′ ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
ρ← Hk(C ′)
repeat
C ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
until Hk(C) = ρ
Append C to Clist
return ρ
b′4 ← D(x4)
return b′4
Consider an algorithm G which takes a security parameter λ and a se-
quence of bits (ρ1, . . . , ρqr) as input and then runs according to the definition of
Game 3 except that instead of choosing random bits to respond to randomness
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queries, it uses the sequence provided as input. Let (ρ1, . . . , ρqr)
R← {0, 1}qr ,
let Ci ← Encrypt(pk, 0) and let ρ′i ← Hk(C ′) for i = 1 to qr. Then Pr[S3] =
Pr[G(λ, ρ1, . . . , ρqr) = 1] and Pr[S4] = Pr[G(λ, ρ
′
1, . . . , ρ
′
qr) = 1] by definition,
since the code is identical.
By Lemma 2.7.6, there is an IND-CPA adversary C such that κ(C) =
AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ). Thus by Theorem 2.7.5, ∆[(k, ρ
′
1, . . . , ρ
′
qr), (k, ρ1, . . . , ρqr)] ≤
qr
√
2κ(C)/2, where qr is an upper bound on the number of randomness queries
made by A.
Thus by Lemma 1.2.1,
∆[x4, x3] = ∆[G(ρ
′
1, . . . , ρ
′
qr), G(ρ1, . . . , ρqr)]
≤ ∆[(ρ′1, . . . , ρ′qr), (ρ1, . . . , ρqr)]
≤ qr
√
2AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ)/2 .
So
|Pr[S4]− Pr[S3]| ≤ qr
√
2AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ)/2 .
Game 5: We modify the Randomness oracle so that it simply computes C ←
Encrypt(pk, 0) and lets ρ← Hk(C). Written out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
k
R← {0, 1}2`(λ)+2
R[A] R← {0, 1}TA(λ)
R[B]← k||R[B]
Run x5 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
(m, stateB∗)← B∗(pk, C,R[B],Clist, stateB∗)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
m← Pβ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
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return C
if A queries Randomness then
C ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
ρ← Hk(C)
Append C to Clist
return ρ
b′5 ← D(x5)
return b′5
This is a bridging step; in game 4 C and C ′ are independent and identically
distributed (i.e. they are drawn from the distribution of C ′′ ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
restricted to those ciphertexts C ′′ such that Hk(C ′′) = ρ). As C ′ is not used
elsewhere, we may replace C ′ with C.
Game 6: Note that Game 5 exactly simulates ExptPA2−FakeΠ,B,B∗,Pβ ,D(λ). Let Game
6 be ExptPA2−RealΠ,B,Pβ ,D (λ). Written out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
k
R← {0, 1}2`(λ)+2
Run x6 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
m← Pβ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
if A queries Randomness then
C ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
ρ← Hk(C)
Append C to Clist
return ρ
b′6 ← D(x6)
return b′6
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By the 2PA2 property of Π,
|Pr[S6]− Pr[S5]| ≤ Adv2PA2Π,B,Pβ ,D(λ) ,
which is negligible in λ.
Game 7: We modify the randomness oracle so that it no longer adds C to
Clist. Written out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
k
R← {0, 1}2`(λ)+2
Run x7 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
m← Pβ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
if A queries Randomness then
C ← Encrypt(pk, 0)
ρ← Hk(C)
return ρ
b′7 ← D(x7)
return b7
By the same reasoning as in Game 2,
|Pr[S7]− Pr[S6]| ≤ qdqr
√
AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ) .
Game 8: We modify the randomness oracle again, so that it simply chooses
ρ
R← {0, 1} again. Written out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
k
R← {0, 1}2`(λ)+2
Run x8 ← ADecrypt,Encrypt(pk)
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if A queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(s) then
m← Pβ(pk, s)
C ← Encrypt(m)
Append C to Clist
return C
if A queries Randomness then
ρ
R← {0, 1}
return ρ
b′8 ← D(x8)
return b′8
By the same reasoning as in Game 4,
|Pr[S8]− Pr[S7]| ≤ qr
√
2AdvIND−CPAΠ,C (λ)/2 .
Finally, we see that Game 8 is exactly ExptPA2+RealΠ,A,Pβ ,D(λ). Putting it all
together we see that
AdvPA2+Π,A,A∗,P,D(λ) = |Pr[S7]− Pr[S0]|
≤ |Pr[S7]− Pr[S6]|+ . . .+ |Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]
= (2qr/
√
2 + 2qdqr)Adv
IND−CPA
Π,C (λ) +Adv
2PA2
Π,B,Pβ ,D(λ)
+qr
(
2
3
)λ
which is negligible in λ as required.
Corollary 2.7.8. Suppose a public key encryption scheme Π is PA2 plaintext
aware, and IND-CPA secure. Then Π is PA2+ plaintext aware.
Proof. Since Π is PA2 plaintext aware and IND-CPA secure, we have that it
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is LH-IND-CCA2 secure by Theorem 2.6.2. Since Π is 2PA2 plaintext aware
and IND-CPA, we have that it is 2PA2+ plaintext aware by Theorem 2.7.7.
Since Π is LH-IND-CCA2 secure, and is 2PA2+ plaintext aware, we have that
it is PA2+ plaintext aware by Theorem 2.5.2.
2.8 Conclusion
Theorem 2.6.2 shows that the PA2 definition rules out encryption schemes
which allow arbitrarily long messages, and I think this is a valuable property
for an encryption scheme to have. On the other hand, Theorem 2.4.6 shows
that for schemes where the comparison makes sense, 2PA2 is as good as PA2
plaintext awareness. For these reasons, it is my belief that although 2PA2 is
a weaker definition than PA2, it is more useful because it can cover a wider
range of encryption schemes.
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Chapter 3
Encryption Schemes based on
Hash Proof Systems
Hash proof systems based on subset membership problems were introduced
by Cramer and Shoup [11] in 2002 to generalise their earlier, DDH-based,
encryption scheme [10] to a wider class of computational problems. Kurosawa
and Desmedt [22] proposed a more efficient scheme in 2004 based on the DDH
problem and which makes use of similar techniques to the original Cramer-
Shoup scheme. In the same paper, Kurosawa and Desmedt presented a version
of their scheme based on hash proof systems.
These constructions based on hash proof systems are one of only two
generic constructions of IND-CCA2 secure public-key encryption schemes in
the standard model, the other being the Canetti-Halevi-Katz construction,
which uses an IND-CPA secure identity-based encryption scheme. The schemes
based on hash-proof systems are a particularly important group, because there
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are instantiations based on a diverse selection of computational problems, in-
cluding the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem, the quadratic residu-
osity problem (QR), the decision composite residuosity (DCR) problem and
others. This wide range of assumptions gives us some flexibility: if, for ex-
ample, the DDH problem was found to be easy on elliptic curves, we could
still rely on the DCR based instantiation of the scheme. We will discuss the
various constructions of hash proof systems further in Section 3.3.
3.1 Definitions
In this chapter, we present definitions for hash proof systems, and concepts
introduced by Dent [14] to show that the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme is
PA2 plaintext aware. In the next two chapters we will apply these techniques
to the generalised Kurosawa-Desmedt and Cramer-Shoup schemes based on
hash proof systems are PA2 plaintext aware.
3.1.1 Simulatability
Dent [14] showed that a variant of the standard discrete-log-based Cramer-
Shoup encryption scheme is PA2 plaintext aware by first showing it was PA1+
plaintext aware, and that is satisfies a notion he called “simulatability”. This
property captures the idea that there is a pair of functions, which we call
a simulator, mapping random ciphertexts to random-looking bit strings and
vice-versa. Essentially this allows you to “simulate” the output of an encryp-
tion oracle in the PA2 game using the randomness oracle of the PA1+ game.
The definitions presented here are based on the work of Dent [14] but are
presented with significantly increased formalism.
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Simulatable Sets
A simulator for a family of collections of finite sets S = ((Si)i∈Iλ)λ∈N indexed by
a set Iλ is a tuple fS = (fS, f
−1
S , nS) where nS : N→ N is a polynomial (called
the length function) and (fS, f
−1
S ) is a pair of polynomial-time algorithms with
the following properties:
• fS is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
1λ, an index i ∈ Iλ, and r ∈ {0, 1}nS(λ), and returns an element s ∈ Si.
• f−1S is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
1λ, an index i ∈ Iλ, and s ∈ Si, and returns a string r ∈ {0, 1}nS(λ).
• For all λ ∈ N, i ∈ Iλ, s ∈ Si, fS(1λ, i, f−1S (1λ, i, s)) = s.
We require a simulator for S to satisfy two security properties, related to
indistinguishability. An adversary A against the Set-Sim property of fS is a
probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm which takes a security parameter 1λ,
an index i ∈ Iλ, and an element s ∈ Si as input, and returns a bit b. We require
that no adversary can distinguish a randomly chosen element of the set from
an element chosen using the simulator. We define experiments Set-Sim-0 and
Set-Sim-1 which capture this notion as follows:
ExptSet−Sim−0S,A,fS (λ)
i
R← Iλ
s
R← Si
b′ ← A(1λ, i, s)
return b
ExptSet−Sim−1S,A,fS (λ)
i
R← Iλ
r
R← {0, 1}nS(λ)
s
R← fS(1λ, i, r)
b′ ← B(1λ, i, s)
return b
For all λ ∈ N, we define the Set-Sim advantage of A as:
AdvSet−SimS,A,fS (λ) = |Pr[ExptSet−Sim−0S,A,fS (λ) = 1]− Pr[ExptSet−Sim−1S,A,fS (λ) = 1]| .
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A Rand-Sim adversary B against the randomness of fS is a probabilistic,
polynomial-time algorithm which takes a security parameter 1λ, an index i ∈
Iλ and an string r ∈ {0, 1}nS(λ) as input, and returns a bit b′. We require
that no adversary should be able to distinguish a randomly chosen string
r ∈ {0, 1}nS(λ) from f−1S (1λ, i, fS(1λ, i, r)). Instead of using the simulator and
the inverse, we could have selected an element of Si and used only the inverse
f−1, but our method has the advantage that we can use the same Rand-Sim
definition when we come to consider simulatable encryption schemes. We
define the two experiments as follows:
ExptRand−Sim−0S,B,fS (λ)
i
R← Iλ
r
R← {0, 1}nS(λ)
b′ ← B(1λ, i, r)
return b
ExptRand−Sim−1S,B,fS (λ)
i
R← Iλ
r
R← {0, 1}nS(λ)
r′ ← f−1S (1λ, i, fS(1λ, i, r))
b′ ← B(1λ, i, r′)
return b
For all λ ∈ N, we define the Rand-Sim advantage of A as:
AdvRand−SimS,B,fS (λ) = |Pr[ExptRand−Sim−0S,B,fS (λ) = 1]−Pr[ExptRand−Sim−1S,B,fS (λ) = 1]| .
Definition 3.1.1 (Computationally Simulatable Sets). A family of sets S =
((Si)i∈Iλ)λ∈N is computationally simulatable if there exists a simulator fS =
(fS, f
−1
S , nS) such that:
• For all probabilistic polynomial-time Set-Sim adversaries A, the advan-
tage AdvSet−SimS,A,fS (λ) is negligible in λ, and
• For all probabilistic polynomial-time Rand-Sim adversaries B, the ad-
vantage AdvRand−SimS,B,fS (λ) is negligible in λ.
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Definition 3.1.2 (Statistically Simulatable Sets). A family S = ((Si)i∈Iλ)λ∈N
of sets is statistically simulatable if there exists a simulator fS = (fS, f
−1
S , nS)
such that
• For all λ ∈ N, i ∈ Iλ, for r R← {0, 1}nS(λ), for s R← Si, and for s′ ←
fS(1
λ, i, r), the statistical distance ∆[(1λ, i, s), (1λ, i, s′)] is negligible as a
function of λ.
• For all λ ∈ N, i ∈ Iλ, for r R← {0, 1}nS(λ) and for r′ ← f−1S (1λ, i, fS(1λ, i, r)),
the statistical distance ∆[(1λ, i, r), (1λ, i, r′)] is negligible as a function of
λ.
Note that these are simply statistical analogues of the computational Set-Sim
and Rand-Sim properties respectively.
Simulatable Public-Key Encryption Schemes
We say a public-key encryption scheme Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is sim-
ulatable if there exists a polynomial-time simulator fΠ = (fΠ, f
−1
Π , nΠ) for
the family (CiphSp(pk)pk∈PKλ)λ∈N, where PKλ is the set of public keys, i.e
PKλ = {pk ∈ {0, 1}∗|Pr[KeyGen(1λ) = (pk, sk) for some sk] > 0}.
A PKE-Sim adversary against the simulatability of a public-key encryption
scheme is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A = (A1,A2),
where A1, takes a security parameter 1λ and a public key pk as input, and
returns a message m ∈MsgSp(pk) and some state information state, and A2
takes a security parameter 1λ, a ciphertext C∗ ∈ CiphSp(pk) and the value
state that was returned by A1 as input, and returns a single bit b′. Both A1
and A2 have access to an oracle Decrypt which takes a ciphertext C as input
and returns Decrypt(sk, C), but A2 may not query Decrypt on the challenge
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ciphertext C∗. We require that it is hard to distinguish a valid encryption of
the message m returned by A1 from a simulated encryption computed using
fΠ. We now describe the PKE-Simulatability experiment:
ExptPKE−Sim−0Π,A,fΠ (λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (1λ, pk)
C∗ ← Encrypt(pk,m)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (1λ, C∗, state)
return b′
ExptPKE−Sim−1Π,A,fΠ (λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (1λ, pk)
r
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
C∗ ← fΠ(pk, r)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (1λ, C∗, state)
return b′
For all λ ∈ N, we define the PKE-Sim advantage of A as:
AdvPKE−SimΠ,A,fΠ (λ) = |Pr[ExptPKE−Sim−1Π,A,fΠ (λ) = 1]− Pr[ExptPKE−Sim−0Π,A,fΠ (λ) = 1]| .
Definition 3.1.3. A public-key encryption scheme Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,
Decrypt) is simulatable if there exists a simulator fΠ = (fΠ, f
−1
Π , nΠ) such that:
• For all probabilistic polynomial-time PKE-Sim adversaries A, the ad-
vantage AdvPKE−SimΠ,A,fΠ (λ) is negligible in λ.
• For all probabilistic polynomial-time Rand-Sim adversaries B, the ad-
vantage AdvRand−SimΠ,B,fΠ (λ) is negligible in λ.
We only define computational simulatability for encryption schemes for
two reasons: Firstly, we will not need statistical notions of simulatability for
encryption schemes. Secondly, if we did define a statistical analogue of this
notion, it is clear that no public-key encryption scheme could meet it, since
that would contradict the soundness requirement of the scheme.
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Simulatable Symmetric Encryption Schemes
Let fΣ = (fΣ, f
−1
Σ , nΣ) be a polynomial-time simulator for (CiphSp(λ))λ∈N.
An adversary against the simulatability of a DEM Σ = (enc, dec) is a pair of
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A = (A1,A2) such that A1 takes a
security parameter 1λ as input and returns a message m ∈ MsgSp(λ) and
some state information state, and A2 takes a ciphertext χ∗ ∈ CiphSp(λ) and
the value state that was returned by A1 as input and returns a single bit b′.
A1 and A2 have access to an oracle dec which takes a ciphertext χ as input
and returns a message m. A2 may not query dec on the challenge ciphertext
χ∗. We now describe the DEM-Simulatability experiment:
ExptDEM−Sim−0Σ,A,fΣ (λ)
κ
R← {0, 1}`(λ)
(m, state)← Adec(κ, · )1 (1λ)
χ∗ ← enc(κ,m)
b′ ← Adec(κ, · )2 (χ∗, state)
return b′
ExptDEM−Sim−1Σ,A,fΣ (λ)
κ
R← {0, 1}`(λ)
(m, state)← Adec(κ, · )1 (1λ)
r
R← {0, 1}n(λ)
χ∗ ← fΣ(1λ, r)
b′ ← Adec(κ, · )2 (χ∗, state)
return b′
For all λ ∈ N, we define the DEM-Sim advantage of A as:
AdvDEM−SimΣ,A,fΣ (λ) = |Pr[ExptDEM−Sim−1Π,A,fΣ (λ) = 1]−Pr[ExptDEM−Sim−0Σ,A,fΣ (λ) = 1]| .
Definition 3.1.4. A DEM Σ = (enc, dec) is simulatable if there exists a sim-
ulator fΣ = (fΣ, f
−1
Σ , nΣ) such that
• For all probabilistic polynomial-time DEM-Sim adversaries A, the ad-
vantage AdvDEM−SimΣ,A,fΣ (λ) is negligible in λ, and
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• For all probabilistic polynomial-time Rand-Sim adversaries, the advan-
tage AdvRand−SimΣ,A,fΣ (λ) is negligible in λ.
As with the public-key case, we will not need statistical notions of simu-
latability for DEMs.
3.1.2 Differences from Dent’s formulation
The notions of simulatability presented above are based on those introduced
by Dent [14]. We have modified Dent’s definitions in several ways; we describe
the changes below:
• Dent defined simulatable groups rather than simulatable sets; this dif-
ference is irrelevant, since the definition does not rely on the group op-
eration in any way, only the underlying set.
• Dent’s definitions did not take into account the fact that the size of
the set or group in question must depend on the security parameter.
We address this by defining simulatability for an infinite family of sets
rather than a single set.
• Dent only defined computational notions of simulatability, while the sta-
tistical notions appear to be necessary for some parts of the proof.
• In Dent’s definitions, the adversary is given access to an oracle which will
supply elements of the set (or ciphertext space of an encryption scheme),
rather than providing a single element as we have done here. We feel
our formalism is clearer, and will now show that the two definitions are
equivalent.
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3.1.3 Single vs. Multiple element Simulatability
The biggest change we have made to the definition is that in Dent’s model,
instead of providing a single element, the adversary may query an oracle as
many times as it likes to get new element sampled according to the appropriate
distribution.
Dent’s variant of the PKE-Sim property is defined as follows:
ExptDent−PKE−Sim−0Π,A,fΠ (λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run b← ADecrypt,Encrypt(1λ, pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(m) then
C ← Encrypt(pk,m)
return C
return b
ExptDent−PKE−Sim−1Π,A,fΠ (λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
Run b← ADecrypt,Encrypt(1λ, pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
m← Decrypt(sk, C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(m) then
r
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
C∗ ← fΠ(pk, r)
return b
In the above, A may not query the Decrypt oracle on any ciphertext C
returned by the Encrypt oracle. For all λ ∈ N, we define the Dent-PKE-Sim
advantage of A as:
AdvDent−PKE−SimΠ,A,fΠ (λ) = |Pr[ExptDent−PKE−Sim−1Π,A,fΠ (λ) = 1]
−Pr[ExptDent−PKE−Sim−0Π,A,fΠ (λ) = 1]|
We will prove that our definition is equivalent up to a factor of the number
of queries, which is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter.
Lemma 3.1.5. Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a public-key encryption
scheme. Then for every Dent-PKE-Sim adversary A there is a sequence of
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adversaries B1,B2, . . . , such that for all λ ∈ N
AdvDent−PKE−SimΠ,A,fΠ (λ) ≤
qe(λ)∑
i=1
AdvPKE−SimΠ,Bi,fΠ (λ)
where qe(λ) is an upper bound on the number of encryption queries made
by A when run in ExptPKE−Sim−0Π,A,fΠ (λ) or ExptPKE−Sim−1Π,A,fΠ (λ). Since A runs in
polynomial time, qe(λ) is polynomially-bounded. In particular, this implies that
if Π is simulatable then AdvDent−PKE−SimΠ,A,fΠ (λ) is negligible in λ. Conversely,
for every PKE-Sim adversary C there is a Dent-PKE-Sim adversary D such
that AdvPKE−SimΠ,C,fΠ (λ) = Adv
Dent−PKE−Sim
Π,D,fΠ (λ).
Proof. Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be a public-key encryption scheme
and let fΠ = (fΠ, f
−1
Π , nΠ) be a simulator for Π. Let A be an adversary against
the Dent-PKE-Sim property. We construct PKE-Sim adversaries B1,B2, . . . as
follows:
function Bj,1(1λ, pk)
Run (m, state)← AEncrypt,Decrypt(1λ, pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
Query m← Decrypt(C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(m) then
ne ← ne + 1
if ne < j then
r
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
C ← fΠ(pk, r)
return C
else if ne = j then
stateA ← Suspend(A)
stateB ← (pk, stateA)
return (m, stateB)
function Bj,2(1λ, C∗, stateB)
Parse stateB as (pk, stateA)
Run b′ ← Resume(A(stateA))
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return C∗ in response to A’s Encrypt query
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
Query m← Decrypt(C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(m) then
C ← Encrypt(pk,m)
return C
return b′
Fix λ ∈ N. We now show that the advantage AdvDent−PKE−SimΠ,A,fΠ (λ) ≤∑qe(λ)
i=1 Adv
PKE−Sim
Π,Bi,fΠ (λ) via a sequence of games: Game 0 to Game qe(λ)
Game j: For 0 ≤ j ≤ qe, let Game j be as follows:
Run b′ ← A(1λ, pk)
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
Query m← Decrypt(C)
return m
if A queries Encrypt(m) then
ne ← ne + 1
if ne ≤ j then
r
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
C ← fΠ(pk, r)
else if ne > j then
C ← Encrypt(pk,m)
return C
return b
Let Sj = Pr[b = 1] in Game j. Since every encryption query is answered us-
ing the real Encrypt algorithm, Game 0 is equivalent toExptDent−PKE−Sim−0Π,A,fΠ (λ).
Likewise, Game qe is identical to Expt
Dent−PKE−Sim−1
Π,Bj ,fΠ (λ). To complete the
proof, we note that ExptPKE−Sim−0Π,Bj ,fΠ (λ) exactly simulates the environment of
Game j−1, and ExptPKE−Sim−1Π,Bi,fΠ (λ) exactly simulates the environment of Game
j. Thus
AdvPKE−SimΠ,Bj ,fΠ (λ) ≤ |Pr[Sj−1]− Pr[Sj]| .
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Putting it all together, we have
AdvDent−PKE−SimΠ,A,fΠ (λ) = |Pr[Sqe(λ)]− Pr[S0]|
≤ |Pr[Sqe(λ)]− Pr[Sqe(λ)−1]|+ . . .+ |Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]|
≤ AdvPKE−SimΠ,Bqe(λ),fΠ(λ) + . . .+Adv
PKE−Sim
Π,B1,fΠ (λ)
≤ qe(λ) qe(λ)max
j=1
AdvPKE−SimΠ,Bj ,fΠ (λ)
which is negligible in λ as required. For the converse, let C be an adversary
against the PKE-Sim property of Π. We construct an adversary D against the
Dent-PKE-Sim property as follows:
function D(1λ, pk)
Run (m, state)← CDecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if C1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Query m← Decrypt(C)
return m
Query C∗ ← Encrypt(m)
Run b′ ← CDecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if C2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Query m← Decrypt(C)
return m
return b′
D satisfies the requirement that it may not query Decrypt on any ciphertext
returned by the encryption oracle by the corresponding property of C. D
exactly simulates the environment of C, and D wins if and only if C does.
Thus
AdvPKE−SimΠ,C,fΠ (λ) = Adv
Dent−PKE−Sim
Π,D,fΠ (λ)
as claimed.
We may define similar (multi-query) security notions for DEM-Sim, Set-
Sim and Rand-Sim. These multi-query security notions can be shown to be
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equivalent to the single-query notions defined above. In particular, this means
we may employ the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1.6 (Dent). Let Π = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt) be an encryption
scheme which is both simulatable and PA1+ plaintext aware. Then Π is PA2
plaintext aware.
The proof of this is given as Theorem 3 in Dent’s paper [14].
3.1.4 Subset Membership Problems
The following definitions are based on those originally presented by Cramer
and Shoup [11]. A subset membership problem consists of a pair of probabilis-
tic polynomial-time algorithms M = (ISA, SSA) with the following properties:
• ISA, the instance sampling algorithm, takes a security parameter 1λ as
input and returns an instance Λ = (X,L,W,R), where X, L and W are
non-empty sets, and R ⊂ X×W is an NP relation for L, i.e a polynomial-
time checkable relation with the property x ∈ L ⇐⇒ (x,w) ∈ R for
some w ∈ W . For all λ ∈ N, we let Iλ be the distribution defined by
ISA(1λ). We will write XΛ for the set X associated with the instance Λ
if necessary for clarity, or simply X if it is unambiguous.
• SSA, the subset sampling algorithm takes a security parameter 1λ and an
instance Λ ∈ Iλ as input, and returns a pair (x,w), where x is uniformly
distributed on L, and (x,w) ∈ R.
We will assume that X is polynomial-time decidable, i.e, there is a deter-
ministic polynomial-time algorithm which takes a security parameter 1λ, an
instance Λ ∈ Iλ, and a bitstring ζ ∈ {0, 1}∗, and returns 1 if ζ ∈ XΛ and 0
otherwise.
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An adversary A against the hardness of a subset membership problem M
is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which takes a security parameter
1λ, an instance Λ ∈ Iλ and an element x ∈ X as input, and returns a bit b.
We define two experiments:
ExptSMP−LM,A (λ)
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(x,w)← SSA(Λ)
b← A(1λ,Λ, x)
return b
Expt
SMP−X\L
M,A (λ)
Λ← ISA(1λ)
x
R← X \ L
b← A(1λ,Λ, x)
return b
Note that we do not assume it is possible to sample the distribution x
R←
X \ L in polynomial time.
Definition 3.1.7 (Subset Membership Problem). A subset membership prob-
lem is hard if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the advan-
tage
AdvSMPM,A(λ) = |Pr[ExptSMP−X\LM,A (λ) = 1]− Pr[ExptSMP−LM,A (λ) = 1]|
is negligible in λ.
We now show that if a subset membership problem is hard, no polynomial-
time algorithm can distinguish X from X \ L.
Lemma 3.1.8. Let M be a hard subset membership problem, and let Λ =
(X,L,W,R) ← ISAM(1λ). Let x1 R← X \ L and let x2 R← X. Then for any
polynomial-time algorithm C, then ² = |Pr[C(x1) = 1] − Pr[C(x2) = 1]| is
negligible.
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Proof. Let x3
R← L. Then
Pr[C(x2) = 1] = Pr[C(x2) = 1 | x2 ∈ X \ L] Pr[x2 ∈ X \ L]
+Pr[C(x2) = 1 | x2 ∈ L] Pr[x2 ∈ L]
= Pr[C(x2) = 1 | x2 ∈ X \ L] ·
(
1− |L||X|
)
+Pr[C(x2) = 1 | x2 ∈ L] · |L||X|
= Pr[C(x1) = 1] ·
(
1− |L||X|
)
+ Pr[C(x3) = 1] · |L||X| ,
since the distribution of x2 conditioned on x2 ∈ X \ L is uniform on X \ L,
and the distribution of x2 conditioned on x2 ∈ L is uniform on L. So
² = |Pr[C(x1) = 1]− Pr[C(x2) = 1]|
=
∣∣∣∣Pr[C(x1) = 1]− (Pr[C(x1) = 1] · (1− |L||X|
)
+ Pr[C(x3) = 1] · |L||X|
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Pr[C(x1) = 1] · |L||X| − Pr[C(x3) = 1] · |L||X|
∣∣∣∣
=
|L|
|X| · |Pr[C(x1) = 1]− Pr[C(x3) = 1]| .
Since |Pr[C(x1) = 1]−Pr[C(x3) = 1]| = AdvSMPM,C (λ), it is negligible in λ by
assumption, so |Pr[C(x1) = 1]− Pr[C(x2) = 1]| is negligible as required.
3.1.5 Projective Hash Families
We present definitions for universal projective hash families, originally defined
by Cramer and Shoup [11]. Let X, S and Π be finite non-empty sets, and
let L ⊂ X be a non-empty subset of X. Let H = (Hk)k∈K be a collection of
functions indexed by a set K such that Hk : X → Π and let α : K → S be a
polynomial-time computable function. The tuple H = (H,K,X,L,Π, S, α) is
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a projective hash family if the value s = α(k) uniquely determines the action
of Hk on L, i.e. for all k, k
′ ∈ K and for all x ∈ L, α(k) = α(k′) =⇒ Hk(x) =
Hk′(x).
Definition 3.1.9 (Universal2 Projective Hashing). A projective hash family
H is ²-universal2 if for all x ∈ X \ L, for all x∗ ∈ X \ (L ∪ {x}), for all
pi, pi∗ ∈ Π, for all s ∈ S and for k R← K:
Pr[Hk(x) = pi ∧Hk(x∗) = pi∗ ∧ α(k) = s] ≤ ²Pr[Hk(x∗) = pi∗ ∧ α(k) = s] .
A projective hash family H is ²-universal if for all x ∈ X \L, for all pi ∈ Π,
for all s ∈ S and for k R← K:
Pr[Hk(x) = pi ∧ α(k) = s] ≤ ²Pr[α(k) = s] .
Lemma 3.1.10. Let H be an ²-universal2 projective hash family. Then H is
²-universal.
Proof. For any x in X \ L, pi, pi∗ ∈ Π, s ∈ S and for k R← K, fix an element
x∗ ∈ X \ (L ∪ {x}). Then
Pr[Hk(x) = pi ∧ α(k) = s]
=
∑
pi∗∈Π
Pr[Hk(x) = pi ∧Hk(x∗) = pi∗ ∧ α(k) = s]
≤
∑
pi∗∈Π
²Pr[Hk(x
∗) = pi∗ ∧ α(k) = s]
= ²
∑
pi∗∈Π
Pr[Hk(x
∗) = pi∗ ∧ α(k) = s]
= ²Pr[Hk(x
∗) ∈ Π ∧ α(k) = s]
= ²Pr[α(k) = s] .
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3.1.6 Strong Universality
Kurosawa and Desmedt [22] define a projective hash family H to be strongly-
universal if for all x ∈ X \ L, for all pi ∈ Π, for all s ∈ S and for k R← K:
Pr[Hk(x) = pi ∧ α(k) = s] = 1|Π| Pr[α(k) = s] ,
and projective hash family H is is strongly universal2 if for all x ∈ X \ L, for
all x∗ ∈ X \ (L ∪ {x}), for all pi, pi∗ ∈ Π, for all s ∈ S and for k R← K:
Pr[Hk(x) = pi ∧Hk(x∗) = pi∗ ∧ α(k) = s] = 1|Π| Pr[Hk(x
∗) = pi∗ ∧ α(k) = s] .
Now, suppose that H is 1|Π| -universal, i.e for all x ∈ X \ L, for all pi ∈ Π,
for all s ∈ S and for k R← K:
Pr[Hk(x) = pi ∧ α(k) = s] ≤ 1|Π| Pr[α(k) = s] ,
and suppose also that there exist xˆ ∈ X, pˆi ∈ Π and sˆ ∈ S such that for
k
R← K
Pr[Hk(xˆ) = pˆi ∧ α(k) = sˆ] < 1|Π| Pr[α(k) = sˆ] .
Then for k
R← K,
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Pr[α(k) = sˆ] =
∑
pi∈Π
Pr[Hk(xˆ) = pi ∧ α(k) = sˆ]
=
∑
pi∈Π\{pˆi}
Pr[Hk(xˆ) = pi ∧ α(k) = sˆ] + Pr[Hk(xˆ) = pˆi ∧ α(k) = sˆ]
≤ |Π| − 1|Π| Pr[α(k) = sˆ] + Pr[Hk(xˆ) = pˆi ∧ α(k) = sˆ]
<
|Π| − 1
|Π| Pr[α(k) = sˆ] +
1
|Π| Pr[α(k) = sˆ]
= Pr[α(k) = sˆ]
which is a contradiction. This implies that if a projective hash family H is
1/|Π|-universal, then it is strongly-universal. Conversely, a strongly uniform
projective hash family is 1/|Π|-universal, thus strongly-universal is equivalent
to 1/|Π|-universal. We will use the notation 1/|Π|-universal throughout this
work.
Definition 3.1.11 (Smooth Projective Hashing). H is ²-smooth if for k
R← K,
s← α(k), x R← X \ L, pi ← Hk(x) and pi′ R← Π,
∆[(x, s, pi′), (x, s, pi)] ≤ ² .
3.1.7 Hash Proof Systems
A hash proof system (HPS) P for a subset membership problem M asso-
ciates a projective hash family H = (H,K,X,L,Π, S, α) to each instance
Λ = (X,L,W,R) ofM. The HPS must also provide the following polynomial-
time algorithms:
• PrivateH takes input (k, x) where k ∈ K and x ∈ X and returns Hk(x).
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• PublicH takes input (s, x, w) where s = α(k) and (x,w) ∈ R, and returns
Hk(x).
Note that the output of Public is well defined, since α(k) determines the value
of Hk on L, even though it may not determine the value of Hk on X \ L.
An extended hash proof system Pˆ for a subset membership problem M is
similar to an ordinary hash proof system, except that Pˆ associates a set E
as well as projective hash family Hˆ = (Hˆ, Kˆ,X × E,L × E, Πˆ, Sˆ, αˆ) to each
instance Λ = (X,L,W,R) ofM. The Public and Private evaluation algorithms
take e ∈ E as an additional input.
If the hash familyH is clear from context, such as when we are working with
only one hash family, we will drop the subscript from PublicH and PrivateH.
3.2 On approximating a projective hash fam-
ily
Cramer and Shoup rightly state that the requirements on a projective hash
family are so strong that many families cannot be efficiently implemented, but
can be efficiently approximated. For this reason they include extra stages in
their proofs, that go along the lines of:
“We replace the projective hash family H that P associates with Λ with its
idealisation, which is an ²(λ)-smooth projective hash family that is δ(λ)-close
to H.”
In this work, I have followed the example of Kurosawa and Desmedt [22],
and chosen not to do this. Such approximations are statistically close, and
seem only to cloud the exposition of the proofs. Suffice it to say that it would
be straight forward to modify any proof in this work to include such steps
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as needed, but I do not believe it would add add any value to the work, and
merely obscure the real content of the proofs.
3.2.1 The Subset Witness Knowledge Assumption
Dent’s proof [14] that the Cramer-Shoup scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman
problem [10] is PA2 plaintext aware relies on an extractor assumption, known
as the Diffie-Hellman Knowledge assumption. The DHK assumption was in-
troduced in 1991 by Damg˚ard [13]. To apply Dent’s methodology in the set-
ting of general subset membership problems, we present a generalised DHK
assumption, which we call the Subset Witness Knowledge (SWK) assumption.
The subset witness knowledge experiment for an adversaryA and a stateful
extractor A∗ works as follows:
ExptSWKM,A,A∗(1
λ)
Λ← ISA(1λ)
Run ASWK(Λ)
if A queries SWK(x) then
i← i+ 1
xi ← x
(wi, stateA∗)← A∗(Λ, xi, R[A], stateA∗)
return w
if xi ∈ L and (xi, wi) 6∈ R for some i then
return 1
else
return 0
A has access to an oracle SWK which takes an element x ∈ X as input
and returns A∗(Λ, x, R[A]). Note that the test x ∈ L cannot be performed in
polynomial time; this test is implicit in Damg˚ard’s statement of the definition
of the DHK problem, but not written explicitly. Instead, he states that A∗
returns a correct witness whenever x ∈ L, except perhaps with negligible
probability. We prefer to include this test in the definition of the problem
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itself, to allow our notation to be more consistent with other similar security
experiments. We define
AdvSWKM,A,A∗(λ) = Pr[Expt
SWK
M,A,A∗(λ) = 1] .
A subset membership problemM satisfies the SWK assumption if for every
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, there exists a stateful probabilistic
polynomial-time extractor A∗ such that AdvSWKM,A,A∗(λ) is negligible in λ. We
note that if x 6∈ L then the response of A∗ may be arbitrary. This definition
is unlike most definitions made in security proofs; the “win” condition is not
simply guessing a value correctly. The adversary wins by submitting a value
x ∈ L to the SWK oracle for which the extractor fails to return a witness w
such that (x,w) ∈ R.
Naor [24] classifies cryptographic assumptions according to how hard they
would be to disprove. For example, he shows that the DDH assumption is
“Efficiently Falsifiable”, but the DHK assumption does not even satisfy the
looser requirement of “Somewhat Falsifiable”. The key difference is that to
show that the DDH assumption is false, one would simply have to present
a polynomial-time DDH adversary with non-negligible advantage, but to dis-
prove the SWK assumption, one would have to show that there is an SWK
adversary for which no extractor exists. This means that proving the SWK
assumption is false is more like proving a conventional computational assump-
tion is true, i.e. proving that there exists no efficient algorithm which solves
a computational problem. However, the SWK assumption is a fairly natu-
ral generalisation of the DHK assumption, and we believe it is a reasonable
trade off to show the plaintext awareness of a large class of schemes under
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this assumption. On the other hand, there are subset membership problems
which are believed to be true, but the corresponding subset witness knowledge
assumption appears to be false.
3.3 On the Validity of the SWK Assumption
We have introduced a new family of assumptions in order to show the PA2
plaintext awareness of the Cramer-Shoup and Kurosawa-Desmedt families of
encryption schemes. Cramer and Shoup [11] gave hash proof systems based on
the DDH assumption, the Quadratic Residuosity assumption and the Decision
Composite Residuosity assumption. We will discuss the corresponding SWK
assumptions for these and other subset membership problems that have been
used to instantiate hash proof systems.
As we have already mentioned, extractor assumptions of this type are even
more difficult to justify than standard computational hardness assumptions,
but nevertheless we will now examine the validity of SWK assumption for a
variety of subset membership problems, and give our best guess as to whether
they hold.
Parts of this section are derived from earlier work done jointly with Dent [5].
3.3.1 The DDH assumption
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p, with generators g0 and g1 = gα0 for
some α ∈ Z∗p. We define X = G× G, W = Zp, L = {(gw0 , gw1 ) : w ∈ Zp}, and
let R be the relation {((gw0 , gw1 ), w) : w ∈ Zp}. Then Λ = (X,L,W,R) is an
instance of the decision Diffie-Hellman problem.
The associated SWK assumption is precisely the Diffie-Hellman knowledge
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assumption, also known as the knowledge of exponent assumption [13]. This is
the same assumption that Dent used to prove the PA2 plaintext awareness of
the Diffie-Hellman-based version of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [14].
3.3.2 The DBDH assumption
Galindo et al. [17] give a construction of a hash proof system based on the
decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. Let G1,G2 and GT be cyclic groups
of prime order p with randomly chosen generators g, g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2, and let
e : G1 ×G2 → GT be an efficiently computable, non-degenerate bilinear map.
Let X = G1 × GT , L = {(gw, e(g1, g2)w)}, W = Zp and let R be the relation
{((gw, e(g1, g2)w), w : w ∈ Zp)}. Then Λ = (X,L,W,R) is an instance of the
decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Distinguishing elements (h, Z) ∈ L from (h, Z) ∈ X \L involves determin-
ing whether (g1, g2, h, Z) form a BDH-tuple. The associated SWK assumption,
which we term the bilinear Diffie-Hellman knowledge (BDHK) assumption cap-
tures the idea that it is hard to compute tuples (g1, g2, h, Z) ∈ L except by
choosing w and computing h = gw and e(g1, g2)
w directly. This assumption
can be proven in the generic bilinear group model in much the same way that
one can prove the DHK assumption in the generic group model.
3.3.3 The Quadratic Residuosity assumption
Let p and q be distinct primes, and let N = pq. Let X = Z∗N and L =
{w2 : w ∈ Z∗N}. Let W = Z∗N and let R = {(w2, w) : w ∈ Z∗n}. Then
Λ = (X,L,W,R) is an instance of the quadratic residuosity problem. This
problem is believed to be hard, but if factoring is hard, then the corresponding
SWK assumption does not hold.
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This is because a randomly selected element of Z∗N is a square root with
probability 1/4, or to put it another way |L|/|X| = 1/4. Let A be an SWK
adversary which chooses a random element x ∈ Z∗N and queries the SWK
oracle on x. If the SWK assumption holds, then there is an extractor A∗
which takes the random coins of A as input and returns a witness w such that
Pr[x ∈ L∧w2 6= x] is negligible. In other words, A∗ can compute square roots
modulo N , which is known to be equivalent to factoring [28].
3.3.4 The DCR assumption
Let N = pq where p = 2p′ + 1 q = 2q′ + 1 and p, q, p′, q′ are all primes. Let
X = Z∗N2 and L = {wN : w ∈ Z∗N2}. Let W = Z∗N2 , and let R be the relation
{(wN , w) : w ∈ Z∗N2}. Then Λ = (X,L,W,R) is an instance of the decision
composite residuosity (DCR) assumption. The decisional composite residu-
osity assumption was introduced by Paillier [27]. The corresponding SWK
assumption, which we term the decisional composite residuosity knowledge
(DCRK) assumption, is that it is hard to compute a value x ∈ L except by
choosing w and computing x = wN . Unlike the QR assumption, there is no
difficulty in building an extractor for an adversary which simply outputs an
element x
R← X because the probability that x ∈ L is 1/N which is negligible.
For this reason, we do not dismiss the possibility that the DCRK assumption
holds.
3.3.5 The GBD assumption
Gonza´lez Nieto et al. [26] introduced a subgroup membership problem which
we will call the GBD assumption. A modified form of this assumption was
later used by Brown et al. [7] to construct a hash proof membership problem
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and instantiate the Cramer-Shoup and Kurosawa-Desmedt schemes. It is this
modified form that we present here.
Let p = 2N + 1, where N = q0q1 and p, q0 and q1 are all primes. Let
X be the subgroup of Z∗p order N and let L be the subgroup of X of order
q0. Let g0 be a generator of L, let W = {0, . . . , N − 1} and let R be the
relation {(gw0 , w) : w ∈W}. Then Λ = (X,L,W,R) is an instance of the GBD
problem.
The associated SWK assumption, which we will call the GBDK assump-
tion, essentially states that the only way to choose an element x ∈ L is to
compute some power of g0. If an adversary knew the factorisation of N then
it could simply take a random element y ∈ Z∗p and compute x = y2q1 , but
q1 is not part of the instance description. If the discrete logarithm problem
in L is easy, then then there is an extractor for any GBDK adversary. On
the other hand, if the discrete logarithm problem in L is hard but factoring
is easy, then it seems unlikely that the GBDK assumption would hold: one
could construct an adversary which factors N and computes an element of
L as described above. Finally, if both factoring and the discrete logarithm
problem in L are hard, as we believe they are, then it seems reasonable that
the GBDK assumption holds.
3.4 The Integers Modulo N are Simulatable
All of the above subset membership problems involve either abstract groups
or the integers mod N for some N . We will show that the integers mod N are
simulatable.
Dent claimed [14] that for p = 2q + 1 where p and q are prime then the
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subgroup of Z∗p of order q is simulatable, and presents a simulator, but he
does not give a proof that the simulator’s output is indistinguishable from a
random element of the group. Although we believe it would be possible to fill
in the details of Dent’s proof, our proof uses an alternative methodology.
Theorem 3.4.1. Let S = ((Z∗N)N∈Iλ)λ∈N, and suppose that there is a constant
c such that Iλ ⊆ {1, . . . , 2λ+c} for all λ ∈ N. Then S is statistically simulatable.
Proof. Let nS(λ) = 2λ + c for all λ ∈ N. This means that nS(λ) is greater
than the bit length of the largest integer in Iλ by at least λ. Let B = 2
2λ+c,
qmax = bBN c and let R = B −Nqmax
In the following algorithms, we interpret the bitstring r ∈ {0, 1}nS(λ) as an
integer.
function fS(1
λ, N, r)
x← r mod N
return x
function fS(1
λ, N, x)
q
R← {0, . . . , qmax − 1}
r ← Nq + x
return r
Firstly, we must ensure that f = (fS, f
−1
S , nS) is a simulator for S. Specif-
ically,
• fS is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
1λ, an index N ∈ Iλ, and r ∈ {0, 1}nS(λ), and returns an element x ∈ Z∗N .
• f−1S is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
1λ, an index N ∈ Iλ, and x ∈ Z∗N , and returns a string r ∈ {0, 1}nS(λ).
• For all λ ∈ N, N ∈ Iλ, x ∈ Z∗N , fS(1λ, N, f−1S (1λ, N, x)) = x.
These properties follow by definition of f .
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We now show that the statistical Set-Sim property of f holds. Let x
R← Z∗N ,
r
R← {0, 1}nS(λ) and let y ← fS(1λ, N, r) = r mod N . Then for all 0 ≤ s < R,
Pr[y = s] = qmax+1
B
and for all R ≤ s < N , Pr[y = s] = qmax
B
.
∣∣∣∣qmax + 1B − 1N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ N +Nqmax −BBN = N −RBN
≤ N
BN
=
1
B
Similarly
∣∣∣∣qmaxB − 1N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣Nqmax −BBN
∣∣∣∣ = RBN
≤ N
BN
=
1
B
Therefore
∆[(1λ, N, x), (1λ, N, y)] ≤ 1
2
∑
s∈Z∗N
|Pr[x = s]− Pr[y = s]| < N
B
≤ 2
c+λ
2c+2λ
=
1
2λ
which is negligible in λ as desired.
Now let us consider the statistical Rand-Sim property. Let r
R← {0, 1}nS(λ),
and let r′ ← f−1S (1λ, i, x). Fix s ∈ {0, 1}nS(λ) and let x = s mod N . We
consider three cases:
• Case 1: 0 ≤ s < Nqmax − 1 and 0 ≤ x < R
In this case, Pr[r = s mod N ] = qmax+1
B
. Pr[r′ = s|r = s mod N ] = 1
qmax
.
Therefore Pr[r′ = s] = qmax+1
Bqmax
, and
|Pr[r′ = s]− Pr[r = s]| =
∣∣∣∣qmax + 1Bqmax − 1B
∣∣∣∣ = 1Bqmax .
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• Case 2: 0 ≤ s ≤ Nqmax − 1 and R ≤ x ≤ N − 1
In this case, Pr[r = s mod N ] = qmax
B
. Pr[r′ = s|r = s mod N ] = 1
qmax
.
Therefore Pr[r′ = s] = 1
B
and
|Pr[r′ = s]− Pr[r = s]| = 0 .
• Case 3: s ≥ Nqmax
In this case Pr[r′ = s] = 0 since f−1S never returns a value greater than
Nqmax − 1. Thus
|Pr[r′ = s]− Pr[r = s]| = 1
B
.
Putting this together, we see that the statistical distance
∆[(1λ, i, r), (1λ, i, r′)] ≤ 1
2
∑
s∈S
|Pr[x = s]− Pr[y = s]|
≤ 1
2
(
Nqmax
1
Bqmax
+R
1
B
)
=
1
2
N +R
B
≤ 2N
B
≤ 1
2
2 · 2c+λ
2c+2λ
=
1
2λ
which is negligible in λ as desired. Therefore the family of sets S is simulatable.
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Chapter 4
The Generalised Cramer–Shoup
Encryption Scheme is PA2
Plaintext Aware
In this chapter, we will use the methodology of Dent [14] which we introduced
in the previous chapter to prove that a version of the Cramer-Shoup encryption
scheme is PA2 plaintext aware under the Subset Witness Knowledge assump-
tion which we introduced in Section 3.2.1.
4.1 The Generalised Cramer-Shoup Encryp-
tion Scheme
Let M be a subset membership problem and let Λ = (X,L,W,R) ← ISA(1λ)
be a randomly chosen instance ofM. Let P be a hash proof system forM, and
let Pˆ be an extended hash proof system for M. Let H = (H,K,X,L,Π, S, α)
and Hˆ = (H, Kˆ,X × Π, L × Π, Πˆ, Sˆ, αˆ) for (X × Π, L × Π) be the projective
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hash family that P and Pˆ associate with Λ respectively. We also require
that Π is an abelian group with respect to some efficiently computable group
operation which we will write additively. The Cramer-Shoup universal hash
proof encryption scheme is then defined as follows:
function KeyGen(Λ)
k
R← K
kˆ
R← Kˆ
s← α(k)
sˆ← αˆ(kˆ)
pk ← (s, sˆ)
sk ← (k, kˆ)
return (pk, sk)
function Decrypt(sk, C)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
function Encrypt(pk,m)
Parse pk as (s, sˆ)
(x,w)← SSA(Λ)
pi ← PublicP(s, x, w)
e← m+ pi
pˆi ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, x, e, w)
C ← (x, e, pˆi)
return C
4.2 Cramer-Shoup is PA1+
Theorem 4.2.1. Suppose that Hˆ is ²Hˆ-universal, that the public keys returned
by KeyGen(Λ) are uniformly distributed on S × Sˆ, and that the family of sets
S = ((SΛ × SˆΛ)Λ∈Iλ)λ∈N of public keys is statistically simulatable, with simu-
lator fS = (fS, f
−1
S , nS). Assume also that the SWK assumption holds for the
underlying subset membership problemM. Then the Cramer-Shoup encryption
scheme based on the hash proof systems H and Hˆ is PA1+.
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Proof. Let A be a PA1+ ciphertext creator which makes at most qr random-
ness queries. We will construct a plaintext extractor A∗ for A by constructing
an SWK adversary B and using the existence of an SWK extractor B∗ to con-
struct a plaintext extractor A∗. In the following, we abuse notation slightly
by treating Rlist as either a list or a string. However, the appropriate meaning
should be clear from the context.
B takes input Λ = (X,L,W,R) and works as follows:
function B(Λ)
rs
R← {0, 1}nS(λ)
rsˆ
R← {0, 1}nSˆ(λ)
Rlist
R← {0, 1}qr
s← fS(rs)
sˆ← fSˆ(rsˆ)
pk ← (Λ, s, sˆ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(1λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
w ← Query SWK(x)
if (x,w) 6∈ R then
return ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, x, e, w)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PublicP(w, x, w)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
By the SWK assumption, there is a witness extractor B∗ such that the
advantage AdvSWKM,B,B∗ is negligible. We use B∗ to construct a PA1+ plaintext
extractor A∗ in much the same way as we did for Kurosawa-Desmedt:
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function A∗(pk, C,R[A],Rlist, stateA∗)
if stateA∗ = ε then
Parse pk as (Λ, s)
rs ← f−1S (s)
rsˆ ← f−1Sˆ (sˆ)
else
Parse stateA∗ as (rs, rsˆ, x1, . . . , xnd−1)
Parse C as (xnd , e, pˆi)
nr ← |Rlist|
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
RB ← rs||rsˆ||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
m← ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, xnd , e, wnd,nd)
if pˆi′ 6= pˆi then
m← ⊥
else
pi ← PublicP(s, xnd , w)
m← e− pi
stateA∗ ← (rs, rsˆ, x1, . . . , xnd)
return (m, stateA∗)
To construct the SWK adversary B, we had to supply the complete Rlist to
B in advance. Unfortunately, A∗ does not know the random bits Rlist′ when
it ran on the jth decryption query, so instead it generates new random bits for
itself to simulate the environment of B∗ in the SWK-Fake experiment. If A∗
preserved the state variable of B∗ between decryption queries, B∗ could detect
that Rlist′ had changed next time it is called. To prevent this, A∗ re-initialises
B∗ with an empty state variable, and runs B∗ again on each of the previous
inputs. If there is more than one witness for a particular xt ∈ L, then B∗
may generate a different witness each time, but as long as (xt, wj,t) ∈ R, then
Public(s, xt, wj,t) = Hk(xj) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t, so the view of A is independent
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of the witness returned by B∗.
We now proceed by a sequence of games to show that AdvPA1+Π,A,A∗,D is
negligible. Let Ti be the event that D(aux) returns 1 in Game i.
Game 0: Let Game 0 be ExptPA1+FakeCS,A,A∗,D(λ). Written out in full, it is as
follows:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
if stateA∗ = ε then
Parse pk as (s, sˆ)
rs ← f−1S (s)
rsˆ ← f−1Sˆ (sˆ)
else
Parse stateA∗ as (rs, rsˆ, x1, . . . , xnd−1)
Parse C as (xnd , e, pˆi)
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
RB ← rs||rsˆ||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, xnd , e, w)
if pˆi′ 6= pˆi then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pi ← PublicP(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
mnd ← e− pi
stateA∗ ← (rs, rsˆ, x1, . . . , xnd)
return mnd
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b← D(aux)
return b
Game 1: This is a bridging step. Game 1 is the same as Game 0 except that
we generate the public key at random, without the corresponding secret key.
We also remove the state∗A variable and move the generation of rs and rsˆ to
the beginning of the game.
Λ← ISA(1λ)
s
R← S
sˆ
R← Sˆ
pk ← (s, sˆ)
rs ← f−1S (s)
rsˆ ← f−1Sˆ (sˆ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , e, pˆi)
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
RB ← rs||rsˆ||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, xnd , e, w)
if pˆi′ 6= pˆi then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pi ← PublicP(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
mnd ← e− pi
return mnd
120
b← D(aux)
return b
By the assumption that the public key pk = (s, sˆ) is uniformly distributed
on S × Sˆ, we see that the inputs to all algorithms are distributed exactly as
in Game 0, so:
Pr[T1] = Pr[T0] .
Game 2: We simulate pk using the simulators fS(r
′
s) and fSˆ(r
′
sˆ) for random
strings r′s, r
′
sˆ. Note we continue to generate the randomness rs and rsˆ which
get passed to B∗ using f−1S (s) and f−1Sˆ (sˆ) just as we did before.
Λ← ISA(1λ)
r′s
R← {0, 1}nS(λ)
r′sˆ
R← {0, 1}nSˆ(λ)
s← fSˆ(r′s)
sˆ← fSˆ(r′sˆ)
pk ← (s, sˆ)
rs ← f−1S (s)
rsˆ ← f−1Sˆ (sˆ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , e, pˆi)
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
RB ← rs||rsˆ||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
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mnd ← ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, xnd , e, w)
if pˆi′ 6= pˆi then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pi ← PublicP(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
mnd ← e− pi
return mnd
b← D(aux)
return b
By the statistical Set-Sim property of S, ²s = ∆[(1
λ,Λ, s), (1λ,Λ, s′)] is
negligible. Similarly, ²sˆ = ∆[(1
λ,Λ, sˆ), (1Λ,Λ, sˆ′)] is negligible. Thus
|Pr[T2]− Pr[T1]| ≤ ²S + ²Sˆ
by Lemma 1.2.1 and a hybrid argument.
Game 3: We provide the randomness r′s and r
′
sˆ that we used to simulate pk
to B∗, instead of using f−1S and to generate a second random string. Written
out in full, the game is as follows:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
r′s
R← {0, 1}nS(λ)
r′sˆ
R← {0, 1}nSˆ(λ)
s← fSˆ(r′s)
sˆ← fSˆ(r′sˆ)
pk ← (s, sˆ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , e, pˆi)
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
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RB ← r′s||r′sˆ||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, xnd , e, w)
if pˆi′ 6= pˆi then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pi ← PublicP(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
mnd ← e− pi
return mnd
b← D(aux)
return b
By the statistical Rand-Sim property of S, ²rs = ∆[(1
λ,Λ, rs), (1
λ,Λ, r′s)]
is negligible as a function of λ, and ²rsˆ = ∆[(1
λ,Λ, rsˆ), (1
λ,Λ, r′sˆ)] is negligible
by the statistical Rand-Sim property of Sˆ. We may regard A together with
the Randomness and Decrypt oracles as a single algorithm which takes either
(rs, rsˆ) or (r
′
s, r
′
sˆ) as one of its inputs, so by Lemma 1.2.1 and using a simple
hybrid argument, this implies that
|Pr[T3]− Pr[T2]| ≤ ²r + ²rsˆ .
Game 4: We replace B∗ with an idealised algorithm that always returns
a valid witness w if one exists. Since w is only used to calculate pi ←
PublicPˆ(sˆ, xnd , e, w), and pi does not depend on the choice of witness by the
definition of a hash proof system, if there are multiple witnesses it does not
matter which one is selected. Written in full the game is as follows:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
r′s
R← {0, 1}nS(λ)
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r′sˆ
R← {0, 1}nSˆ(λ)
s← fSˆ(r′s)
sˆ← fSˆ(r′sˆ)
pk ← (s, sˆ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , e, pˆi)
if there exists w such that (xnd , w) ∈ R then
wnd ← w
else
return ⊥
pˆi′ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, xnd , e, w)
if pˆi′ 6= pˆi then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pi ← PublicP(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
mnd ← e− pi
return mnd
b← D(aux)
return b
We do not require this computation to be performed in polynomial time.
Let F3 be the event that B∗ returns an invalid witness during one of the
decryption queries in Game 3. If F3 does not occur then each ciphertext is
decrypted correctly and Game 3 proceeds identically to Game 4. We will
show that Pr[F3] is negligible via a sequence of games, Game (3, 0), . . . , Game
(3, qd), where Game (3, 0) = Game 3 and Game (3, qd) = Game 4.
Game (3, i):
Λ← ISA(1λ)
r′s
R← {0, 1}nS(λ)
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r′sˆ
R← {0, 1}nSˆ(λ)
s← fSˆ(r′s)
sˆ← fSˆ(r′sˆ)
pk ← (s, sˆ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , e, pˆi)
if nd ≤ i then
if there exists w such that (xnd , w) ∈ R then
wnd ← w
else
return ⊥
else
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
RB ← r′s||r′sˆ||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, xnd , e, w)
if pˆi′ 6= pˆi then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pi ← PublicP(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
mnd ← e− pi
return (mnd , stateA∗)
b← D(aux)
return b
Let F3,i be the event that B∗ returns an incorrect witness when called in
response to the ith decryption query, i.e. xi ∈ L but (xi, wi,i) 6∈ R. If F3,i does
not occur then Game (3, i) proceeds identically to Game (3, i− 1).
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We would like to show that each time B∗ is called in Game (3, i − 1), the
inputs to B∗, namely Λ, xt, RB and stateB∗ , are distributed as in ExptSWKM,B,B∗(λ).
The instance Λ is correctly sampled using ISA and each of the bits of RB =
r||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A] are distributed uniformly at random (although the random
tape used in subsequent queries depends on this random tape, an issue we will
return to below).
Consider running ExptSWKM,B,B∗(λ), using the instance Λ and with B’s ran-
dom tape set to r||Rlist|| ˆRlist′||R[A], where Λ, r,Rlist and R[A] are as above,
and ˆRlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr is independent of Rlist′. To avoid ambiguity, we will
use xˆi to distinguish variables in the SWK experiment from their counterparts
in Game (3, i − 1). In the SWK experiment, the output of B∗ at any stage
may affect the next query made by A. In contrast, A’s first i− 1 decryption
queries in Game (3, i − 1) are answered without using B∗. B∗ is invoked for
the first time when answering the ith query, and list of elements x1, . . . , xi−1
obtained previous decryption queries are successively used as inputs to B∗.
Despite this, we will now show by induction that x1 = xˆt for 1 ≤ t ≤ i− 1.
By definition of B we see that B computes a public key pk ← fS(r), and
runs A(pk;R[A]). Let 1 ≤ t ≤ i, and suppose by induction that for all
1 ≤ t′ ≤ t, xˆt′ = xt′ , and (xˆt′ , wˆt′) ∈ R) if xˆt′ ∈ L. wˆt′ may be different to wi,t′ ,
but these values are never passed on to A. Since Public(s, xˆt′ , wˆt′) = Hk(xˆt′)
for all valid witnesses, it follows that the decrypted messages returned to
A are identical in the two games. The values of Rlist are identical in the
two experiments, and B does not pass any of ˆRlist′ to A until after the ith
decryption query is made the responses to A’s randomness queries are also
identical, because B does not use any part of ˆRlist′ to A until after the ith
decryption query is made.
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This shows that the inputs to A in the SWK experiment, including the
randomness, are identical to their values in Game (3, i − 1). It follows that
xˆt = xt, since ciphertexts that A passes to its Decrypt oracle are functions of
A’s randomness, it’s inputs and the responses to previous queries, which are
all held fixed. By induction, this implies that all inputs to B∗ have the same
distribution in the ith decryption query of Game (3, i − 1) as they do in the
SWK experiment, so
Pr[F3,i] = Pr[xt ∈ L ∧ (xt, wi,t) 6∈ R] ≤ AdvSWKM,B,B∗ .
We must now address the dependence of the events Fj. Consider the event
Gj =
⋃j
i=1 F3,j. Then G1 = F1 and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ qd,
Pr[Gj+1] = Pr[Gj∪F3,j+1] = Pr[Gj]+Pr[F3,j+1]−Pr[Gj∩F3,j+1] ≤ Pr[Gj]+Pr[F3,j+1] .
Since the events F3,j+1 andGj are not independent, we do not know Pr[Gj ∩ Fj+1],
but we do not need to know it, since we only need an upper bound on the
probability of Gj+1. By induction, this shows that
Pr[F3] = Pr[Gqd ]
≤
qd∑
j=1
Pr[F3,j+1]
≤
qd∑
j=1
AdvSWKM,B,B∗
≤ qdAdvSWKM,B,B∗ .
If F3 does not occur, then B∗ correctly computes a witness every time it is
called in Game 3, and so Game 4 is identical to Game 3. Thus
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|Pr[T4]− Pr[T3]| ≤ Pr[F3] ≤ qdAdvSWKM,B,B∗ .
Game 5: We choose the public key at random.
Λ← ISA(1λ)
s
R← S
sˆ
R← Sˆ
pk ← (s, sˆ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , e, pˆi)
if there exists w such that (xnd , w) ∈ R then
wnd ← w
else
return ⊥
pˆi′ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, xnd , e, w)
if pˆi′ 6= pˆi then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pi ← PublicP(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
mnd ← e− pi
return (mnd , stateA∗)
b← D(aux)
return b
By the statistical Set-Sim property of S, ²s = ∆[(1
λ,Λ, s), (1λ,Λ, s′)] is
negligible. Similarly, ²sˆ = ∆[(1
λ,Λ, sˆ), (1Λ,Λ, sˆ′)] is negligible. Thus
|Pr[T5]− Pr[T4]| ≤ ²S + ²Sˆ
by Lemma 1.2.1 and a hybrid argument. Note that because we are relying on a
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perfect witness extractor, we cannot assume the algorithm is polynomial-time,
so computational Set-Sim would not suffice for this transition.
Game 6: We compute the public key using KeyGen once more:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , e, pˆi)
if there exists w such that (xnd , w) ∈ R then
wnd ← w
else
return ⊥
pˆi′ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, xnd , e, w)
if pˆi′ 6= pˆi then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pi ← PublicP(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
mnd ← e− pi
return mnd
b← D(aux)
return b
By the assumption that the public key pk = (s, sˆ) is uniformly distributed
on S × Sˆ, we see that the inputs to all algorithms are distributed exactly as
in Game 5, so Pr[T6] = Pr[T5]
Game 7: We use Private instead of Public to answer decryption queries:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(pk)
if A queries Randomness then
129
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , e, pˆi)
if there exists w such that (xnd , w) ∈ R then
wnd ← w
else
return ⊥
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, xnd , e)
if pˆi′ 6= pˆi then
mnd ← ⊥
else
pi ← PrivateP(k, xnd)
mnd ← e− pi
return mnd
b← D(aux)
return b
If xj ∈ L, then there exists wj ∈ W such that (xj, wj) ∈ R by defini-
tion, and this wj is used in Game 7 to answer decryption queries. In par-
ticular this means that PublicP(s, xj, wj) = Hk(xj) = PrivateP(k, xj), and
PublicPˆ(sˆ, xj, e, wj) = Hˆkˆ(xj, e) = PrivatePˆ(kˆ, xj, e), so the value returned by
the decryption oracle is unchanged in Game 7.
If xj 6∈ L, then the decrypt oracle will return ⊥ in Game 6. However,
in Game 7, pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, xnd , e). By the ²Hˆ-universal property of Hˆ, it
follows that Pr[pˆi′ = pˆi] ≤ ². Since the decrypt oracle rejects whenever pˆi′ 6= pˆi,
it follows that it rejects with probability at least 1− ². Since there are at most
qd decryption queries, it follows that
|Pr[T7]− Pr[T6]| ≤ qd²Hˆ .
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Finally, we note that Game 7 is exactly ExptPA1+RealCS,A,D (λ). Thus:
AdvPA1+CS,A,A∗(λ) = |Pr[T7]− Pr[T0]|
≤ 2²S + 2²Sˆ + ²r + ²rsˆ + qdAdvSWKM,B,B∗ + qd²Hˆ
which is negligible in λ as required.
4.3 Cramer-Shoup is Simulatable
Theorem 4.3.1. Suppose that ((XΛ)Λ∈Iλ)λ∈N is a computationally simulatable
family of sets, with simulator fX = (fX , f
−1
X , nX), that ((ΠΛ)Λ∈Iλ)λ∈N is a
computationally simulatable family of sets, with simulator fΠ = (fΠ, f
−1
Π , nΠ)
and that ((ΠˆΛ)Λ∈Iλ)λ∈N is also a computationally simulatable family of sets,
with simulator fΠˆ = (fΠˆ, f
−1
Πˆ
, nΠˆ). Suppose also that the subset membership
problem M is hard, H is δ-smooth and that Hˆ is both ²-universal2 and γ-
smooth. Then the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme based on the hash proof
systems H and Hˆ is simulatable.
Proof. We construct a simulator fCS = (fCS, f
−1
CS, nCS) for the Cramer-Shoup
scheme, where nCS(λ) = nX(λ) + nΠ(λ) + nΠˆ(λ)) for all λ ∈ N, and fCS, f−1CS
are as follows:
function fCS(1
λ, pk, r)
Parse r as r1||r2||r3 where |r1| = nX(λ), |r2| = nΠ(λ) and |r3| = nΠˆ(λ)
x← fX(1λ,Λ, r1)
e← fΠ(1λ, r2)
pˆi ← fΠˆ(1λ, r3)
return (x, e, pˆi)
function f−1CS(1
λ, pk, C)
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
r1 ← f−1X (1λ,Λ, x)
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r2 ← f−1Π (1λ, e)
r3 ← f−1Πˆ (1λ, pˆi)
return r1||r2||r3
Since the ciphertext space of CS, CiphSpCS(pk) = XΛ × ΠΛ × ΠˆΛ, the
following required properties hold as a direct consequence of the corresponding
properties of fX and fΠ and fΠˆ:
• fCS is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input (1λ, pk, r) where
pk is a public key and r ∈ {0, 1}nCS(λ), and outputs an element C ∈
CiphSp(pk), the ciphertext space.
• f−1CS is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input (1λ, pk, C) where
pk is a public key and C ∈ CiphSp(pk), and outputs a string r ∈
{0, 1}nCS(λ).
• For all public keys pk, and for all C ∈ CiphSp(pk), fCS(pk, f−1CS(pk, C)) =
C.
We must now show that for all probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms
A, the Rand-Sim advantage of A against fCS is negligible. Let A be an
arbitrary probabilistic, polynomial-time Rand-Sim adversary.
We will now show that
AdvRand−SimCS,A,fCS (λ) ≤ AdvRand−SimX,B,fX (λ) +AdvRand−SimΠ,C,fΠ (λ) +AdvRand−SimΠˆ,D,fΠˆ (λ)
for some polynomial-time adversaries B, C and D. The proof is structured as
a sequence of games. We let Ti be the event that b
′ = 1 in game i.
Game 0: Let Game 0 be the experiment ExptRand−Sim−0CS,A,fCS (λ). Written out in
full it is as follows:
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Λ
R← Iλ
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
r3
R← {0, 1}nΠˆ(λ)
b′ ← A(1λ,Λ, r1||r2||r3)
return b
Note that we have written r1, r2 and r3 separately, but this is simply a change
of notation, since nCS(λ) = nX(λ) + nΠ(λ) + nΠˆ(λ).
Game 1: Let Game 1 be as follows:
Λ
R← Iλ
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
r3
R← {0, 1}nΠˆ(λ)
r′1 ← f−1X (1λ,Λ, fX(1λ,Λ, r1))
b′ ← A(1λ,Λ, r′1||r2||r3)
return b
We construct an adversary B against the Rand-Sim property of (XΛ) as
follows:
function B(1λ,Λ, r1)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
r3
R← {0, 1}nΠˆ(λ)
b← A(1λ, pk, r1||r2||r3)
return b
We now see that Game 0 is simply ExptRand−Sim−0X,B,fX (λ) while Game 1 is
ExptRand−Sim−1X,B,fX (λ). Thus
|Pr[T1]− Pr[T0]| = AdvRand−SimX,B,fX (λ) .
Game 2: Let Game 2 be as follows:
Λ
R← Iλ
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
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r2
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
r3
R← {0, 1}nΠˆ(λ)
r′1 ← f−1X (1λ,Λ, fX(1λ,Λ, r1))
r′2 ← f−1Π (1λ,Λ, fΠ(1λ,Λ, r1))
b← A(1λ,Λ, r′1||r′2||r3)
return b
We construct an adversary C against the Rand-Sim property of (ΠΛ) as
follows:
function C(1λ,Λ, r2)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r3
R← {0, 1}nΠˆ(λ)
r′1 ← f−1X (1λ,Λ, fX(1λ,Λ, r1))
b← A(1λ, pk, r′1||r2||r3)
return b
We now see that Game 2 is simply ExptRand−Sim−0Π,C,fΠ (λ) while Game 2 is
ExptRand−Sim−1Π,C,fΠ (λ). Thus
|Pr[T2]− Pr[T1]| = AdvRand−SimΠ,B,fΠ (λ) .
Game 3: Let Game 3 be ExptRand−SimCS,A,fCS (λ). Written in full it is as follows:
Λ
R← Iλ
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
r3
R← {0, 1}nΠˆ(λ)
r′1 ← f−1X (1λ,Λ, fX(1λ,Λ, r1))
r′2 ← f−1Π (1λ, fΠ(1λ, r2))
r′3 ← f−1Πˆ (1λ, fΠˆ(1λ, r3))
b← A(1λ,Λ, r′1||r′2||r′3)
return b
We construct an adversary D against the Rand-Sim property of Πˆ as fol-
lows:
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function D(1λ, r3)
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
r′1 ← f−1X (1λ,Λ, fX(1λ,Λ, r1))
r′2 ← f−1Π (1λ, fΠ(1λ, r2))
b← A(1λ, pk, r′1||r′2||r3)
return b
We now see that Game 1 is simply ExptRand−Sim−0
Πˆ,D,fΠˆ
(λ), while Game 2 is
ExptRand−Sim−1
Πˆ,D,fΠˆ
(λ). Thus
|Pr[T3]− Pr[T2]| = AdvRand−SimΠˆ,D,fΠˆ (λ) .
Putting it all together we see that
AdvRand−SimCS,A,fCS (λ) = |Pr[T3]− Pr[T0]|
≤ |Pr[T1]− Pr[T0]|+ |Pr[T2]− Pr[T1]|+ |Pr[T3]− Pr[T2]
= AdvRand−SimX,B,fX (λ) +Adv
Rand−Sim
Π,C,fΠ (λ) +Adv
Rand−Sim
Πˆ,D,fΠˆ
(λ)
Thus AdvRand−SimCS,A,fCS (λ) is negligible in λ as required.
Finally, we must show that for any PKE-Sim adversary A, the advantage
AdvPKE−SimCS,A,fCS(λ) is negligible in λ. Let A be an arbitrary adversary against
the PKE-Sim property of CS. Let qd be an upper bound for the number of
decryption queries made by A. We prove that theAdvPKE−SimCS,A,fCS(λ) is negligible
in λ using a sequence of games. Let Ti be the event that A outputs 1 in Game
i.
Game 0: Let Game 0 be ExptPKE−Sim−0CS,A,fCS (λ). Written in full, it is as follows:
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ExptPKE−Sim−0CS,A,fCS (λ)
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (1λ, pk)
Parse pk as (s, sˆ)
(x∗, w∗)← SSA(Λ)
pi∗ ← PublicP(s, x∗, w∗)
e∗ ← m+ pi∗
pˆi∗ ← PublicPˆ(sˆ, x∗, e∗, w∗)
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (1λ, C∗, state)
return b′
A has access to a decryption oracle Decrypt which takes a ciphertext C as
input and returns Decrypt(sk, C). This oracle is restricted so that A may not
request the decryption of the challenge ciphertext C∗.
Game 1: We modify the challenge ciphertext so that it is generated using
the PrivateP and PrivatePˆ evaluation functions instead of the Public functions.
Written in full, it is as follows:
ExptPKE−Sim−0CS,A,fCS (λ)
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (1λ, pk)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
(x∗, w∗)← SSA(Λ)
pi∗ ← PrivateP(k, x∗)
e∗ ← m+ pi∗
pˆi∗ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x∗, e∗)
C ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
return C
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (1λ, C∗, state)
return b′
This is a bridging step; PrivateP(k, x
∗) = Hk(x∗) = PublicP(s, x∗, w∗) since
x∗ ∈ L, and similarly, PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x∗, e∗) = Hˆkˆ(x∗, e∗) = PublicPˆ(sˆ, x∗, e∗, w∗)
so the challenge ciphertext in Game 1 is equal to the challenge ciphertext in
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game 0. Thus Pr[T1] = Pr[T0].
Game 2: This is a transition based on indistinguishability. We choose x∗ at
random from X \L instead of using the subset sampling algorithm to generate
x∗ ∈ L. Written out in full, it is as follows:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (1λ, pk)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
x∗ R← X \ L
pi∗ ← PrivateP(k, x∗)
e∗ ← m+ pi∗
pˆi∗ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x∗, e∗)
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (1λ, C∗, state)
return b′
In this game, x is chosen at random from X \ L. We do not assume that
sampling x
R← X \L can be done in polynomial time, since the challenger need
not be efficient.
Let B be the adversary described below. B takes an element x∗ ∈ X and
runs as follows:
function B(1λ,Λ, x∗)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
pi∗ ← PrivateP(k, x∗)
e∗ ← m+ pi∗
pˆi∗ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x∗, e∗)
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
To respond to a query Decrypt(C), B computes m ← Decrypt(sk, C) and
returns m. If x∗ is chosen at random from L, then B exactly simulates Game
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1, but if x∗ R← X \ L, B exactly simulates Game 2. Thus
Pr[B(1λ,Λ, x∗) = 1 : x∗ R← L] = Pr[T1]
and
Pr[B(1λ,Λ, x∗) = 1 : x∗ R← X \ L] = Pr[T2] ,
so
|Pr[T2]− Pr[T1]| ≤ AdvSMPM,B (λ) .
Game 3: We modify the Decrypt oracle so that if x 6∈ L, the oracle returns
⊥
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
x∗ R← X \ L
pi∗ ← PrivateP(k, x∗)
e∗ ← m+ pi∗
pˆi∗ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x∗, e∗)
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
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if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
In Game 2, any ciphertext C = (x, e, pˆi) is rejected if Hˆkˆ(x, e) 6= pˆi. In
Game 3, ciphertexts are additionally rejected if x 6∈ L. Let F3 be the event
that A makes a query Decrypt(x, e, pˆi) such that x 6∈ L but Hˆkˆ(x, e) = pˆi. If
F3 does not occur then Game 2 and Game 3 proceed identically, since all all
decryption queries for which x 6∈ L are rejected.
Consider the conditional probability space defined by fixing the random
coins of the adversary and the public key pk = (s, sˆ). This determines the mes-
sage m output by A1. In addition, fix the values x∗ and pˆi∗ used in computing
the challenge ciphertext, and the value k. This determines the challenge ci-
phertext (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗), because e∗ is a function of x∗,m and k. In this conditional
probability space, kˆ is uniformly distributed on the set {kˆ ∈ Kˆ|αˆ(kˆ) = sˆ}. For
any decryption query made by A on a ciphertext C = (x, e, pˆi) where x 6∈ L,
there are two possibilities:
1. If (x, e) = (x∗, e∗) then pˆi 6= pˆi∗ since A may not decrypt the challenge
ciphertext. But Hˆkˆ(x
∗, e∗) = pˆi∗ by definition, so Hˆkˆ(x, e) = pˆi
∗ 6= pˆi
2. If (x, e) 6= (x∗, e∗) then in the conditional probability space defined
above, Pr[Hˆkˆ(x, e) = pˆi] ≤ ²(λ) by the ²-universal2 property of Pˆ.
Thus Pr[F3] ≤ qd²(λ) and so
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|Pr[T3]− Pr[T2]| ≤ qd²(λ) .
Game 4: We choose pi∗ at random.
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
x∗ R← X \ L
pi∗ R← Π
e∗ ← m+ pi∗
pˆi∗ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x∗, e∗)
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
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Let x∗, e∗, s and pi∗3, be as in Game 3, let pi
∗
4 be as in Game 4. By the
δ-smoothness of H, we see that ∆[(x∗, e∗, sˆ, pi∗3), (x
∗, e∗, sˆ, pi∗4)] ≤ δ(λ). By
Lemma 1.2.1 it follows that
|Pr[T4]− Pr[T3]| ≤ δ(λ) .
Game 5: We choose e∗ at random.
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
x∗ R← X \ L
e∗ R← Π
pˆi∗ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x∗, e∗)
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
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else
return ⊥
return b′
This game is a bridging step: In Game 4, e∗ = pi∗ +m and pi∗ is selected
uniformly at random, so e∗ is distributed at random. Since the distribution of
e∗ is unchanged, we see that
Pr[T5] = Pr[T4]
Game 6: We choose pˆi∗ at random
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
x∗ R← X \ L
e∗ R← Π
pˆi∗ R← Πˆ
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
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if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
Let x∗, e∗, s and pˆi∗5, be as in Game 5, let pˆi
∗
6 be as in Game 6. By the
γ-smoothness of Hˆ, we see that we see that ∆[(x∗, e∗, sˆ, pˆi∗5), (x
∗, e∗, sˆ, pˆi∗6)] ≤
γ(λ). By Lemma 1.2.1 it follows that
|Pr[T6]− Pr[T5]| ≤ γ(λ) .
Game 7: We modify the decryption oracle once more so that it no longer
checks if x ∈ L, i.e. it runs as follows:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
x∗ R← X \ L
e∗ R← Π
pˆi∗ R← Πˆ
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
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pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
By the same reasoning as in Game 3
|Pr[T7]− Pr[T6]| ≤ qd²(λ) .
We note that in Dent’s proof [14] of plaintext awareness for the DDH based
Cramer-Shoup scheme, the decryption oracle is not returned to its original
behaviour and the proof is therefore incomplete.
Game 8: We select x∗ from X instead of X \ L:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
x∗ R← X
e∗ R← Π
pˆi∗ R← Πˆ
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
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m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
Let C be the following adversary:
function C(1λ,Λ, x∗)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
e∗ R← Π
pˆi∗ R← Πˆ
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
If C is given x∗ R← X \L as input, then it exactly simulates Game 7, while
if it is given x∗ R← X, then it exactly simulates Game 8.
By Lemma 3.1.8 and Lemma 1.2.1 this implies that
|Pr[T8]− Pr[T7]| ≤ |L||X|Adv
SMP
M,C (λ) .
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Game 9: We choose x∗ using the simulation function fX :
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
x∗ ← fX(1λ,Λ, r1)
e∗ R← Π
pˆi∗ R← Πˆ
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
Note that the adversary C defined in Game 8 serves just as well as a Set-Sim
adversary as it does as an adversary against the subset membership problem.
If C is given x∗ R← X as input, then it exactly simulates Game 8, but if C
is given x∗ ← fX(1λ,Λ, r1), where r1 R← {0, 1}nX(λ) then C exactly simulates
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Game 9. By the Set-Sim property of X,
|Pr[T9]− Pr[T8]| = AdvSet−SimX,C,fX (λ) .
Game 10: We choose e∗ using the simulation function fΠ:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
x∗ ← fX(1λ,Λ, r1)
e∗ ← fΠ(1λ,Λ, r2)
pˆi∗ R← Πˆ
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
We construct an adversary D against the Set-Sim property of Π in the
natural way:
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function D(1λ,Λ, e∗)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
x∗ ← fX(1λ,Λ, r1)
pˆi∗ R← Πˆ
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
If D is given e∗ R← Π as input, then it exactly simulates Game 9, but if D
is given e∗ ← fΠ(1λ,Λ, r2), where r1 R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ) then it exactly simulates
Game 10. By the Set-Sim property of Π,
|Pr[T10]− Pr[T9]| = AdvSet−SimΠ,D,fΠ (λ) .
Game 11: We choose pˆi∗ using the simulation function fΠˆ:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
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Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
r3
R← {0, 1}nΠˆ(λ)
x∗ ← fX(1λ,Λ, r1)
e∗ ← fΠ(1λ,Λ, r2)
pˆi∗ ← fΠˆ(1λ,Λ, r3)
pˆi∗ R← Πˆ
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
We construct another Set-Sim adversary E as follows:
function E(1λ,Λ, pˆi∗)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Parse sk as (k, kˆ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt1 (1λ, pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
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m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΠ(λ)
x∗ ← fX(1λ,Λ, r1)
e∗ ← fΠ(1λ,Λ, r2)
C∗ ← (x∗, e∗, pˆi∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt2 (1λ, C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, e, pˆi)
pˆi′ ← PrivatePˆ(kˆ, x, e)
if pˆi′ = pˆi then
pi ← PrivateP(k, x)
m← e− pi
return m
else
return ⊥
return b′
If E is given pˆi∗ R← Πˆ as input, then it exactly simulates Game 10, but if
E is given pˆi∗ ← fΠˆ(1λ,Λ, r3), where r1 R← {0, 1}nΠˆ(λ) then it exactly simulates
Game 11. By the Set-Sim property of Πˆ,
|Pr[T11]− Pr[T10]| = AdvSet−SimΠˆ,E,fΠˆ (λ) .
We now see that Game 11 is exactly ExptPKE−Sim−1KD,A,fKD (λ). Putting it all
together, we see that
|Pr[T11]− Pr[T0]| ≤ |Pr[T11]− Pr[T10]|+ . . .+ |Pr[T1]− Pr[T0]|
≤ AdvSMPM,B (λ) + 2qd²(λ) + δ(λ) + γ(λ) +
|L|
|X|Adv
SMP
M,C (λ)
+AdvSet−SimX,C,fX (λ) +Adv
Set−Sim
Π,D,fΠ (λ) +Adv
Set−Sim
Πˆ,E,fΠˆ
(λ)
which is negligible in λ as required.
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Finally, we see that the Cramer-Shoup scheme is PA1+ plaintext aware
and simulatable, and thus it is PA2 plaintext aware by Theorem 3.1.6.
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Chapter 5
The Generalised Kurosawa–
Desmedt Encryption Scheme is
PA2 Plaintext-Aware
In this chapter, we follow up the previous work on the Cramer-Shoup encryp-
tion scheme with a proof that the variants of the Kurosawa-Desmedt encryp-
tion scheme based on hash proof systems are also PA2 plaintext aware.
5.1 The Kurosawa-Desmedt Encryption Scheme
We now present the variant of the Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme based
on a hash proof system [22]. LetM be a subset membership problem and let P
be a hash proof system forM. Let Λ = (X,L,W,R)← ISA(1λ) be a randomly
chosen instance ofM, and let H = (H,K,X,L,Π, S, α) be the projective hash
family that P associates with Λ. Let Σ = (enc, dec) with key-length function
`(λ) and let Hash : Π→ {0, 1}`(λ) be a hash function. The Kurosawa-Desmedt
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universal hash proof encryption scheme is then defined as follows:
function KeyGen(Λ)
sk
R← K
pk ← α(sk)
return (pk, sk)
function Decrypt(sk, C)
pi ← PrivateH(sk, x)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
function Encrypt(pk,m)
(x,w)← SSA(Λ)
pi ← PublicH(pk, x, w)
κ← Hash(pi)
χ← enc(κ,m)
C ← (x, χ)
return C
Note that we have abused the notation slightly, by defining KeyGen to take
an instance Λ as input instead of a security parameter 1λ; this is done to
simplify the writing of the proofs. One could define KeyGen so that it first
generates an instance Λ ← ISA(1λ) and then runs as above without affecting
the results.
Theorem 5.1.1 (Kurosawa-Desmedt). Let M be a subset membership prob-
lem, H be a projective hash proof system, let Σ be a DEM and let Hash be a
hash function. Then if M is hard, H is 1/|Π|-universal2, Σ is both one-time
IND-CCA2 secure and ²-rejection secure, and Hash is δ-smooth, where ² and
δ are negligible, then the resulting scheme is IND-CCA2 secure.
5.2 Kurosawa-Desmedt is PA1+
Theorem 5.2.1. Suppose that H is 1/|Π|-universal2, that Σ is ²-rejection
secure for some negligible ², the hash function Hash is δ-smooth for some
negligible δ, the public keys returned by KeyGen(Λ) are uniformly distributed
on the set S and that the family of sets S = ((SΛ)Λ∈Iλ)λ∈N of public keys
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is statistically simulatable, with simulator fS = (fS, f
−1
S , nS). Assume also
that the SWK assumption holds for the underlying subset membership problem
M. Then the Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme based on the hash proof
system H is PA1+.
The proof of this is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 4.2.1, the
analogous theorem for the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. The only differ-
ences are technical, the result of the differences between the two encryptions
schemes, but conceptually the proof follows the same steps. Nevertheless, we
include the proof in its entirety here.
Proof. Let A be a PA1+ ciphertext creator which makes at most qr random-
ness queries. We will construct a plaintext extractor A∗ for A by constructing
an SWK adversary B and using the existence of an SWK extractor B∗ to con-
struct a plaintext extractor A∗. In the following, we abuse notation slightly
by treating Rlist as either a list or a string. However, the appropriate meaning
should be clear from the context.
B takes input Λ = (X,L,W,R) and works as follows:
function B(Λ)
r
R← {0, 1}nS(λ)
Rlist
R← {0, 1}qr
pk ← fS(r)
Run aux← A(1λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, χ)
w ← Query SWK(x)
if (x,w) 6∈ R then
return ⊥
else
pi ← PublicH(s, x, w)
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κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
By the SWK assumption, there is a witness extractor B∗ such that the
advantage AdvSWKM,B,B∗(λ) is negligible in λ. We use B∗ to construct a PA1+
plaintext extractor A∗ as follows:
function A∗(pk, C,R[A],Rlist, stateA∗)
s← pk
if stateA∗ = ε then
r ← f−1S (s)
else
Parse stateA∗ as (r, x1, . . . , xnd−1)
Parse C as (xnd , χ)
nr ← |Rlist|
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
RB ← r||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
m← ⊥
else
pi ← Public(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
stateA∗ ← (r, x1, . . . , xnd)
return (m, stateA∗)
We now proceed by a sequence of games to show that AdvPA1+KD,A,A∗,D(λ) is
negligible in λ. Let Ti be the event that D(aux) returns 1 in Game i.
Game 0: Let Game 0 be ExptPA1+FakeKD,A,A∗,D(λ). Written out in full, it is as
follows:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
s← pk
stateA∗ ← ε
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Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(Λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , χ)
if stateA∗ = ε then
r ← f−1S (s)
else
Parse stateA∗ as (r, x1, . . . , xnd−1)
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
RB ← r||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
return ⊥
pi ← Public(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
stateA∗ ← (r, x1, . . . , xnd)
return m
b← D(aux)
Game 1: Let Game 1 be as Game 0, except that we choose a public key at
random. Since we have written A, A∗ and the challenger as one algorithm,
we no longer track the stateA∗ variable, as it just consists of constants we
are recording already. Instead of generating r ← f−1S (s) the first time the
decryption oracle is used, we move this to the beginning of the game.
Written out in full it is as follows:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
s
R← S
pk ← s
r ← f−1S (s)
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Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(Λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , χ)
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
RB ← r||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
return ⊥
pi ← Public(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
b← D(aux)
By assumption that s is uniformly distributed on SΛ, the distribution of
pk is unchanged, so Pr[T1] = Pr[T0]
Game 2: We simulate s using the simulator fS(r
′) where r′ is a random
string. Note that we continue to generate the string r which gets passed to B∗
using f−1S (s), which is not in general equal to r’.
Λ← ISA(1λ)
r′ R← {0, 1}n(λ)
s← fS(r′)
r ← f−1S (s)
pk ← s
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(Λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
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if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , χ)
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
RB ← r||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
return ⊥
pi ← Public(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
b← D(aux)
By the statistical Set-Sim property of S, ²S = ∆[(1
λ,Λ, s), (1λ,Λ, s′)] is
negligible in λ. Thus
|Pr[T2]− Pr[T1]| ≤ ²S(λ)
by Lemma 1.2.1.
Game 3: We provide the randomness r′ that we used to simulate pk to B∗,
instead of using f−1S to generate a second random string. Written out in full,
the game is as follows:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
r′ R← {0, 1}n(λ)
s← fS(r′)
r ← f−1S (s)
pk ← s′
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(Λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return b
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , χ)
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
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RB ← r′||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
return ⊥
pi ← Public(s, xnd , wnd,nd)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
b← D(aux)
By the statistical Rand-Sim property of S, ²r = ∆[(1
λ,Λ, r), (1λ,Λ, r′)] is
negligible in λ. We may regard A together with the Randomness and Decrypt
oracles as a single algorithm which takes either r or r′ as one of its inputs, so
by Lemma 1.2.1, this implies
|Pr[T3]− Pr[T2]| ≤ ²r(λ) .
Game 4: We replace B∗ with an idealised algorithm that always returns a
valid witness if one exists. Note that the value r computed in Game 3 is no
longer used, so we omit it here.
Λ← ISA(1λ)
r′ R← {0, 1}n(λ)
s′ ← fS(r′)
pk ← s′
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(Λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return b
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Parse C as (xnd , χ)
if there exists w such that (xnd , w) ∈ R then
wnd ← w
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else
return ⊥
pi ← Public(s, xnd , wnd)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
b← D(aux)
We do not require this computation to be performed in polynomial time.
Let F3 be the event that xt ∈ L but (xt, wnd,t) 6∈ R for some nd, t in Game 3.
If F3 does not occur then each ciphertext is decrypted correctly and Game 3
proceeds identically to Game 4. We will show that Pr[F3] is negligible via a
sequence of games, Game (3, 0), . . . , Game (3, qd), where Game (3, 0) = Game
3 and Game (3, qd) = Game 4.
Game (3, i):
Λ← ISA(1λ)
r′ R← {0, 1}n(λ)
s′ ← fS(r)
pk ← (Λ, s′)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(Λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Cnd ← C
Parse C as (xnd , χ)
if nd ≤ i then
if there exists w such that (xnd , w) ∈ R then
wnd ← w
else
return ⊥
else
Rlist′ R← {0, 1}qr−nr
RB ← r′||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A]
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stateB∗ ← ε
for t = 1 to nd do
(wnd,t, stateB∗)← B∗(Λ, xt, RB, stateB∗)
if (xnd , wnd,nd) 6∈ R then
return ⊥
pi ← Public(s, xnd , wnd)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
stateA∗ ← (r, x1, . . . , xnd)
return m
b← D(aux)
Let F3,i be the event that xi ∈ L but (xi, wi,i) 6∈ R. If F3,i does not occur
then Game (3, i) proceeds identically to Game (3, i− 1).
We would like to show that each time B∗ is called during the ith decryption
query in Game (3, i − 1), the inputs to B∗, namely Λ, xt, RB and stateB∗ , are
distributed as in ExptSWKM,B,B∗(λ). Λ is correctly sampled using ISA and each
of the bits of RB = r||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A] are distributed uniformly at random
(though the random tape used in subsequent queries depends on this random
tape, an issue we will return to below). The big difference is that in Game
(3, i), the list of elements (x1, . . . , xi−1) obtained from previous decryption
queries are successively used as inputs to B∗, and this list is fixed prior to the
execution of B∗. In contrast, in the SWK experiment, the output of B∗ at any
stage is returned to B, and so may affect the next query made by A. However,
whenever B∗ returns a valid witness, B correctly decrypts the ciphertext, so
the message returned to A is independent of the choice of witness.
More formally, consider running ExptSWKM,B,B∗(λ), using the instance Λ and
with B’s random tape set to r||Rlist||Rlist′||R[A], where Λ, r,Rlist,Rlist′ and
R[A] are as above. To avoid ambiguity, we will use xˆi to distinguish variables
in the SWK experiment from their counterparts in Game (3, i − 1). We will
now show by induction that xt = xˆt for 1 ≤ t ≤ i− 1.
161
By definition of B we see that B computes a public key pk ← fS(r), and
runs A(pk;R[A]). Let 1 ≤ t ≤ i − 1, and suppose by induction that for all
1 ≤ t′ ≤ t, xˆt′ = xt′ , and (xˆt′ , wˆt′) ∈ R if xˆt′ ∈ L. wˆt′ may be different to wi,t′ ,
but these values are never passed on to A. Since Public(s, xˆt′ , wˆt′) = Hk(xˆt′)
for all valid witnesses, it follows that the decrypted messages returned to
A are identical in the two games. The values of Rlist are identical in the
two experiments, and B does not pass any of ˆRlist′ to A until after the ith
decryption query is made the responses to A’s randomness queries are also
identical, because B does not use any part of ˆRlist′ to A until after the ith
decryption query is made.
This shows that the inputs to A in the SWK experiment, including the
randomness, are identical to their values in Game (3, i − 1). It follows that
xˆt = xt, since ciphertexts that A passes to its Decrypt oracle are functions of
A’s randomness, it’s inputs and the responses to previous queries, which are
all held fixed. By induction, this implies that all inputs to B∗ have the same
distribution in the ith decryption query of Game (3, i − 1) as they do in the
SWK experiment, so
Pr[F3,i] = Pr[xt ∈ L ∧ (xt, wi,t) 6∈ R] ≤ AdvSWKM,B,B∗(λ) .
We must now address the dependence of the events Fj Consider the event
Gj =
⋃j
i=1 F3,j. Then G1 = F1 and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ qd,
Pr[Gj+1] = Pr[Gj ∪ F3,j+1]
= Pr[Gj] + Pr[F3,j+1]− Pr[Gj ∩ F3,j+1]
≤ Pr[Gj] + Pr[F3,j+1] .
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Since the events F3,j+1 andGj are not independent, we do not know Pr[Gj ∩ Fj+1],
but we do not need to know it, since we only need an upper bound on the
probability of Gj+1. By induction, this shows that
Pr[F3] = Pr[Gqd ]
≤
qd∑
j=1
Pr[F3,j+1]
≤
qd∑
j=1
AdvSWKM,B,B∗(λ)
≤ qdAdvSWKM,B,B∗(λ) .
If F3 does not occur, then B∗ correctly computes a witness every time it is
called in Game 3, and so Game 4 is identical to Game 3. Thus
|Pr[T4]− Pr[T3]| ≤ Pr[F3] ≤ qdAdvSWKM,B,B∗(λ) .
Game 5: We choose the public key at random.
Λ← ISA(1λ)
s
R← S
pk ← s
stateA∗ ← ε
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(Λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Cnd ← C
Parse C as (xnd , χ)
if there exists w such that (xnd , w) ∈ R then
wnd ← w
else
163
return ⊥
pi ← Public(s, xnd , wnd)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
b← D(aux)
By the statistical Set-Sim property of S, ²1 = ∆[(1
λ,Λ, s), (1λ,Λ, s′)] is
negligible. Thus |Pr[T5] − Pr[T4]| ≤ ²1(λ) by Lemma 1.2.1. Note that be-
cause we are relying on a perfect witness extractor, we cannot assume the
algorithm is polynomial time, so computational Set-Sim would not suffice for
this transition.
Game 6: We compute the public key using KeyGen once more:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(Λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Cnd ← C
Parse C as (xnd , χ)
if there exists w such that (xnd , w) ∈ R then
wnd ← w
if (xnd , wnd) 6∈ R then
return ⊥
pi ← Public(s, xnd , wnd)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
b← D(aux)
By assumption that s is uniformly distributed on SΛ, the distribution of
pk is unchanged, so Pr[T6] = Pr[T5]
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Game 7: We use Private instead of Public to answer decryption queries:
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
stateA∗ ← ε
Run aux← ADecrypt,Randomness(Λ, pk)
if A queries Randomness then
nr ← nr + 1
b
R← {0, 1}
Append b to Rlist
return Rlist[nr]
if A queries Decrypt(C) then
nd ← nd + 1
Cnd ← C
Parse pk as (Λ, s)
Parse C as (xnd , χnd)
pi ← Private(sk, xnd)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
b← D(aux)
If xj ∈ L, then there exists wj ∈ W such that (xj, wj) ∈ R by definition,
and this wj is used in Game 7 to answer decryption queries. In particular this
means that Public(s, xj, wj) = Hsk(xj) = Private(sk, xj), so the value returned
by the decryption oracle is unchanged in Game 7.
If xj 6∈ L, then the decrypt oracle will return ⊥ in Game 6. However,
in Game 7, pij = Private(sk, xj) is uniformly distributed on Π by the 1/|Π|-
universal property. By the δ-smoothness of Hash, the ²-rejection security of Σ
and Lemma 1.5.2, Pr[dec(κj, χ) 6= ⊥] ≤ ²(λ) + δ(λ). Since there are at most
qd decryption queries, it follows that
|Pr[T7]− Pr[T6]| ≤ qd(²(λ) + δ(λ)) .
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Finally, we note that Game 7 is exactly ExptPA1+RealKD,A,D (λ). Thus
AdvPA1+KD,A,A∗(λ) = |Pr[T7]− Pr[T0]|
≤ 2²S(λ) + ²r(λ) + qdAdvSWKM,B,B∗ + qd(²(λ) + δ(λ))
is negligible in λ as required.
5.3 Kurosawa-Desmedt is Simulatable
Theorem 5.3.1. Assume that ((XΛ)Λ∈Iλ)λ∈N is a computationally simulatable
family of sets, with simulator fX = (fX , f
−1
X , nX), that the symmetric encryp-
tion scheme Σ is ²-rejection secure for some negligible ², and simulatable with
simulator fΣ = (fΣ, f
−1
Σ , nΣ), that the subset membership problem M is hard,
that Hash is δ-smooth for some negligible δ and that H is (1/|Π|)-universal2.
Then the Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme based on the universal hash
proof system H is simulatable.
Like the proof of PA1 plaintext awareness, the proof that Kurosawa-Desmedt
is simulatable is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, the analogous theorem
for the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. The differences slightly more pro-
nounced in this case though, in particular we must take care to answer de-
cryption queries for ciphertexts of the form (x∗, χ), using the challenge sym-
metric encryption key κ∗, where (x∗, χ∗) is the challenge ciphertext. This
proof also inherits the requirement that H is (1/|Π|)-universal2 from the origi-
nal proof that the Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme is IND-CCA2 secure
[22]. This requirement is needed to ensure the key κ for the DEM component
is distributed uniformly at random.
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Proof. We construct a simulator fKD = (fKD, f
−1
KD, nKD) for the Kurosawa-
Desmedt scheme, where nKD(λ) = nX(λ)+nΣ(λ) for all λ ∈ N, and fKD, f−1KD
are as follows:
function fKD(1
λ, pk, r)
Parse r as r1||r2 where |r1| = nX(λ) and |r2| = nΣ(λ)
x← fX(1λ,Λ, r1)
χ← fΣ(1λ, r2)
return (x, χ)
function f−1KD(1
λ, pk, C)
Parse C as (x, χ)
r1 ← f−1X (1λ,Λ, x)
r2 ← f−1Σ (1λ, χ)
return r1||r2
Since the ciphertext space of KD, CiphSpKD(pk) = XΛ ×CiphSpΣ(λ),
the following required properties hold as a direct consequence of the corre-
sponding properties of fX and fΣ:
• fKD is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input (1λ, pk, r) where
pk is a public key and r ∈ {0, 1}nKD(λ), and outputs an element C ∈
CiphSp(pk), the ciphertext space.
• f−1KD is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input (1λ, pk, C) where
pk is a public key and C ∈ CiphSp(pk), and outputs a string r ∈
{0, 1}nKD(λ).
• For all public keys pk, and for all C ∈ CiphSp(pk), fKD(pk, f−1KD(pk, C)) =
C.
We must now show that for all probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms
A, the Rand-Sim advantage of A against fKD is negligible. Let A be an
arbitrary probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm.
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We will now show thatAdvRand−SimKD,A,fKD(λ) ≤ AdvRand−SimX,B,fX (λ)+AdvRand−SimΣ,C,fΣ (λ)
for some polynomial time adversaries B and C. The proof is structured as a
sequence of games. We let Ti be the event that b
′ = 1 in game i.
Game 0: Let Game 0 be the experiment ExptRand−Sim−0KD,A,fKD (λ). Written out in
full it is as follows:
Λ
R← Iλ
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΣ(λ)
b′ ← A(1λ,Λ, r1||r2)
return b
Note that we have written r1 and r2 separately, but this is simply a change of
notation, since nKD(λ) = nX(λ) + nΣ(λ).
Game 1: Let Game 1 be as follows:
Λ
R← Iλ
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΣ(λ)
r′1 ← f−1X (1λ,Λ, fX(1λ,Λ, r1))
b′ ← A(1λ,Λ, r′1||r2)
return b
We construct an adversary B against the Rand-Sim property of ((XΛ)Λ∈Iλ)λ∈N
as follows:
function B(1λ,Λ, r1)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΣ(λ)
b← A(1λ, pk, r1||r2)
return b
We now see that Game 0 is simply ExptRand−Sim−0X,B,fX (λ) while Game 1 is
ExptRand−Sim−1X,B,fX (λ). Thus
|Pr[T1]− Pr[T0]| = AdvRand−SimX,B,fX (λ) .
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Game 2: Let Game 2 be ExptRand−SimKD,A,fKD(λ). Written in full it is as follows:
Λ
R← Iλ
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΣ(λ)
r′1 ← f−1X (1λ,Λ, fX(1λ,Λ, r1))
r′2 ← f−1Σ (1λ, fΣ(1λ, r2))
b′ ← A(1λ,Λ, r′1||r′2)
return b
We construct an adversary C against the Rand-Sim property of Σ as follows:
function C(1λ, r2)
Λ← ISA(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
r1
R← {0, 1}nΣ(λ)
r′1 ← f−1X (1λ,Λ, fX(1λ,Λ, r1))
b← A(1λ, pk, r′1||r2)
return b
We now see that Game 1 is simply ExptRand−Sim−0Σ,C,fΣ (λ), while Game 2 is
ExptRand−Sim−1Σ,C,fΣ (λ). Thus
|Pr[T2]− Pr[T1]| = AdvRand−SimΣ,C,fΣ (λ) .
Putting it all together we see that
AdvRand−SimKD,A,fKD(λ) = |Pr[T0]− Pr[T2]|
≤ |Pr[T0]− Pr[T1]|+ |Pr[T1]− Pr[T2]|
= AdvRand−SimX,B,fX (λ) +Adv
Rand−Sim
Σ,C,fΣ (λ)
Thus AdvRand−SimKD,A,fKD(λ) is negligible in λ as required.
Finally, we must show that for any PKE-Sim adversary A, the advantage
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AdvPKE−SimKD,A,fKD(λ) is negligible in λ. This proof is based on the proof that
Kurosawa-Desmedt is IND-CCA secure [22]. Let A be an arbitrary adversary
against the PKE-Sim property of KD. Let qd be an upper bound for the
number of decryption queries made by A. We prove that the AdvPKE−SimKD,A,fKD(λ)
is negligible in λ using a sequence of games. Let Ti be the event that A outputs
1 in Game i.
Game 0: Let Game 0 be ExptPKE−Sim−0KD,A,fKD (λ). Written in full, it is as follows:
ExptPKE−Sim−0KD,A,fKD (λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
(x∗, w∗)← SSA(Λ)
pi∗ ← PublicH(pk, x∗, w∗)
κ∗ ← Hash(pi∗)
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
A has access to a decryption oracle Decrypt which takes a ciphertext C as
input and returns Decrypt(sk, C). This oracle is restricted so that A may not
request the decryption of the challenge ciphertext C∗.
Game 1: We modify the challenge ciphertext so that it is generated using
the Private evaluation function for H instead of the Public function. Written
in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
(x∗, w∗)← SSA(Λ)
pi∗ ← PrivateH(sk, x∗)
κ∗ ← Hash(pi∗)
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
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This is a bridging step; Private(sk, x∗) = Hsk(x∗) = Public(pk, x∗, w∗) since
x∗ ∈ L, so the challenge ciphertext in Game 1 is equal to the challenge cipher-
text in game 0. Thus Pr[T1] = Pr[T0].
Game 2: This is a transition based on indistinguishability. We choose x∗ at
random from X \L instead of using the subset sampling algorithm to generate
x∗ ∈ L. Written out in full, it is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
x∗ R← X \ L
pi∗ ← PrivateH(sk, x∗)
κ∗ ← Hash(pi∗)
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
In this game, x is chosen at random from X \ L. We do not assume that
sampling x
R← X \L can be done in polynomial time, since the challenger need
not be efficient.
Let B be the adversary described below:
function B(1λ,Λ, x∗)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
pi∗ ← PrivateH(sk, x∗)
κ∗ ← Hash(pi∗)
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
To respond to a query Decrypt(C), B computes m ← Decrypt(sk, C) and
returns m. If x∗ is chosen at random from L, then B exactly simulates Game
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1, but if x∗ R← X \ L, B exactly simulates Game 2. Thus
Pr[B(1λ,Λ, x∗) = 1 : x∗ R← L] = Pr[T1]
and
Pr[B(1λ,Λ, x∗) = 1 : x∗ R← X \ L] = Pr[T2] ,
so
|Pr[T2]− Pr[T1]| ≤ AdvSMPM,B (λ) .
Game 3: This is a bridging step. We move the generation of κ∗ to the
beginning of the game.
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
x∗ R← X \ L
pi∗ ← PrivateH(sk, x∗)
κ∗ ← Hash(pi∗)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
Since x∗, pi∗ and κ∗ are independent of the view of A, Pr[T3] = Pr[T2].
This step ensures that κ∗ is defined when A1 is run in the next game.
Game 4: We now modify the decryption oracle as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
x∗ R← X \ L
pi∗ ← PrivateH(sk, x∗)
κ∗ ← Hash(pi∗)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
if x = x∗ and χ 6= χ∗ then
return dec(κ∗, χ)
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else
pi ← PrivateH(sk, x)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Respond as in A1
return b′
This is a bridging step, since if x = x∗, then κ∗ = Hash(PrivateH(sk, x∗))
by definition, so the result is the same as in Game 2. Thus Pr[T4] = Pr[T3].
Game 5: We modify the decryption oracle again so that if A submits a
ciphertext C = (x, χ) such that x 6= x∗ and x ∈ X \ L, the decryption oracle
returns ⊥, i.e.
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
x∗ R← X \ L
pi∗ ← PrivateH(sk, x∗)
κ∗ ← Hash(pi∗)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, χ)
if x = x∗ and χ 6= χ∗ then
return dec(κ∗, χ)
else if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pi ← PrivateH(sk, x)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Respond as in A1
173
return b′
Note that the check if x 6∈ L cannot be implemented in polynomial time,
but this is not necessary as the simulator need not be efficient.
Let F5 be the event that a ciphertext is rejected by the decryption oracle
in Game 5 that would not be rejected in Game 4. We will now show that
Pr[F5] is negligible.
Consider the conditional probability space defined by fixing the random
coins of the adversary and the public key pk. This determines the message m
output by A1. In addition, fix the values x∗ and pi∗ used in computing the
challenge ciphertext. Together, this determines the values of κ∗ and χ∗. In
this conditional probability space, all values known to the adversary are fixed,
but k is uniformly distributed on the set {sk ∈ K|α(sk) = pk}.
Now, supposeAmakes a query Decrypt(x, χ). Then by the 1/|Π|-universal2
property of P, for all pi ∈ Π,
Pr[Hsk(x) = pi] ≤ 1/|Π|]
where this probability is taken over the choice of sk subject to the constraints
above. In other words, pi is uniformly distributed on Π. Since Hash is δ smooth,
and Σ is ²-rejection secure, it follows by Lemma 1.5.2 that Pr[dec(κ, χ) 6= ⊥] ≤
²(λ) + δ(λ).
Thus
|Pr[T5]− Pr[T4]| ≤ qd(²(λ) + δ(λ)) .
Game 6: We modify the challenge ciphertext so that it uses pi∗ chosen at
random. Written in full, Game 6 is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
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x∗ R← X \ L
pi∗ R← Π
κ∗ ← Hash(pi∗)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, χ)
if x = x∗ and χ 6= χ∗ then
return dec(κ∗, χ)
else if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pi ← PrivateH(sk, x)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Respond as in A1
return b′
In Game 6, the joint distribution of (sk, x∗, pi∗) is changed, but since A is
not given sk, and the inputs to A and the responses to its queries are functions
of the variables pk, x∗ and pi∗, it suffices to show that the joint distribution
of (pk, x∗, pi∗) is unchanged, by Lemma 1.1.3. Let (pˆk, xˆ∗, pi∗) be an arbitrary
element of S ×X \ L× Π. Then in Game 5,
Pr[Hsk(x
∗) = pi∗ ∧ α(sk) = pˆk ∧ x∗ = xˆ∗]
= Pr[Hsk(x
∗) = pi∗ ∧ α(sk) = pˆk] Pr[x∗ = xˆ∗]
since x∗ is chosen independently. But by the 1/|Π|-universal2 property we see
that this equals
1/|Π|Pr[α(sk) = pˆk] Pr[x∗ = xˆ∗] .
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In particular, this shows that pi∗ is independent of pk and x∗. In Game 6,
x∗, pi∗ and pk are explicitly chosen independently from one another. Thus the
view of A is unchanged in Game 6. So
Pr[T6] = Pr[T5] .
Game 7: We modify the challenge ciphertext so that κ∗ is chosen at random.
Since this leaves pi∗ unused, we remove it from the game. Written in full, Game
7 as is follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
x∗ R← X \ L
κ∗ R← {0, 1}`(λ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, χ)
if x = x∗ and χ 6= χ∗ then
return dec(κ∗, χ)
else if x 6∈ L then
return ⊥
else
pi ← PrivateH(sk, x)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Respond as in A1
return b′
Let κ7
R← {0, 1}`(λ), pi R← Π and κ6 ← Hash(pi). By the δ-smoothness of
Hash, we see that ∆(κ1, κ2) ≤ δ(λ). Note that A does not receive κ∗ at any
point, but it does receive χ∗ which depends on κ∗. We may view the entire
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game as an algorithm which takes κ7 as one of its inputs in Game 7, but
receives instead in κ6 in Game 6. By Lemma 1.2.1, it follows that
|Pr[T7]− Pr[T6]| ≤ δ(λ) .
Game 8: We modify the decryption oracle once more so that it no longer
checks if x ∈ L, i.e. it runs as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
x∗ R← X \ L
κ∗ R← {0, 1}`(λ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, χ)
if x = x∗ and χ 6= χ∗ then
return dec(κ∗, χ)
else
pi ← PrivateH(sk, x)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Respond as in A1
return b′
This means it is computable in polynomial time once more. By the same
logic as in Game 4,
|Pr[T8]− Pr[T7]| ≤ qd(²(λ) + δ(λ)) .
Game 9: We modify the challenge ciphertext so that it chooses x∗ at random
from the whole of X instead of X \ L, i.e:
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(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
x∗ R← X
κ∗ R← {0, 1}`(λ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, χ)
if x = x∗ and χ 6= χ∗ then
return dec(κ∗, χ)
else
pi ← PrivateH(sk, x)
κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Respond as in A1
return b′
Let C be the algorithm which is identical to Game 9, except that it takes
an element x∗ as an input instead of choosing x∗ for itself, in the same manner
as the algorithm B described in Game 2.
By Lemma 3.1.8 and Lemma 1.2.1 this implies that
|Pr[T9]− Pr[T8]| ≤ |L||X|Adv
SMP
M,C (λ) .
Game 10: We must return the decryption oracle to its original state. Writ-
ten out in full, the game is as follows:
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
x∗ R← X
κ∗ R← {0, 1}`(λ)
Run (m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
if A1 queries Decrypt(C) then
Parse C as (x, χ)
pi ← PrivateH(sk, x)
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κ← Hash(pi)
m← dec(κ, χ)
return m
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
Run b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
if A2 queries Decrypt(C) then
Respond as in A1
return b′
Since κ∗ is randomly chosen, any ciphertext of the form (x∗, χ) will decrypt
to ⊥ with probability 1− ²(λ) by the ²-rejection property of the DEM.
Hence,
|Pr[T10]− Pr[T9]| ≤ qd²(λ) .
Game 11: We choose x∗ using the simulation function fX :
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
x∗ ← fX(1λ,Λ, r1)
κ∗ R← {0, 1}`(λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
We construct an adversary D against the Set-Sim property of (XΛ) as
follows:
function D(1λ,Λ, x)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
x∗ ← x
χ∗ ← enc(κ∗,m)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
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If D is given x R← XΛ as input, then it exactly simulates Game 10, while if
it is given x← fX(1λ,Λ, r1) as input, it exactly simulates Game 11. Thus
|Pr[T11]− Pr[T10]| = AdvSet−SimX,D,fX (λ) .
Game 12: We choose χ∗ using the simulation function fΣ
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, state)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
r2
R← {0, 1}nΣ(λ)
x∗ ← fX(1λ,Λ, r1)
χ∗ ← fX(1λ, r2)
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
We construct an adversary E = (E1, E2) against the DEM-Sim property of
Σ as follows:
function E1(1λ)
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(Λ)
(m, stateA)← ADecrypt(sk, · )1 (pk)
stateE ← (pk, sk, stateA)
return (m, stateE)
function E2(1λ, χ, stateE)
Parse stateE as (pk, sk, stateA)
r1
R← {0, 1}nX(λ)
x∗ ← fX(1λ,Λ, r1)
χ∗ ← χ
C∗ ← (x∗, χ∗)
b′ ← ADecrypt(sk, · )2 (C∗, state)
return b′
If E2 is given χ← enc(κ∗,m) as input, then it exactly simulates Game 10,
while if it is given x← fΣ(1λ, r2) as input, it exactly simulates Game 11. Thus
|Pr[T12]− Pr[T11]| = AdvSet−SimX,D,fX (λ) .
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We now see that Game 12 is exactly ExptPKE−SIM−1KD,A,fKD (λ). So
AdvPKE−SimKD,A,fKD(λ) = |Pr[T11]− Pr[T0]| .
Putting it all together, we get
|Pr[T11]− Pr[T0]| ≤ |Pr[T11]− Pr[T10]|+ . . .+ |Pr[T1]− Pr[T0]|
≤ AdvSMPM,B (λ) + qd(²(λ) + δ(λ)) +
qd
|X \ L| + δ(λ) +
qd(²(λ) + δ(λ)) +
|L|
|X|Adv
SMP
M,C (λ) + qd²(λ) +
AdvSet−SimX,D,fX (λ) +Adv
DEM−Sim
X,E,fΣ (λ)
= qd(3²(λ) + 2δ(λ) +
1
|X \ L|) + δ(λ) +
|L|
|X|Adv
SMP
M,B (λ)
+AdvSMPM,C (λ) +Adv
Set−Sim
X,D,fX (λ) +Adv
DEM−Sim
X,E,fΣ (λ)
which is negligible in λ as required.
Finally, we see that the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme is PA1+ plaintext
aware and simulatable, and thus it is PA2 plaintext aware by Theorem 3.1.6.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In chapter 2 we introduced a new definition of plaintext awareness, which we
called 2PA2, which is simpler than the existing PA2 definition. We showed
that any encryption scheme which is PA2 plaintext aware must hide the length
of a message as well as its contents, but that our definition does not have this
limitation. We also showed that for schemes which do hide the length of a
message, our definition is equivalent to the standard PA2 definition. We also
showed that our definition is in some sense close to minimal, because a simpler
definition which omits the plaintext creator entirely, which we called PA2E,
is inadequate because it does not suffice to prove the fundamental theorem of
plaintext awareness.
In chapters 3 we introduced a new computational assumption related to a
subset membership problems, which we called the subset witness knowledge
assumption. This is a generalisation of the DHK assumption. We showed that
for some subset membership problems our new assumption seems comparable
to the DHK assumption, while at least one case, namely the one based on the
quadratic residuosity assumption, it is almost certainly false. In chapters 4
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and 5, we use Dent’s techniques to show that the generalised Cramer-Shoup
and Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption schemes are PA2 plaintext aware, in the
cases where our new assumptions hold.
6.1 Future Work and Open Problems
As noted in Section 2.2, it may be possible to show that a scheme which is
PA2E plaintext aware and LH-IND-CPA secure is LH-IND-RCCA2 secure.
This would give us a nicer notion of plaintext awareness at the expense of a
weaker and less well-known notion of indistinguishability.
Our techniques cannot be used to prove the plaintext awareness of the
quadratic residuosity variants of the Cramer-Shoup and Kurosawa-Desmedt
encryption schemes, because the SWK assumption does not appear to hold
in this case. It would be interesting to prove that this encryption scheme is
actually not plaintext aware, since this will demonstrate the intuitively obvious
claim that plaintext awareness is not necessary to achieve IND-CCA2 security.
Aside from the Cramer-Shoup and Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption schemes,
the only known efficient encryption schemes which are IND-CCA2 secure in
the standard model are based on the CHK construction [8]. It is not yet known
whether these schemes are plaintext aware.
Finally, the long standing open question in plaintext awareness is whether
full PA2 plaintext awareness can be achieved in the standard model without
using extractor assumptions, like the SWK assumption we introduced here.
This question remains open.
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